Modern Korea: The Socialist North, Revolutionary Perspectives in the South, and Unification

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}

MODERN

K 06 tEA

Zhe Socialist North, Kevolutionary
Perspectives in the South, and
Unification

by KIM 'BY0NG SIK

International Publishers

Translated from the Japanese by Takeshi Haga
and edited by Victor Perlo

Copyright © 1970, by

INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHERS CO., INC.
All Rights Reserved

First Edition

First published in Japanese by Miraisha Publishing Co.,
Tokyo, under the title Basic Problems of Modern Korea

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 70-130866
SBN (doth) 7178-0291-4; (paperback) 7178-0292-2
Manufactured in the United States of America

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y/j. i

A'sm PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION

It is indeed a great pleasure for the author to see his book
translated into English and presented to the American reader.

As stated in the Preface to the Japanese Edition, this work
endeavors to explain the basic problems of present-day Korea
in the light of Premier Kim II Sung’s theory and policy, which
for over forty years guided the victorious struggles of the
Korean people. Here the reader will also learn what forces
were responsible for blocking the full independence and self-
determination of Korea, bringing such great distress and un-
happiness to its people.

For the American people, it is important to understand cor-
rectly the present situation in both the North and the South of
Korea, for this is inseparable from their own destiny as a peo-
ple. As we learn from history, a nation that oppresses another
cannot itself be free. In the author’s opinion, if there be any
people in the world today who should feel this truth most
acutely, it is the American people.

The Koreans are a homogeneous people. Throughout their
history they have fought heroically against invaders. But also
(hey have always been a peace-loving people; never in their
history have they threatened or invaded any other country.

It is important to note that during the past hundred years of
modern Korea, imperialist invasion began, at the end of the
I ciidal era, with an American armed ship, the General Sher-
man, in 1866. Since then the only imperialist invaders have
been either the Japanese or American.

These two powers — at times conspiring with each other, and
al other times in conflict— have occupied either the entire
country or part of it, practicing their colonial policies. Should
one seek to discern the difference in their policies, it will be
found that Japanese imperialism once occupied the whole of

5

6

MODERN KOREA

Korea and imposed a Japanese governor-general over it, while
today U.S. imperialism occupies the southern half of the
country and rules through a Korean puppet regime.

In July 1905, during the Russo-Japanese War, Premier
Katsura of Japan made a secret agreement with U.S. Secre-
tary of War Taft, in which Japan recognized American impe-
rialist occupation of the Philippines in return for U.S. recog-
nition of Japanese imperialist designs upon Korea. It was
then that Japan began to plunder Korea, leading to annexa-
tion in 1910. In the process, her imperialist ambitions grew
rapidly until, using Korea as a stepping stone, she occupied
Manchuria, the northeastern region of China, in 1932. From
there, moving South into China, her aim was to occupy the
whole of that country and eventually the whole of Asia under
the slogan of the “Great East-Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.”
Having launched full-scale war in China, in 1937, Japan at-
tacked Pearl Harbor in 1941, plunging the entire Pacific into
war.

After the Second World War, under American aegis, the
ground was laid for the revival of Japanese militarism. Fur-
thermore, great fortunes were amassed by Japanese monopoly
in the supply of materials for the U.S. armed forces during the
Korean and Vietnam wars. This fed the rapid recovery of the
Japanese economy, leading to substantial rearmament and
to the revival of militarism.

As is now well established, the secret Johnson-Sato agree-
ment of January 1965 — a modern version of the Katsura-Taft
secret agreement of 1905 — provided for the negotiations
which led to the conclusion of the pact between the puppet
regime in Seoul and Japan. Through the ROK-Japan treaty,
Japan gained the right of joint exploitation of South Korea
alongside American imperialism, as compensation for her
support of the U.S. aggressive policy in Asia. From this re-
sulted the U.S.-Japan-ROK triple military alliance and the

PREFACE TO AMERICAN EDITION

7

perpendicular joint strategical system, with the United States
at the head.

In November 1969, after the Nixon-Sato talks in Washing-
Ion, a joint communique announced that South Korea, Taiwan
and South Vietnam, as well as “other countries” in the Far
Fast, w’ere of serious concern to the security of Japan. This is
merely an indirect way of indicating Japan's participation in
American aggression in Asia, and at the same time reviving
I he erstwhile dream of the “Great East-Asia Co-prosperity
Sphere.”

Thus, in the past century the historical development of
modern Korea was determined largely by the intrigues and
intervention of U.S. and Japanese imperialisms, and the
Korean people were compelled to fight them. One cannot
understand the problems of modern Korea without knowing
this historical background.

At the same time, it is equally important to know that the
long anti-imperialist struggles of the Korean people, including
(lie socialist victory in the North, were carried out under the
revolutionary leadership of Kim 11 Sung, now Premier of the
I )emocratic People’s Republic of Korea. Inspired by his
revolutionary theory, the Juche idea, during the past four de-
cades the Korean people progressed from the national libera-
lion struggle, to the people’s democratic revolution and to
the socialist revolution. Through various stages of revolution,
| Inal victory has been won, despite the extreme devastation
ol the Korean War, in the foundation of the socialist fatherland
In ihe North and in socialist construction.

In South Korea, where fascistic oppression goes from bad
In worse, revolutionaries and patriots recently organized the
lie volutionary Party for Reunification, and in a proclamation
sel forth their program. It is hoped that the world, and parti-
i 1 1 larly the American people, will understand the significance
ol this new development.

8

MODERN KOREA

The author did his best to explain the problems of modern
Korea, basing himself upon Premier Kim II Sung’s theory. He
can only hope that this will satisfy the reader’s expectations.
If the work serves to clarify some aspect of the situation, the
author will be well satisfied.

In conclusion, the author wishes to express his appreciation
to James S. Allen, president of International Publishers, for
his invaluable advice; to the translator, Takeshi Haga, and to
the English editor, Victor Perlo.

—The Author

June 25, 1970, on the
20th anniversary of the
outbreak of the Korean War

PREFACE TO THE JAPANESE EDITION

This book deals with essential questions concerning pres-
ent-day Korea on the basis of the ideas and theories, the
strategy and tactics, developed by Premier Kim 11 Sung. A
most important source document is Kim II Sung’s report
delivered at the celebration of the 20th Anniversary of the
founding of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Delegates to the celebration from abroad regarded this
report as a valuable contribution to the theory of socialism,
pertinent to the international communist movement generally.

In the report, Kim 11 Sung:

(1) Analyzed and summed up the Korean people s struggles
lor the conquest of power, and the successive stages of the
national liberation revolution, democratic revolution, socialist
revolution and socialist construction.

(2) Scientifically clarified theoretical questions of the
I runsitional period and the proletarian dictatorship, and of the
complete and final victory of socialism. His solutions repre-
sented a major, original contribution to Marxist-Leninist
theory.

(3) Elaborated the strategy of anti-imperialist, anti-U.S.
struggle at the present stage, and the basic policy of com-
pleting the revolution in South Korea and of unifying North
und South Korea.

This important report provides a programmatic guide to the
complete victory of the Korean revolution and contributes to
ensuring the victory of the international communist move-
ment and the world revolution. It enriches the treasure-house
of Marxism-Leninism.

9

10

MODERN KOREA

The present volume is in three parts. The first deals with
socialist construction in the Democratic People s Republic of
Korea (DPRK), the second with the revolution in South
Korea and the unification of the entire country, and the third
with the relationship between the Korean revolution and the
world revolutionary struggle.

The period of 20 years since the founding of the DPRK is but
a short moment in the 5, 000-years’ history of our Korean people.
But in these 20 years the Koreans have carried out tremendous
social, economic and cultural transformations that our fore-
fathers were unable to achieve in thousands of years. Formerly
a colonial, semi-feudal society, with a backward agricultural
economy, the northern half of our Republic has developed
into a socialist industrial-agrarian country. This was accom-
plished through difficult socialist construction after the Korean
War (1950-53). Now it is being developed further into an
advanced socialist industrial country through implementation
of the Seven-Year Plan.

Foreign visitors praise North Korea as an example oi a
socialist country useful for all countries and peoples. We
Korean people take boundless pride in having such a splendid

socialist country as our fatherland.

This victory would have been unthinkable without the
correct guidance of Kim 11 Sung, extending over a period of 40
years. Revolution is a complex and difficult undertaking — to
destroy the old and create the new. This requires excellent

leadership, great leadership.

Marxism-Leninism is not a dogma, but a science. Natuia y,
it is not necessarily developed only in a big country. Failure
to develop the science in small countries also, subservience to
developments in big countries, inevitably leads to dogmatism.

Kim II Sung’s revolutionary ideas are based on the concept
of Juche* which rejects subservience and dogmatism. This

*Pronounced chewche.

PREFACE TO JAPANESE EDITION

11

concept embraces the principle of self-reliance in ideology
and in politics, in the economy and in military affairs. It
means to think creatively about all problems ourselves, to
solve them in accord with actual conditions in our own coun-
try, independently with our own strength, and in accord with
our own revolutionary interests.

Through the Juche principle we can apply to Korea the
universal truths of Marxism-Leninism, the experience of other
countries, while opposing subservience and dogmatism. No
people can carry through revolutionary construction success-
fully without giving full play to the spirit of self-reliance, in

this way. .

The masters of the Korean revolution are the workers

Party of Korea and the Korean people. The Korean people
themselves are the decisive factor. Nobody else can carry it
out for us. No revolution can be exported or imported.

If a nation becomes subservient, it will lose independence.
If an individual becomes subservient, he becomes incapable
of making an independent judgment and becomes a useless
person. Historical experience in Korea shows that all those
who were subservient became traitors to the nation. A typical
example of this is the Pak Chung Hi* clique, which has turned
South Korea over to plunder and military occupation by U.S.

imperialism. -

While upholding the line of self-reliance based on the idea
of Juche of Kim II Sung, we consider that this idea must
strengthen proletarian internationalism. For the line of self-
reliance is inseparable from proletarian internationalism.
The two must not be counterposed under any circumstances
or for any reason whatsoever.

Recently, the U.S. imperialists and the Pak Chung Hi clique
have been intensifying new war provocation maneuvers more
and more openly, while the Japanese militarists have been

Mteferred to in the U.S. press as President Park of South Korea.

12

MODERN KOREA

making serious efforts to reinvade South Korea. We cannot
overlook the fact, under these circumstances, that slanderous
attacks are being made on the foreign policy and the indepen-
dent and principled policy of unifying Korea followed by the
Democratic People’s Republic. Thus it is necessary to strength-
en further real friendship between the Korean and Japanese
people.

Already many representatives of various circles oi Japan
have visited the DPRK, and economic and cultural exchanges
between the two countries are developing. At the same time,
studies are being made of the politics, economy and culture of
the DPRK and articles dealing with these questions are fre-
quently published. However, these studies and articles plain-
ly are not sufficient to meet the actual need.

One cannot understand present-day Korea without knowing
the ideas and theories, strategy and tactics, of Premier Kim II
Sung, which are related to the basic questions of Marxism-
Leninism in our era.

The author wishes to draw special attention to Chapter 4
of Part I, which outlines Kim II Sung’s important recent
contribution, “On Some Theoretical Problems of Socialist
Economy.”

The author hopes this book will help readers to understand
the problems of present-day Korea.

April 10, 1969

-The Author

Contents

Preface to the United States Edition 5

Preface to the Japanese Edition 9

PART ONE

Theory and Practice of Socialist Construction
in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

I. FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF
THE DPRK 19

1. Historical Foundations of the DPRK, 20

2. Historical Significance of the DPRK, 26

3. Achievements of the DPRK, 38

II THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND
THE HISTORICAL MISSION OF

DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT 69

I. The Transitional Period, 71

The Complete Victory of Socialism, 91

(1) Superiority of the Socialist System, 91

(2) Requirements for Complete Victory of Socialism, 95
3. Toward World Socialism, 103

III SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 111

I, Essence of the Chongsanri Spirit and Method, 113

The Daean Work System - Management for
Industry, 119

(1) Essence of the Daean System, 120

(2) Superiority of the Daean System, 126

(3) Significance of the Daean System, 131

I. A New System of Agricultural Guidance, 135

13

14

MODERN KOREA

4. Unified and Detailed Planning, 149

5. The Chollima Movement, 154

IV. SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS OF
SOCIALIST ECONOMY 160

1. Problems of Correlation between the Scale of the
Economy and the Rate of Development of
Production, 162

2. Problems of the Means of Production in the Form of
Commodities and the Application of the Law of
Value, 173

3. Problems of the Peasant Market and of its Abolition, 185

PART TWO

Revolution in South Korea and Unification of Korea

I. U.S. IMPERIALISM IN SOUTH KOREA AND

THE PAK CHUNG HI REGIME 193

1. Characteristics of U.S. Imperialist Domination of
South Korea, 194

2. Real Nature of the Pak Chung Hi Regime, 207

II. TASKS AND METHODS OF THE SOUTH

KOREAN REVOLUTION 213

1. Revolutionary Tasks of the South Korean People, 214

2. Forms of Struggle in the South Korean Revolution, 219

III. UNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH 224

1. Basic Policy on Unification, 224

2. Unification and the Korean Revolution, 236

IV. THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN

PEOPLE 241

I . The Course of the Struggle, 241

(1) First Period: From the August 15 Liberation to
Installation of the Puppet Regime, 241

(2) Second Period: From Establishment of the Puppet
Regime to the April 1960 Popular Uprising, 244

CONTENTS

15

(2) Third Period: From the April Popular Uprising to
the Present, 246

2. The Present Struggle and Its Prospects, 252

(1) Workers’ Struggles, 253

(2) Struggles of Peasants, 256

(3) Youth and Students, 257

(4) Urban Struggles, 258

(5) Guerrilla Struggles, 259

3. The United Revolutionary Party of South Korea, 261

PART THREE

The Korean Revolution and the World Revolution

I. KIM IL SUNG ON ACCELERATION OF THE

WORLD REVOLUTION 271

1. The Fight Against U.S. Imperialism, 271

2. The Simultaneous Fight Against Allies of U.S.
Imperialism, 275

II. REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY OF

ANTI-IMPERIALIST, ANTI-U.S. STRUGGLE 281

III. KIM IL SUNG ON ULTIMATE VICTORY OF

WORLD REVOLUTION 290

I , Historical Position of Contemporary Imperialism, 291

2. Theory of the Anti-Imperialist, Anti-U.S. United
Front, 295

REFERENCE NOTES
INDEX

307

313

PART ONE

Theory and Practice
of Socialist Construction
in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea

In the past 50 years, the Korean people have fulfilled suc-
cessfully the tasks of anti- imperialist, national liberation, the
people’s democratic and socialist revolution in the DPRK, and
oilier tasks under the leadership of Kim 11 Sung, and they are
< ontinuing to forge ahead toward the unification of their
l.ilherland and to complete victory of the socialist revolution
lliroughout Korea.

17

CHAPTER I

Founding and Development
of the DPRK

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is the real
fatherland of all the Korean people; the standard bearer of
I heir freedom, independence and happiness; the most power-
Inl weapon for the construction of socialism and communism,
which the Korean people have gained through lengthy, fierce,
i evolutionary struggles. Premier Kim 11 Sung said:

file Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the real fatherland
ol .ill the Korean people, and it has their unreserved support and
love. Our state is completely democratic and stable. It was estab-
h .hed by the people and relies on the united, solid forces of all the
people, based on a worker-peasant alliance which is led by the work-
ing class and which involves broad masses of people in state affairs.

< )iir Republic is a genuine people's state which ensures all strata of
I In* people, including the workers and peasants, not only political
hredom and rights but also material and cultural well-being . 1

In 1950 U.S. imperialism launched its armed aggression
against our young Republic. Our people were victorious in
this bitter and most difficult struggle. Our country dealt a
disastrous blow to U.S. imperialism, shattering the myth of its
invincibility and starting it on the long downhill road to its
nllimate demise.

Immediately after the 1953 armistice ending the Korean
War, the U.S, imperialists arrogantly declared that Korea
would not be able to rise again, even in 100 years. However,
ihe Korean people smashed this prediction by forging ahead

19

20

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

toward socialism and communism, successfully carrying out
historic transformations.

The power of the Republic has eliminated completely all
forms of exploitation and oppression in urban and rural areas,
a centuries-old aspiration of mankind; has developed the great
Chollima* movement, the general line of socialist construction,
and has laid firm foundations for an independent, national
economy.

Today, the DPRK has become a really independent nation
with an advanced socialist system, an independent national
economy and a flowering national culture.

Indeed, these years have been a glorious 20 years of struggle
and victory, of creativity and advance.

1. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE DPRK

The question of power is the fundamental question in the revolu-
tion and the vital question on which depend the victory of the revo-
lution and the success of constructive work [writes Kim II Sung].
The working class can achieve complete class and national liberation
and win in the cause of socialism and communism only when it
takes power firmly into its hands, constantly enhances its functions
and role, and steadily strengthens the dictatorship of the proletariat . 2

As the historical experience of all the revolutionary strug-
gles of the working class of the entire world shows, the pro-
letariat cannot liberate the masses of people from exploitation
and oppression without overthrowing the state power of the
old bourgeoisie and without establishing its own revolu-
tionary power. Only when it has achieved political power can
the working class sweep away all the political, economic and
social foundations of the exploiting classes and build social-
ism and communism.

*The “flying-horse” movement, explained in Part I, Chapter 3, Section 5.

FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK

21

In all exploiting societies, political power has been the most
powerful means and instrument of domination and oppression
by the exploiting classes against the exploited classes. In
capitalist society, the last exploiting society that mankind ex-
periences, bourgeois state power is thus used by the capitalists
lo oppress and suppress the revolutionary struggles of the
working class. Consequently, the question of power is the
fundamental question of revolution and is the life-and-death
question that determines the success or failure of revolution
and the achievement of socialist construction.

That is precisely why all revolutionary struggles of the
working class should be concentrated ultimately on the ques-
tion of power and why the political struggle of the working
class, including armed struggle, is the highest form of class
si niggle. Because the question of the dictatorship of the
proletariat, too, is a question of power, it is the sharpest ques-
tion of principle, on which a Marxist-Leninist can make no
c o nee s s i ons whats oe ver .

Korean Communists, headed by Kim 11 Sung, consistently
have paid close attention to the question of power during the
entire period in which they led the revolution, and they have
lought firmly for its correct solution. To begin with there is
the problem of how to conquer power; then the question of the
appropriate form of exercising power during each stage of the
involution. The problem also arises of how to prepare revolu-
tionary cadres to maintain and exercise power. And, finally,
there* is the question of how to expand and strengthen the
political, economic and social foundations of people’s power.

The DPRK is the great achievement of the Korean Com-
munists and people, through bloody and difficult struggles,
Im the correct solution of the question of power. The entire
10 year history of the Republic may be said to have been the
\ letorious road of struggle for the most correct solutions.

As early as the 1930’s, Kim 11 Sung defined scientifically the
question of power, indicated the Marxist-Leninist line for its

22

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

solution in our country, and personally led the struggles for its
realization. He regarded revolutionary violence as a necessary
ingredient of that struggle. He advanced the line of develop-
ing organized armed struggles with a powerful standing armed
force based on the broad masses of people under the banner of
Marxism-Leninism. Kim 11 Sung said: “Without revolutionary
violence the working class cannot triumph in the struggle to
overthrow the power machine of the exploiting classes and
establish political rule.” 3

When the fascist terror of barbarous, heavily armed Japa-
nese imperialism raged, there was not even the slightest
possibility of legal political activity. Thus the method of
revolutionary violence, of anti-Japanese armed struggle, was
the only correct line for smashing the terror machine, for
wresting power from Japanese imperialism by the Korean
people. As experience has shown, organized violence, that is,
armed struggle in a national liberation war, is the most de-
cisive form of political struggle for national liberation. This is
inevitable in view of the aggressive nature of imperialism.

Counter-revolutionary violence is the essential method of
domination used by the exploiting classes. Human history
teaches us that no ruling class has yet surrendered its power of
its own accord, and that no reactionary class has retired grace-
fully from power without resorting to counter-revolutionary
violence. In fact, imperialists cling more and more desperately
to violent means in order to maintain their rule as their dooms-
day approaches. The imperialists not only oppress their own
people but also launch aggression against other peoples,
mobilize military forces for the purpose of invading and
plundering other countries, and take repressive actions
against any revolutionary advances of oppressed peoples.
Under these conditions, the liberation struggles of an op-
pressed people can never triumph without recourse to revo-
lutionary violence aimed at overthrowing the reactionary
dictatorial machine of imperialists and their collaborators.

IOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK

23

The line of anti-Japanese armed struggle presented by Kim
1 1 Sung followed the Juche principle, in which Marxism-
Leninism was applied creatively to the concrete realities of
our country.

The 15 years of armed struggle by the anti-Japanese guer-
1 1 lias, organized by progressive workers, peasants and patriotic
youth under the direct leadership of Kim 11 Sung, developed
In its highest plane the national liberation struggle of the
Korean people for independence of the fatherland and laid
,i linn foundation for the establishment of people’s power.

In the course of the anti-Japanese armed struggle, Kim II
Sung clearly defined the character and form of the power to
hr established in the future. On the basis of a scientific analy-
sis of national and class contradictions and of social and eco-
nomic conditions, he defined the character of the revolution
r. an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic revolution. As
lm the form of power to be established, he presented the view
that it should be a people’s revolutionary government based
no a united front of broad anti-Japanese forces spearheaded
by the peasant-worker alliance led by the working class.

This perspective for a people’s revolutionary government
was clearly laid down in the 10-point program of the Associa-
lion for the Restoration of the Fatherland, formed on May 5,
I *>36, as the first Marxist-Leninist national united front in the
history of our country. For instance, Article 1 of the 10-point
piogram states: “To mobilize the Korean nation generally and
imlize a broad-based anti-Japanese united front and thereby
lo overthrow predatory Japanese imperialist rule and establish
i genuine people’s government of Korea.” The program also
tressed the need to organize a revolutionary army and de-
llned the political, economic and social tasks to be carried out
In the people’s power.

II specified policies for realizing freedom of speech, press,
iNscmbly and association, equality of the sexes, and other
democratic freedoms and rights.

24

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

The program called for confiscation of land, enterprises,
railways, banks, ships, farms, irrigation and other facilities in
the hands of the Japanese imperialists, and of lands and
properties owned by traitorous, pro-Japanese elements. These
fully reflected the basic demands for land reform and nation-
alization of key industries to be fulfilled in the stage of the
people's democratic revolution.

Further, the program called for an eight-hour working day,
implementation of a democratic system of labor safeguards,
development of national industry, agriculture and commerce —
that is, the construction of an independent national economy —
development of a democratic educational system and national
culture, and various other tasks.

In this way, the 10-point program integrated the task of
national liberation and that of social revolution, thereby
embracing the basic demands of the working class in the stage
of an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic revolution.
During that period there was a view prevalent that revolution-
ary power everywhere had to take the same form as in the
USSR, namely to be exercised through Soviets of workers and
peasants deputies. Advocates of this line ignored the character
of the immediate revolution and wrongly demanded that
socialism be realized at once, starting with liberated guerrilla
bases. They also advocated elimination of all private owner-
ship of land, including that of working peasants as well as
landlords, and the forced establishment of collective cul-
tivation.

This view confused stages of revolutionary struggle and did
serious damage to the revolutionary movement in Korea.
However, Kim II Sung led those who considered it necessary
to strive for establishment of a people's revolutionary govern-
ment based on a broad united front of anti-Japanese forces.
These were spearheaded by the worker-peasant alliance, in
turn led by the working class. The line of a people's revolu-
tionary government was of great significance. It corresponded

FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK

25

(o similar tendencies in the world Communist movement, in
llu* formation of broad anti-imperialist and anti-fascist united
IVonts, and the struggle to create people’s democratic revolu-
I ionary governments by the national liberation forces.

Kim II Sung consciously prepared revolutionary cadres for
establishing people's power in the future, while undergoing
licrce anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare. Thus, the guerrillas
were tempered by the study of Marxism-Leninism and by
practical struggles, and they won the wholehearted confi-
dence of the people by fighting devotedly for the interests of

I he masses. Many revolutionary leaders were trained in Kim

II Sung’s Juche ideas, which were fostered in various revolu-
tionary organizations, including the Association for the Res-
toration of the Fatherland. Successful preparation of these
■ ore leaders enabled them to become effective government
and Party leaders after liberation, and quickly to expand and
strengthen the people's power.

During the anti-Japanese armed struggle valuable experi-
ence was gained for the establishment of people’s power. The
practical struggle proved that people's power could be estab-
lished only through revolutionary violence and that only
people's power can represent the interests of the broad masses
ol people in all walks oflife under the leadership of the work-
ing class.

lixperience in the course of the rigorous anti-Japanese con-
lliet showed that the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance
should be given full play in all areas of people's power; the
i evolutionary line of independence, self-reliance and self-
i Irlonse should be the guide to action so that the people's
power may be strengthened and developed, and its tasks
ul I iciently fulfilled; the leadership should carry out thor-
oughly the mass line, constantly improve its capacity and
methods of action so that people's power may surely main-
liim firm ties with the masses.

In this way, the form of power to be established was clearly

26

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

defined. Revolutionary cadres for establishing people's power
were trained and tempered in the course of the bitter anti-
Japanese armed struggle, organized and developed for the
conquest of power. Rich experience for the operation of
people’s power was gained through management of the
people’s revolutionary government established in the guer-
rilla bases and liberated areas.

As Kim II Sung wrote: “The Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea is a political power which inherited the brilliant
revolutionary traditions of the glorious anti-Japanese armed
struggle waged by the Korean Communists and patriotic
people and is a great revolutionary achievement won by our
people through an arduous struggle against the internal and
external enemies under the leadership of our Party.” 4

2. HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DPRK

The Marxist-Leninist line of people’s power, presented by
Kim II Sung during the anti-Japanese armed struggle, was
realized fully and thoroughly after liberation in the northern
half of the Republic.

The foundation for the establishment of people’s power laid
during the anti-Japanese armed struggle had a decisive effect
on its implementation after liberation in our country and on
strengthening and developing it. It was on this foundation that
the question of power, the most fundamental and difficult
question in a revolution, was correctly solved after liberation
from Japanese imperialism. And people’s power quickly was
strengthened and developed on the basis of that firm foun-
dation.

Under conditions in which the U.S. imperialists were oc-
cupying South Korea and foreign and domestic reactionaries
were herded together there, opposing the founding of a
unified independent state for the Korean people and schem-

I OUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK

27

mg to split the nation, the policy of constructing a powerful
democratic base in the northern half was the correct Marxist-
I icninist political line. Kim 11 Sung explained it as follows:

Under existing circumstances, the tasks confronting the Com-
munists in North Korea were to carry through a democratic revolu-
tion against the remnant forces of imperialism and the feudal forces
mid to build a unified, democratic independent state, by uniting their
i.mks promptly and rallying the broad masses of the people around
themselves. Without energetically furthering the revolution in North
Korea, already liberated, and creating a powerful revolutionary base
there to meet the aggressive policy of the U.S. imperialists, we could
not plan successfully for the country's unification and the all-Korea
\ letory of the revolution. 5

From the moment the U.S. imperialists landed in South
Korea after World War II, Premier Kim II Sung understood
their aggressive nature and foresaw the complexities and
difficulties ahead for the Korean revolution. He started to
« onstruct a powerful base for its victory.

The formation of a broad united front to rally the masses of
people in all walks of life was the first question to be solved
oiler the Liberation. It was on this basis that a really potent
people’s power could be established.*

'In those days, the right opportunists, welcoming the U.S. imperialist aggres-
<»i forces as if they were a liberation army and disregarding the interests of
I lie overwhelming majority of the people, but representing the interests of
I uicllords and capitalists, asserted that a bourgeois republic should be
Intmded. On the other hand, the left opportunists, ignoring the objective law
>1 l he social development of the country, demanded that the power of pro-
!• I. irian dictatorship should be established immediately after the Liberation
I a -.kipping over the stage of democratic revolution.

Subsequent developments show clearly that these assertions reflected a

• uniter-revolutionary desire to divorce workers and broad sections of the
i m nple, beginning with workers and peasants, from the revolution and there-
in In destroy the revolution. These developments also show that the Marxist-
I i ii mist line of establishing people’s power, presented by Kim 11 Sung, was

• In only correct line.

28

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

Thus, early in 1946, a united front was formed of different
parties and groupings, democratic forces of various social
strata. The old machinery of Japanese colonial rule was
smashed thoroughly by mobilizing broad sections of the
masses in the struggle. People’s committees were organized
in all corners of the country, on the basis of which the Pro-
visional People’s Committee of North Korea, apolitical power
of a new type, was founded. This was by nature a people’s
power, relying on the democratic national united front of anti-
imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic forces, based on the
worker-peasant alliance led by the working class. In function,
it was a people’s democratic dictatorship.

Its basic task was to carry out the 10-point program of the
Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland and the 20-
point program presented in March 1946, and to build a strong
democratic revolutionary base in North Korea. The provisional
regime enabled the Korean people completely to wipe out the
old machinery of colonial domination of Japanese imperialism.
It operated as a dictatorship against subservient capitalists,
traitors to the nation, pro-Japanese elements and other re-
actionaries. At the same time it guaranteed complete democ-
racy for the broad masses of people, including national
capitalists. Premier Kim II Sung wrote:

The Party formed a united front with all the political parties, all
groups and democratic forces of all strata, and organized and mobi-
lized the broad masses of people to wipe out, first of all, the old rul-
ing machinery of Japanese imperialism thoroughly and set up state
power of a new type. Thus it solved the question of power, which is
the key issue in revolution. The state power we have set up is
genuine people’s power, based on the worker-peasant alliance led by
the working class and representing the interests of the people of all
strata, and it has become a powerful weapon for revolution and
construction . 6

A series of democratic reforms — beginning with land reform,
nationalization of key industries, rights of labor, equal rights

FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK

29

lor women — which the Provisional People’s Committee of
North Korea carried out successfully, not only eliminated the
economic foundations of landlords, comprador capitalists and
ill I other reactionary classes and opened up a broad road of
social progress, but also consolidated the social and economic
basis of the people’s power. They were decisive in turning
I he northern half of the Republic into a powerful democratic
base of the revolution.

I ,and reform is an urgent question that should be solved in
I lie stage of democratic revolution. It was of special impor-
lauce for Korea, then a backward colonial agricultural country
where the peasantry formed the overwhelming majority of the
population. Only if the land question is solved correctly can
I lie peasantry be liberated from feudal landlord exploitation,

• an the economic base of the reactionary forces, deeply rooted
in the countryside for several centuries, be done away with.

I lms the broad peasant masses can be won to the side of the
i evolution, raising their political enthusiasm, and the bases for
democratizing the political, economic and cultural life of a
« uuntry can be strengthened. The winning of the masses is
(lie vital question that determines the success or failure of the
icvolution, and to win the broad masses of peasants to the side
nl the revolution was of decisive significance at the time.

Above all, the correct solution of the land question makes it
possible to expedite the development of agricultural produc-
II ve forces, which have been stagnant, by freeing them from
Irudal fetters and promoting the rehabilitation and develop-
ment of the national industry and economy in general.

The Provisional People’s Committee defined clearly the
kind of lands to be confiscated, taking fully into consideration
I lie relations of class forces in the countryside, the relations of
Lmdownership and the centuries-old aspirations of peasants
lor land. Land reform was carried out by confiscation and dis-
tribution without compensation.

First, as a result of land reform, feudal landownership, the
.oeial and economic base of the undemocratic reactionary

30

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

forces, was done away with once and for all in the rural vil-
lages of the northern half of the Republic. Peasants, liberated
from bondage, faced a bright future, free to develop agricul-
ture rapidly and improve their living standards.

Second, the land reform changed the countryside in the
northern half of the Republic from a stronghold of reaction
into a stronghold of democracy. The freed peasants became
masters of their lands, a basic force for constructing a pros-
perous, powerful, united, democratic independent state,
together with the working class, the most progressive class
of the country.

Third, the reform was the first complete land reform ever
carried out in the Far East, and has encouraged the liberation
struggles of the oppressed peoples of the East who are fight-
ing against imperialism and domestic feudal forces.

The nationalization of key industries was decisive in wiping
out the political and economic bases of the imperialists and
domestic reactionaries and in promoting the general rehabili-
tation and development of the national economy. While the
imperialists and subservient capitalists control the main
arteries of the economy, they will continue to plunder and
exploit, and a country cannot attain sovereignty and indepen-
dence or economic development. Only when the state has a
firm hold on the basic means of production and has socialized
them can the political and economic bases of the imperialists
and domestic reactionaries be wiped out. Then the country
can develop its national economy, increase the welfare of the
entire people, and lay the foundation for a socialist economy.

The Provisional People’s Committee implemented the Law
on the Nationalization of Important Industries in August 1946.
Under it, all large factories, mines, power stations, railway
transport, telecommunication facilities, banks and commercial
and cultural establishments were made the property of the
Korean people, the only legitimate owners of these facilities.
Further, factories and other enterprises owned by pro-

I OUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK

31

lapanese elements and traitors who had fled with the Japanese
were confiscated without compensation and became the prop-
erly of the people.

It was not for the good of the Korean people that the Japa-
nese imperialists developed industry in Korea. It was to secure
large colonial profits by plundering the rich resources of our
country and by exploiting the Korean people. Moreover, the
lapanese imperialists also utilized many Korean industrial
enterprises for the purpose of supplying military goods for
I lieir aggressive war. The Korean people were forced to lead a
difficult life of extreme hunger and poverty just before Lib-
eration. However, this unjust and humiliating system was
done away with once and for all, and the factories, mines,
power plants, railways, banks and other enterprises became
ihe property of the Korean people, to be used to develop a rich
and powerful fatherland and increase public welfare.

As a result of the nationalization of key industries, the root
causes of social ills basically were removed in the northern
half of the Republic, and socialist relations of production were
created for the first time in Korea. Democratic reforms,
beginning with the Labor Law and the Law on the Equality
of the Sexes, were enforced, putting an end to unlimited ex-
ploitation of the working class and liberating women from
I eudal subordination. Women acquired the same rights as
men in all spheres of social life.

Moreover, the Provisional People’s Committee successfully
,( lived the question of national cadres, particularly important
oi the construction of a new society. Not only did it achieve
encouraging results in the training of national cadres, but it
also prepared a revolutionary armed force to defend the
people’s democratic system from enemy aggression in estab-
lishing the Korean People’s Army on February 8, 1948.

In this way the line of an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal,
democratic revolution presented by Kim II Sung in the days of
anti-Japanese armed struggle was carried out completely in

32

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

the northern half of the Republic, and the Provisional People’s
Committee of North Korea successfully carried out its his-
torical mission.

Radical changes were effected in social, economic and class
relations in the northern half of the Republic, a people’s
democratic system was established and a powerful revolu-
tionary base for an all-Korea victory was founded. In other
words, all colonial and semi-feudal components were re-
moved, and socialist economic relations, based on state and
cooperative economy, came to occupy a leading position in all
areas of the people’s economy, with capitalist relations con-
fined to only small commodity production by private farms
and handicraft enterprises in urban areas and to some com-
merce and small-scale industry. Concerning class relations,
landlords, comprador capitalists, pro-Japanese elements and
traitors were eliminated and working people became the
masters of the country, the leading role of the working class
increased and the worker-peasant alliance was consolidated.
In this way, the balance of forces developed decisively in
favor of the revolution.

These developments showed that transition to the socialist
revolution was on the order of the day and that conditions for it
had been created. With deep insight, Kim 11 Sung programmed
the further development of people’s power for the successful
carrying out of the tasks of the socialist revolution. On Novem-
ber 3, 1946, the first democratic election in the history of
Korea was held in the northern half of the Republic. And the
People’s Committee of North Korea — no longer “Provisional”
— the first proletarian dictatorship in the country, was created
in February 1947 at the people’s assemblies of provinces,
cities and counties of North Korea.

The People’s Committee of North Korea, functioning as the
organ of the dictatorship of the proletariat, carried out tasks
for the transition to socialism and fought for development of
the people’s economic plan. It achieved successful results in

FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK

33

this struggle. The people’s economic plan for the fiscal year
of 1947 was the first economic plan in the history of our coun-
try. When it was made public, waverers and reactionaries
placed obstructions in the way of its implementation. But the
People’s Committee of North Korea organized powerful
workers’ production emulation movements, headed by mem-
bers of the Workers Party in factories, mines and rural com-
munities. The plan was carried out successfully through an
upsurge of labor enthusiasm, dealing a shattering blow to
obstructionists.

This success established firmly the leading position of
socialist economy. By 1947 state-controlled industry ac-
counted for 80.2 per cent and private industry for only 19.8
per cent of industrial output. Mining was completely state-
controlled. Industrial production jumped 70 per cent, and
labor productivity 51 per cent, in fiscal 1947 in comparison
with the previous year.

The following year’s plan was also fulfilled successfully.
These results, combined with democratic reforms, further
expanded and consolidated the social and economic basis of
people’s power and provided the foundations for construction
of a Republic. In addition, a large number of core revolution-
ary cadres were brought up in the course of the fulfillment of
the people’s democratic revolution, and broad sections of the
people were politically awakened.

These positive factors created a firm foundation for a
sovereign, democratic, united, independent state, the Demo-
cratic People’s Republic of Korea, in 1948. Kim 11 Sung wrote
of this step:

On the basis of great socio-economic changes in the northern
sector, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was founded in
September 1948, according to the general will of the entire Korean
people, amidst a nationwide struggle against U.S. imperialists and
their stooges, who had become more pronounced in their colonial
enslavement policy and maneuvers to split our nation. 7

34

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

After liberation from Japanese imperialism a sihmtion

entirely different from that which prevailed in Noith Korea

was created in South Korea. . , , .

U S. imperialism followed a complete colonial enslavement
nolicv as soon as it occupied South Korea on September 8,
1945, and carried out two basic policies for this puipose. ey
suppressed politically all the initiatives of the South Korean
people opposed to the colonial enslavement policy and all
democratic forces. They mobilized and encouraged all the
Reactionary forces willing to help the aggressive policy of
splitting the Korean nation and turning Korea into a colony
iffain Thus people’s committees that had been set up on the
initiative of the people immediately after “n were
ordered disbanded. Reactionaries at home and abioad we
gathered in South Korea, and former agents of Japan became
the stooges of U.S. imperialism and began to oppose the pe
pie. Economically, the U.S. imperialists obstructed the de-
velopment of Korea’s industry and national economy and tol
lowed a policy of subordinating them to the U.S. economy.
They disposed at will of factories and enterprises formerly
owned by Japanese imperialism in the name o entity
assets ” selling them to pro-Japanese elements, hartor ,
greedy businessmen and American entrepreneurs They
even destroyed some outright. Instead rf dtatrib^gte^to
farmers they cooked up a plunderous organ called Shin Ha
p"bh Corporation,* which began to exploit the farmmg
masses more ruthlessly than had the Japanese imperialists.

‘The predecessor of Shin Han Public Corporation was the notorious Toyo

="S2s“9~r.:=

of land rentals in kind were raked in.

IOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK

35

In this way, South Korea was again plunged down the road

10 bankruptcy, misfortune, ruin and subordination. The
policy of aggression and colonial enslavement followed by the
United States necessarily aroused strong anger and anti-
American, national salvation struggles among the South
Korean people.

At the end of World War II Soviet troops, together with
Korean and Chinese patriotic forces, smashed the Japanese

1 1 mies on the continent of Asia. Soviet troops were temporari-
ly in North Korea, while American troops seized control of
South Korea. A Soviet-U.S. Joint Committee was set up to
liieilitate the unification of all Korea under a single demo-

• ratio government. However, the U.S. imperialists sabotaged
l lie meetings of the Joint Committee and moved to set up their
own puppet regime in South Korea, thereby revealing their
intention to perpetuate the division of the country.

This action stimulated and intensified the national salva-
tion struggles of the masses in South Korea. It erupted in a

• harp, violent struggle at the time of the “separate election”
in May 1948, when more than 140 polling stations and a num-
ber ol police stations were destroyed and burned.

lo save Korea from this grave national crisis, Kim 11 Sung
nhmitted the draft Provisional Constitution of Korea for dis-

• ussion by all the people North and South and he proposed
I lm election of an all-Korea supreme legislative assembly
•• n <>ugh a general, direct, equal and secret ballot. At the same
*m* % he called on the political parties and social organizations

• I South Korea to hold a South-North joint conference to
<PI>ose the “separate election” and to discuss ways and means

• •I .living the nation.

In response to this call, such a joint conference was held in
ISongyang on April 20, 1948. At the conference, Kim II
•img reported on the political situation and the tasks for the
unification of the fatherland. On the basis of his report, the
• uilerence adopted a resolution completely exposing the

36

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

fraudulent nature of the planned “separate election and
called on the people to boycott it. The conference, atten e
from right to left irrespective of political persuasions, gave u

supportto Kim II Sung’s report.

Defying the Korean people’s opposition, the United States
forcibly carried out the “separate election,” resorting to fascist
terror and suppression, and it cooked up a puppet regime
consisting of a group of landlords, subservient capitalists and

* On June 29, 1948, a conference of leaders of various political
parties and social organizations of North and South Korea
decided to hold an all-Korea general election on August to
organize a supreme legislative organ, in line with the proposal
of Kim II Sung. Participating in the general election, he
according to this decision, were 99.97 per cent of the total
eligible voters in North Korea and 77.52 per cent in South
Korea, despite ruthless suppression by the United States an
its stooges. As a result of the election, 572 deputies to the
Supreme People’s Assembly were elected from the North an
South The first session of the Supreme People s Assem y,
held in Pyongyang in September 1948, named the country the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, adopted a constitu
tion and established a government of the Republic headed by

Premier Kim 11 Sung. .

The founding of the DPRK was in accord with the unani-
mous desire of all the Korean people to win freedom and
independence for their fatherland. It was an event of historic
significance in the revolutionary struggle of the Korean peo-
ple. It was also a brilliant victory for the Korean people, umtec
firmly around the Workers Party of Korea under the leadership
of Kim II Sung, in their tenacious struggle for a prosperous,
sovereign, independent state.

As a result of the founding of the Republic he Korean
people achieved a homeland, becoming a powerful and digni-
fied people no one would dare to insult, people of a sovereign,

FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK

37

independent state, people who were building their fatherland
on their own, with sovereignty completely in their hands. The
Korean people, under the banner of the Republic, made its
dclmt anew on the stage of history, and the fatherland, which
had been obliterated from the map of the world for a long
lime, took its place shoulder to shoulder with the world’s
countries, large and small, on an equal footing.

As a result of the founding of the Republic, the Korean
people acquired a more powerful weapon with which to
achieve socialism and communism. That weapon is the dic-
tatorship of the proletariat, making it possible for them to
assure the overwhelming superiority of the revolutionary
lorees over the counter-revolutionary forces on a nationwide
' ale, to smash all possible maneuvers of the imperialists and
i dictionaries and to accelerate the revolution and socialist

• oustruction.

Finally, the founding of the Republic gave boundless
>1 length and encouragement to the entire Korean people who,
with their destiny in their hands, had risen in revolutionary
1 1 aggie to create a bright, new life for themselves and to unify
die divided fatherland. At the same time, it increased decisive-
d I lie national pride and confidence of the people, who had
I 'i i mne masters of their own country. Today the South Korean
I>le, encouraged by the victory achieved in revolution and

• instruction in the northern half of the Republic, are develop-

tenacious struggles in defiance of fascist suppression and
" piession to realize national unification under the banner of
dn Republic.

Indeed, the DPRK is the banner of freedom and indepen-

1 for the entire people, the symbol of their victory and

l"iv, and a powerful weapon in the struggle to achieve the
mitl ication of the fatherland and the building of socialism and
•'Nimunism.

38

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

3. ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE DPRK

In the 20 years since its founding, the Republic has tra-
versed a glorious and victorious road under the leadership o
Premier Kim 11 Sung and fulfilled its role as a weapon lor
socialist revolution and construction. It has strengthened
constantly the functions of the dictatorship of the proletary
and carried out revolutionary tasks in all domains, including
political, economic, cultural and military affairs.

The political power of the Republic smashed revolts by the
defeated exploiting classes and secured the leading position of
the state sector in the economic field, while restnc g
capitalist development, fought for the planned development
of the national economy and achieved great results.

On the basis of the plans of 1947 and 1948, the two-year eco-
nomic plan for 1949 and 1950 was adopted. In those days, pre-
parations for a socialist transformation of the relations of
production were set into motion, and substantial results were
achieved in eliminating the colonial distortions of the econ-
omy and laying the foundations for an independent national

e °However, this preparatory work for the transition to social-
ism had to be suspended when U.S. imperialism launched its
predatory armed aggression against the North on ^ June 25,
1950. The hard-fought three-year war for defense of the father
land was the most severe trial for the Republic and the entire

Korean people. r .1

The Workers Party of Korea and the government of the

Republic put everything on a wartime footing in response
,0 Premier Kim II Sung’s eal) "All for Victory in the War, and
organized and mobilized the people for a decisive struggle.
The people fought heroically with patriotic devotion and sell-

FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK

39

sacrifice. The Korean People's Army engaged in fierce
counter-offensives to liberate areas in the southern half, then
in strategic retreat and again in hard-fought battles for re-
newed advance and in defense of positions. In the midst of
intensified enemy air-raids, workers, farmers, youths and
students in the rear concentrated on wartime production,
supported the front, and surmounted all obstacles and dif-
liculties to insure victory.

1 he peoples of the socialist countries, beginning with the
Soviet Union, actively extended material and moral assistance

10 the struggle of the Korean people. The Chinese sent volun-
Iccrs, who shed their blood to help the Korean people in the
war. Together with the socialist countries, all progressive
countries and people of the world denounced the aggression
n| U.S. imperialism and supported the Korean people in their
lust struggle.

In the United States, American Communists and other anti-
imperialists opposed the war, and were persecuted severely
l>y the ruling class. Later, mass opposition to the war spread in
I lie United States, and helped hasten its end.

U.S. imperialism mobilized tremendous quantities of the
liitcst type of combat equipment and materials and resorted to
barbarous methods and means of warfare unprecedented in
military history.* But it suffered an irretrievable defeat for the
In si time in its history at the hands of the Korean people who
•ought heroically, following the strategy and tactics of Kim

11 Sung.

'IS. imperialism mobilized an armed force of two million men on the Korean
•"'•it. including one-third of its army, a large part of its Pacific Fleet, and

• miles of 15 satellite countries. At the same time, it used all modern arms
M *'Pt the atomic bomb. In the three years of the Korean War, the United

• ' lies suffered losses in personnel and military equipment 2.3 times larger
»!• 111 il had suffered in the four years of battles in the Pacific theater in World
Win II.

40

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

The Fatherland Liberation War was a hard-fought anti-
imperialist struggle against the allied forces of international
reaction, headed by U.S. imperialism. It was at the same tune
a sharp class struggle against the enemies of *e People. The
great historic victory of the Korean people m the war was an
epochal event of great historical significance for devetop-
ment not only of the Korean revolution but a so of the worW
revolution. The world anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. struggle

^Thetictory of the Korean people in the Fatherland Libera-
tion War was a victory for Kim 11 Sungs revolutionary ideas
and for his strategy and tactics. The victory demonstrated that
free people who fight for the independence and progress of
their fatherland, under the leadership of a Marxist-Lenims
Party are invincible. It showed also that the decisive factor
ta vi'ctoTvTn war is not the kind of weapons used or technical
superiority but the power of the united people, who are firmly

convinced of the justness of their cause.

The outcome of the war set back U.S imperialism, which
boastfully had declared itself the “mightiest in the world,
shattering the myth of its “world leadership and signaled the
beginning of its decline. Furthermore, it shattered the aggres-
sive designs of U.S. imperialism toward the countries of
socialist camp, safeguarded the eastern outpost of the socialist
camp and contributed to the defense of world peace and

secunty^atheriand Liberation War strengthened decisively
the subjective revolutionary capacity of our country, s
result of severe trials during the war, the people were awak-
ened more and tempered more, and the People s Army de-
veloped into an invincible revolutionary army, well trained
politically, ideologically and in military technique, an
equipped with rich combat experience. At the same time
several hundreds of thousands of revolutionary cadres we
trained in the blazing flames of war. They were to be the
precious foundation for the victory of the revolution.

FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK

41

After the war, the North Korean people were faced with
I he grave task of converting the armistice into a lasting peace,
rebuilding the destroyed economy as soon as possible, im-
proving the impoverished people's living conditions quickly,
•md thereby strengthening the northern half of the Republic,
I Ik* base of the Korean revolution, politically, economically
.md militarily, and converting it into a powerful material
lorce for the unification of the fatherland.

The sixth plenum of the Central Committee of the Korean
Workers Party, called on August 5, 1953 to consider these
pressing tasks of the revolution, decided to promote postwar
lolmbilitation and development of the people's economy in
llnee basic stages, according to a proposal of Kim II Sung.

The first was a preparatory stage for general rehabilitation
•md development of the people's economy, a period of six
months to one year in which preparations and adjustments
were to be made for general rehabilitation of the economy.
In I lie second stage, it was decided to carry out a Three-Year
I Ian for the rehabilitation and development of the people's
• i onomy and to recover prewar levels in all economic
In, inches. In the third stage, a Five-Year Plan would be
worked out to complete the first stage of industrialization in
North Korea and to lay the foundations for socialist indus-
hlulization.

The basic line of postwar economic construction was the
M.irxist-Leninist theory of expanded reproduction applied

suit the requirements and possibilities of economic devel-
opment in the northern half of the Republic. It was a revolu-
llonary line, reflecting the Juche principle of constructing
m independent national economy as soon as possible, in the
pit it of self-reliance.

\ 1 1 essential feature was the priority development of heavy
industry while simultaneously developing light industry and
ijp (culture. Without first developing heavy industry, it is
impossible to develop light industry or agriculture, nor is it
Possible to secure expanded reproduction. Heavy industry

42

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

is the most important base of the economy and is a cential
factor in successfully solving all problems. It is only when
heavy industry is developed that socialist industrialization
can be realized and a firm foundation laid for a powerful, in-
dependent national economy. In other words, heavy industi>
is the material basis for a country’s political and economic
independence. Without it, the economy cannot be inde-
pendent or national and the national defense capability can-
not be built up.

The country had conditions favorable for the development
of heavy industry, despite the limitations of the colonial
economy. In particular, it has vast mineral resources. If
these mineral resources were developed and utilized coi-
rectly, it would be possible to develop a decisive heavy
industry.

The Party’s program was for the country to create its own
heavy industrial base, which would be equipped with new
techniques, developed mainly on the basis of domestic natuial
resources, and would be able to provide domestic manufac-
ture with materials, fuels, power, machinery and equipment
necessary for the people’s economy of the northern half of
the Republic. It would also rely on its own technical cadres.
This was precisely the program for creating an independent,
modern heavy industry, on th e Juchs piinciple.

Further, most important was to develop heavy industry
not for its own sake but in a manner that would serve directly
and most effectively the development of light industry and
agriculture. This would lay the foundation for socialist in-
dustrialization and would supply the clothing, food and
shelter which the people required. When heavy industry
of all types was developed, a powerful base for simultaneously
developing light industry and agriculture would be created.

Moreover, without developing light industry and agricul-
ture, it would be impossible to restore and improve the living
standards of the people, impoverished by wartime destruc-

IOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK

43

lion. Indeed, there was a pressing need to improve the
people’s living conditions as soon as possible.

Industry in North Korea, distorted to satisfy the specific
requirements of Japanese colonialists, included hardly any
light industry. It was difficult to decide under what condi-
tions light industry was to be developed and to settle on its
specific content.

Furthermore, our agriculture was extremely backward, as
might be expected under colonial conditions and, to make
matters worse, it was largely destroyed by the war. Without
developing agriculture, it was impossible to supply raw
materials to light industry, or to improve living conditions.
Kim II Sung wrote of this period:

We suffered from a shortage of able technicians, and we did not
Imve equipment, either. We had to develop light industry at the
mine time as we were rehabilitating heavy industry, under con-
ditions where the economy had been seriously damaged by war.

I here is no precedent for this in the annals of other countries.

II we study the history of the industrial development of other
< mmtries, we will see that in many, heavy industry was developed
I li si, and later light industry was developed, while in other coun-
tues, light industry was developed first, to accumulate funds, and
llirii later heavy industiy was constructed.

However, in our country, if heavy industry only had been de-
i loped, when the people had only the clothes on their backs be-

■ misc of the war and when the towns and countryside had been
ili'vustated, it would have been impossible to provide the people
villi clothing, food and shelter.

I herefore, we had to develop heavy industry and, at the same time,
ll«bl industry and agriculture as well. 8

I'liis was a completely untrodden path, one that had never
I 'li followed even by a socialist country, let alone by a

■ ipltalist country.

As might be expected, anti-Party elements in the Party,
revisionists and dogmatists at home and abroad, made a
'"mini attack on this line, charging that undue importance

44

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

was being given to heavy industry when people are suffer-
ing- machinery does not produce food. They argued, in effec ,
that everything should be channeled into consumer goods,
whatever the future might be, and they opposed the con-
struction of a foundation for an independent national

< C However, the Party and the government turned back these
attacks and resolutely defended Kim II Sung’s program for
postwar economic rehabilitation and development, mobiliz-
ing the people to fight for its fulfillment. In only nine months
alter the armistice the tasks set for the first stage tie pie
paratory stage of general rehabilitation and development ol
the economy- were carried out successfully.

In this short period, several scores of thousands of tempo-
rary houses were built in towns and countryside; rehabili a-
tion and construction in tbe countryside were started. Prices
were lowered and living conditions of the people were be-
ginning to improve. Destroyed cities and factories rose horn
the debris and were restored and repaired. Large ceramic
plants were constructed in all parts of the country and were
preparing for production. A large number of industrial and
agricultural enterprises, beginning with the Kangson Steel
Works, Songjin Steel Works, Sunghori Cement Factory and
Komusan Cement Factory, mines and other enterprises, were
already either partially or wholly in production while many
enterprises in light industry, including Nampo Glass Factory
and Pyongyang Spinning Mill, were being readied lor full-

On the basis of these successes, the Party proposed a Th
Year Plan for the rehabilitation and development of t e
people’s economy for 1954-1956. This was the second stage^
The basic task of the Three-Year Plan was to raise industrial
and agricultural production to their prewar levels, to develop
rapidly every sector of the people’s economy, science cul-
ture and arts and to provide a strong economic foundation
for improving the living standards ol the people.

FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK

45

The Three-Year Plan was intended not only to restore
the war-torn people’s economy. Its main task was to eradicate
every vestige of distortion in the economy inherited from long
colonial rule by Japanese imperialism, and ensure priority
development of heavy industry for the purpose of laying the
foundation for socialist industrialization of the northern half
of the Republic. At the same time, the purpose was also to
rehabilitate and develop light industry and agriculture in
order to stabilize and improve the living conditions of the
people, which had been lowered by the war.

For instance, the Three-Year Plan envisaged a 2.6-fold
Increase in total industrial production in fiscal 1956, the final
year of the plan, as compared with 1953. A 1.3-fold advance
was planned for the production of the means of production,
mid a two-fold increase for the production of consumer goods.
These goals were far in excess of their respective prewar
1949 levels.

In the sphere of agriculture, it was planned during the
1 1 n ee-year period to increase grain output to the level of
1949, when the highest grain production was recorded, to
expand further the mechanization of agriculture, and to lay
• lie foundation for its rapid development.

Concerning the life of the people, the plan proposed that
production of foodstuff and daily necessities in 1956 was to
lie double that of 1949. A five-fold increase in the output of
« olton fabrics and more than a three-fold gain in the manu-
facture of rubber shoes was envisaged for the same period.

The plan called for an increase in labor productivity of
/(i per cent in industry and 74 per cent in construction.

'The workers succeeded in fulfilling these important tasks
ni I wo years and four months, or ahead of schedule, by dis-
playing initiative and good will and by fighting heroically
lor I he fulfillment of the tasks set by the Party.

Total industrial production of state-run and cooperative
■ nlcrprises in 1955 was 2.3 times greater than in 1953 and 56
i 'Ci cent higher than the prewar level. The production of the

46

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

means of production rose 3.1-fold in 1955 oyer 1953 and con-
sumer goods, 1.7-fold. In other words, by the end of January
1955, industrial production of state-run and cooperative
enterprises exceeded the level set for 1956 in the Three-7 eai

In comparison with 1949, by 1955 output of means of pro-
duction was up 51.7 per cent, while output of consumers
goods was up 48.3 per cent. Thus the preferential develop-
ment of heavy industry was carried out, along with the rapi
rebuilding and development of light industry and agriculture.

Concerning heavy industry, production of the machine
building and metal working industry climbed 2.3-fold; oie
extraction, 107 per cent; the metallurgical industry, 109 per
cent, and construction materials manufacturing, • °

All these industries exceeded their prewar levels.

In light industry, output of the spinning and weaving indus-
tries jumped 2.2-fold; paper manufacturing, 106 per cent;
leather and shoemaking, 196 per cent. Production of the food
processing and pharmaceutical manufacturing industries
rose 120 and 260 per cent, respectively, during the plan

Pe in°agriculture, encouraging results were also achieved. In
the two years of 1954 and 1955, 37,700 chongbo * 'of land were
brought under cultivation for the first time, while irrigation
work in South Pyongan province made progress -43 waei
reservoirs and 568 pumping stations were repaired or newly
constructed. Construction work in this respect was expanded

on a larger scale in 1956. As a result, between 1954. and April
1956 the area of irrigated land was increased b> . ,

chongbo through state capital investments and riverem-
bankment construction work to prevent flooding of 100,000
or more chongbo of farmland was completed.

The number of farm machinery leasing stations rose three-

*A chongbo equals a hectare or 2.47 acres.

FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK

47

Ibid between 1953 and 1955, and the number of tractors (in
terms of 15 hp units) climbed 3.9-fold. A large number of
power-driven farm machines, including threshing machines,
were turned out for agriculture.

On the basis of results accomplished during the experi-
mental period 1953-1954, the trend toward agricultural co-
operatives was phased into a mass movement in 1956. Thus,
by the end of February 1956, 14,651 agricultural cooperatives
were organized, comprising 65.2 per cent of total farm house-
holds and accounting for 62.1 per cent of the total land under
cultivation.

The people's material and cultural levels were measurably
improved during the plan period. Thus, national income in
1955 rose to 160 per cent of 1953 and to 111 per cent of the
prewar year 1949. As a result of four postwar reductions in
I he prices of consumer goods, prices in state-run and coopera-
llve stores fell as much as 40 per cent in 1955 as compared
with 1953. Together with this, the wages of industrial and
clerical workers rose 35 per cent on an average during 1955
alone.

Of special importance regarding the fulfillment of the
Iliree-Year Plan was the fact that, during the plan period,
socialist elements were especially developed in all branches
ul the economy and that these elements came to occupy a
ilmninant position, providing a powerful material foundation
lor a socialist transformation of the people's economy.

Thus, in industry, production of state-run and cooperative
industrial enterprises which was 90.7 per cent of total in-
dustrial production in fiscal 1949, rose to 98.3 per cent in
1955. Further, hitherto in agriculture, socialist sectors, in-

• hiding state farms, stock-breeding farms and agricultural
I. ii m machine leasing stations, accounted for only 3.2 per cent

• •I total agricultural production. In 1955, however, these
icctors, together with agricultural cooperatives, took a lead-
ing position in agriculture. In the distribution of commodities,

48

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

the proportion of state-run and cooperative commerce to total
distribution of retail commodities rose from 56.5 to 84.6 per
cent in the same period, with only 15.4 per cent left to private

As a result of successful fulfillment of the Three-Year Plan,
the tasks set for the second stage of postwar economic rehabil-
itation and development -completely erasing the damage
done by the war to all branches of the economy and raising
industrial and agricultural production to their prewar levels -
were fulfilled ahead of schedule. The Korean people became
self-sustaining and able to promote socialist construction
more vigorously. The most difficult postwar rehabilitation
work was thus carried out successfully in a short period -only

three to four years — after the war.

Thus the stage was set for Premier Kim 11 Sung to propose
a long-range Five-Year Plan, the first of its kind in Korean
history, at the Third Congress of the Workers Party of Korea
(April 1956). The basic task of the Five-Year Plan, started in
1957 was to lay the foundations for socialism in oui counti}
and to solve the basic problems of food, clothing and shelter

The most important task in the construction of the basis of
socialism, which was to be implemented during the Five-Year
Plan period, was to complete the socialist transformation of
the relations of production in the towns and countryside and
to establish the socialist system generally. Only through the
socialist transformation of the relations of production and
overall establishment of the socialist system is it possible to
eliminate all the socio-economic sources of exploitation and
oppression, to give full play to the essential superiority ol
the socialist system, to develop rapidly the productive foices
of the country and improve decisively the lives of the people.

In particular, the socialist transformation of agriculture was

the most pressing revolutionary task. It had to be started im-
mediately following the completion of land reform so the
agrarian question finally could be solved by drawing broad

FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK

49

sections of the farming masses onto the road of socialism and
leading them to participate in the construction of socialism
and communism.

The political power of the Republic, relying on the basic
program for the socialist transformation of agriculture, carried
out this difficult and complex task successfully in a short
period of only four to five years. Kim 11 Sung wrote:

In carrying out the socialist transformation of agriculture, we
determined properly the stages and tempo of the development of
agricultural collectivization and the forms and sizes of the collectives
by creatively applying the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism
lo suit the specific conditions of our country, and we strictly ad-
hered to the Leninist voluntary principle and brought the peasants
(o realize the advantages of the cooperative economy through
practical examples and, on this basis, promoted this movement
efficiently. 9

Earlier, as a result of the successful implementation of the
land reform, landlord ownership of land was completely
eliminated, and the land became the property of its tillers.
Thus, agriculture developed at a rapid tempo and the living
conditions of the peasantry improved markedly. Economic
lies between town and countryside, industry and agriculture
were also strengthened, further consolidating the worker-
peasant alliance.

However, although land reform was a far-reaching, revolu-
l ionary transformation of great political and economic sig-
nificance, it alone was not sufficient to solve the agrarian
question finally or to develop agricultural production de-
cisively.

As a result of the land reform, small-scale commodity pro-
duction in the form of private farms became dominant in the
countryside. As is well known, this situation breeds capital-
ism and a bourgeoisie. It goes without saying, however, that
in our country where political power was in the hands of the

50

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

people, led by the working class, the basic means of produc-
tion were concentrated in the state. Even though land reform
had been completely carried out, such a process of class dif-
ferentiation in the country necessarily was greatly restricted.
Whatever the case may be, where private commodity economy
prevailed, it was impossible to improve radically the living
standards of farmers or to eliminate the sources of exploita-
tion and poverty in the countryside.

Further, where there were small-scale, scattered private
farms, it was impossible to develop agricultural production
in a planned way, nor was it possible to achieve expanded
reproduction. This situation necessarily came into conflict
with the large-scale, greatly concentrated, socialist industry,
which had been rebuilt and developed according to the state
plans in the postwar period, and was achieving expanded
reproduction.

It was possible to solve this contradiction only by trans-
forming private farms into socialist cooperatives.

The solution to the agrarian and agricultural question in
the stage of the socialist revolution was to eliminate all
capitalist elements from the countryside, to liberate the
peasantry from all forms of exploitation and oppression once
and for all by transforming private farms into socialist collec-
tive farms and to liberate agricultural productive forces com-
pletely from the fetters of the old relations of production based
on private ownership.

Particularly in the postwar situation, in which the economy
and the lives of the people were seriously destroyed and im-
poverished, was such a solution most pressing. If the contra-
diction between socialist industry and private farms had been
left as it was, not only would the development of agriculture
have been hampered, but also the balance between industry
and agriculture would have been destroyed, and the problem
of foodstuffs would not have been solved.

Accordingly, the sixth plenum of the Central Committee

FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK

51

of the Workers Party of Korea (August 1953) presented the
task of establishing agricultural cooperatives.

Preparations had already been made gradually, even before
the war, for agricultural collectivization. Land reform elimi-
nated landlords, and rich farmers received a shattering blow
when they were forbidden to sell or purchase land, to use
mortgages, or to have their land cultivated by tenant peasants.
At the same time when key industries were nationalized,
material conditions were provided for the socialist transfor-
mation of agriculture. Various forms of cooperative labor on
the farm, including the organization of traditional draught-ox-
joint-use teams and mutual-aid labor teams, which had been
developed and spread during the war, increased the spirit
of mutual assistance and the desire for cooperative manage-
ment among the farmers.

After the armistice, the Party actively supported the policy
of collectivization of agriculture. Relying on poor peasants
who accepted the policy, and on Party activists, a number of
agricultural cooperatives were organized in each county.
These were experimental agricultural cooperatives. In this
stage, the Party and the government extended positive guid-
ance and aid in control and management of agricultural
cooperatives. They supplied chemical fertilizers, agricultural
machinery and building material; loaned foodstuffs and seed;
advanced funds; cut the tax rate in kind, and offered labor
assistance. As a result, agricultural cooperatives were able
gradually to display their superiority, to demonstrate the ad-
vantages of cooperative management in practice.

By 1954 the per unit area yield of crops on cooperative
farms increased by 10 to 50 per cent as compared with that
on private farms, and cash income increased two to seven
limes as well. In addition, powerful organizational and
political activities, developed by the Party among the peas-
ants, led to the participation not only of poor peasants but also
of middle peasants in the cooperative movement, thus making

52

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

it possible for the movement eventually to reach nationwide
development.

A particularly important problem at this stage was to deter-
mine the correct form of cooperative management and inte-
gration of the means of production in keeping with the actual
situation. This was of great significance for involving more
middle peasants in the cooperative movement and in pre-
venting mistakes.

On the basis of a scientific analysis of actual circumstances
in the rural districts and of farmers in the country, Kim II
Sung set forth three forms of cooperative management and
integration of the means of production:

1. Permanent mutual-aid labor units for collective farm
work.

2. A semi-socialist form of distribution, according to
labor and land, with farm management itself carried out
jointly after land integration.

3. A completely socialist setup in which distribution is
made solely according to labor, after land and other basic
means of production are integrated.

The Republic conducted a campaign to enlist the farming
masses in these three forms of cooperative management. In
the course of this campaign, the principle of free choice
always was strictly observed, although the movement was
never allowed to develop spontaneously. In promoting the
cooperative movement, the Republic constantly held fast to
the correct class policy of relying firmly on the poor peasantry
and strengthening its alliance with the middle peasants while,
at the same time, placing restrictions on well-to-do farmers,
instead of expropriating their land, so that they might grad-
ually adapt themselves to actual conditions.

An important factor was to decide the proper size for agri-
cultural cooperatives. At the outset, they were comparatively
small, one cooperative covering about 40 to 100 farm house-

FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK

53

holds. Under existing circumstances, this size was most
reasonable.

Numerical growth in cooperative farms proceeded parallel
with their qualitative strengthening. Of great significance
in this respect was an intensive course given as a guide by
the Party to the agricultural cooperatives, once or twice a year,
from the beginning of 1955. This concentrated program was
given to several thousand leading members of both central
and local organs at a time. It was of decisive significance in
further consolidating agricultural cooperatives politically
and economically.

State assistance by the working class to the agricultural
cooperatives was also strengthened decisively, as is proven
by the fact that state funds invested in agriculture after the
war amounted to the huge sum of 12 billion won* This ac-
corded with principles expressed by Lenin at a corresponding
period of the development of socialism in the USSR: “A
social system emerges only if it has the financial backing of
a definite class. ... At present we have to realize that the
cooperative system is the social system to which we must
now give more than ordinary assistance. . .” 10

By 1956 more than half of all farms were members of cooper-
atives, and their superiority’ was manifest. Thus the Workers
Party of Korea at its Third Congress, April 1956, set the task
of completing agricultural collectivization during the first
Five-Year Plan. The task was accomplished, in fact, by August
1958.

This was a great revolutionary gain and was a brilliant vic-
tory for the agrarian policy of the Party. As a result, our farm
villages were able to do away with the social and economic
sources of all forms of exploitation and oppression, as well as
of poverty. All the peasants became socialist worker-farmers
and the farm villages in the northern half of the Republic

•About $5 billion at the rate of $0,403 for the North Korean t von.

54

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

became advanced socialist farm villages. Further, this victory
completely freed the agricultural productive forces from all
the fetters of the old relations of production, thus paving the
way for unlimited development of agricultural productive
forces. On the new socialist basis, the worker-peasant alliance
was consolidated further, which contributed toward strength-
ening the political and economic foundations of the people s
power.

Thus, North Korea’s most important task in the stage ot
socialist revolution, the socialist transformation of the rela-
tions of production in the rural areas, was carried out success-
fully in the short period of four to five years after the war.

It is by no means an easy task to convert private agricultural
farms, comprising several million peasants, into socialist
farms, on the basis of their free choice, and in such a shoit
span of time. It could only be achieved through fierce class
struggle.

Vacillating elements opposed the program, pleading it was
“premature.” This was expressed in their questions: “What is
the reason for collectivization now when North and South
still remain divided?” and, * Is collectivization really possible
when there are no farm machines available?” In the course of
the program, also, some objectionable actions were observed,
such as a tendency to concentrate efforts solely on increasing
the number of cooperatives and on organizing cooperatives
too high in level or too large in scale.

The Party maintained that, even where the material and
technical foundations of farm villages are weak and where the
agricultural productive forces have not yet reached a suffi-
ciently high level of development, socialist transformation of
production relations in rural districts is unavoidable when
farmers demand it and when it accords with the objective
laws of the development of the revolution, and that, in such
a case, it must be pushed forward resolutely.

Moreover, the Party adhered strictly to the Leninist pnnci-

FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK

55

pie of voluntary cooperative formation so that the farmers
should be convinced of the superiority of cooperative farms
through actual examples, and the program should be promoted
on the basis of their conviction. Particularly, the voluntary
principle was applied not only to middle peasants, but also to
all other classes in the farm villages, including even well-
to-do farmers. In other words, the Party adopted the policy
of gradually remolding well-to-do farmers in the process of
the collectivization movement, though it placed strict re-
strictions on their acts of exploitation. Since the drive for
agricultural cooperatives was accompanied by fierce class
struggles, the Party was always faithful to the Marxist-Leninist
class policy of depending on the poor peasants, of strengthen-
ing their alliance with middle peasants, and of restricting and
gradually remolding big farmers.

Along with agricultural collectivization, the conversion of
urban handicrafts and capitalist commerce and industry into
socialist forms is an important component of the socialist
revolution.

During the period of Japanese colonial rule, the important
sectors of the economy were under the complete control of
Japanese monopoly capital and the role of Korean national
capital was insignificant, since very strict restrictions were
placed upon its development.

Even after the liberation of Korea, capitalist commerce and
industry, which were weak from the very outset, played an
even less important part because of the successful nationaliza-
lion of key industries, which assumed a leading position in the
people’s state-managed socialist sector. Further, owing to war
damage, capitalist commerce and industry suffered so severe a
decline that it was almost impossible to tell them from handi-
craft in scale of operations.

Under these circumstances, the conversion of capitalist
commerce and industry to socialist forms became urgent in
the postwar period. The Republic adopted a policy of enlisting

56

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

people engaged in capitalist commerce and industry in various
forms of cooperative enterprises in conformity with their
actual conditions and, by so doing, succeeded in giadually
orienting them to socialism. In this way, they were able to
make a clean break with their past, when they had not earned
their livelihoods with their own labor but with others labor,
and to become socialist workers, producing material wealth
through their own labor.

Thus, in the northern half of the Republic, the socialist
transformation of the relations of production, in both the rural
and urban communities, was completed by August 1958, and
socialism was firmly established in cities and villages. This
was an event of truly great historical significance in the de-
velopment of the Korean revolution. As Kim 11 Sung wrote.

As a result of the socialist transformation of private handicrafts and
capitalist trade and industry, as well as the completion of agricultural
collectivization, the socialist forms of economy came to hold undivid-
ed sway in our towns and countryside. This opened a wide avenue
for the rapid development of the country s productive forces and
made it possible to liquidate the sources of exploitation and poverty
which had existed for thousands of years and to improve the material
and cultural standards of the people markedly. 11

The basic task for socialist construction during the period of
the Five-Year Plan was to lay the foundation for socialist
industrialization and build a base for the development of an
independent national economy. As a result of its successful
fulfillment, North Korea advanced from the period of rehabili-
tation into a period of technical innovation.

The Five-Year Plan was devised as the first stage of this
technical innovation. It aimed at further consolidating the
foundations for an independent national economy by laying
the bases for socialist industrialization during the plan peiiod
and by creating the facilities for equipping all sectois of the
economy with up-to-date technology, dhe Plan also aimed at
solving the food, clothing and housing problems, the basic

FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK

57

problems of the people's existence, during the five-year period
and to this end concentrated on grain production, textile
industries and housing construction. In short, the task of the
Five-Year Plan in the realm of socialist construction was to
achieve a rationally coordinated, balanced solution to the
problems of economic construction and people's living
conditions.

Building the foundations for socialist industrialization
meant wiping out completely the colonial distortions of indus-
try and constructing an independent and modern socialist
industry. It meant converting the northern half of the Repub-
lic from a backward agricultural country into a socialist in-
dustrial-agricultural state by overcoming the backwardness of
agriculture and building a self-reliant and independent
economy. This was the main thrust of the Five-Year Plan
looking toward future socialist construction.

Kim II Sung said: “By the construction of a self-reliant and
independent economy is meant the building of a country
where we can meet all our needs ourselves and can live a
decent life, that is, a country of self-sufficiency." 12

In the course of implementing the Five-Year Plan, the
Workers Party of Korea and the people were again confronted
by new difficulties and trials.

During the period between 1956 and 1957, when the Five-
Year Plan was in its initial stage, differences appeared within
the international communist movement and, availing them-
selves of this opportunity, the world's imperialists and re-
actionaries evolved large-scale anti-communist campaigns.
Keeping pace with these international movements, the U.S.
imperialists occupying South Korea and their South Korean
stooges greatly intensified their reactionary offensive against
I he northern half of the Republic. At the same time, within
l lie Party itself, anti-party revisionist elements conspired with
external forces, exploiting this complicated situation, and
made a frontal challenge to the Party.

58

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

There were also many problems hampering economic
construction, such as insufficient materials or funds to accom-
plish the gigantic Five-Year Plan. People’s lives were hard.
To cope with this complex and difficult situation at home and
abroad, the Party urged all to work and fulfill successfully the
Five-Year Plan. Premier Kim 11 Sung wrote: "We could rely
only on our Party members and our people. The Party decided
to surmount the difficulties and trials by placing confidence
in Party members and the masses of the people and by mobi-
lizing their efforts.' ” 13

At the December 1956 plenum of the Party’s Central Com-
mittee, the tasks to be accomplished during the first year of
the Five-Year Plan and the methods of fulfilling them were
discussed and decided. The Party adopted the line of advanc-
ing the revolution and construction, frustrating all attacks by
enemies within and without, by relying upon the revolution-
ary zeal of the people and by inspiring them to bring about a
great upsurge in socialist construction.

After the plenum, members of the Political Committee of
the Party Central Committee, as well as other leaders, toured
difficult factories and farm villages to acquaint the working
people with the problems facing the Party and to inspire them
to surmount all difficulties and trials.

In response to the Party appeal, the North Korean workers
strongly supported the Party Central Committee and success-
fully introduced great innovations on all fronts of socialist
construction. They found hidden resources to overcome short-
ages and smashed old records and norms. Thus industrial
production recorded an annual growth rate of 40 to 50 per cent,
and in agriculture a rich harvest was reaped. Both towns and
rural communities changed in appearance for the better day
by day and the people’s living standard also improved rapidly.

It was during this great upsurge in socialist construction
that the historic Chollima (Flying Horse) movement was
initiated. This movement was adopted by the Workers Party

FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK

59

of Korea as its general line for socialist construction. And in
this way, the tasks of the Five-Year Plan were overfulfilled
ahead of schedule: the plan to increase total industrial pro-
duction 2.6 times was fulfilled in only two and a half years,
and that to raise production indices of important industrial
products was fulfilled as a whole or overfulfilled in four years.

As a result, gross industrial production in the Republic rose
3.5 times during the four years from 1957 to 1960, inclusive,
with the output of the means of production climbing 3.6 times
and that of consumer goods 3.3 times. Thus, in spite of the
serious war damage, industrial output of the Republic rose
as much as 7.6 times over the prewar year of 1949.

In the industrial sector during this period, material and
technical foundations were laid for developing the backward
colonial industry, completely destroyed by the war, into an
independent and modern industry in a short time and, by
achieving this, for equipping all sectors of the people’s econo-
my with up-to-date technology and thereby further improving
the people’s living standards.

Good results were also obtained in agriculture. The funda-
mental task of the Five-Year Plan for agriculture was to
strengthen the material and technical basis of agriculture and
rapidly to increase agricultural production.

Following the completion of agricultural collectivization,
(he Party immediately got started on the technical innovation
of agriculture — irrigation, electrification and mechanization.

By the end of 1960, the problem of irrigation, which was of
primary importance, basically was solved. Further, during
this period, electricity was supplied to 92.1 per cent of the ri
(smallest administrative unit) in rural communities through-
out the country, or to 62 per cent of the total number of farm
households, and electric power came to be used extensively,
not only for lighting but also as motive power for various
operations, such as pumping water, threshing and feed proc-
essing. Mechanization, considered to be the most difficult

60

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

task in the technical innovation of agriculture, also made re-
markable progress. Compared to 1956, the number of factories
producing farm machinery approximately doubled in 1960.
Also during this period, the total number of tractois in use
increased 4.2 times (in terms of 15 h.p. units) and the area
cultivated by them jumped 10 times. Thus, the level of mech-
anization in agriculture was raised substantially. As a lesult,
grain output reached a high of 3.8 million tons, 32 per cent
more than in 1956.

Agriculture in the Republic became socialist and made
significant progress toward laying the material and technical
foundations for an advanced socialist agriculture.

A marked improvement was also witnessed in the material
and cultural aspects of the people’s lives. The task of solving
basically the food, clothing and housing problems was ful-
filled successfully. In 1960, national income increased 2.1
times over 1956, and the wages of industrial and office woik-
ers showed a 2.1-fold advance during the same period. Kim
II Sung wrote on this:

Thanks to the successful fulfillment of the postwar Three-Year
Plan, our country went over from the period of rehabilitation to the
period of technical reconstruction. Our Party and the Government
of the Republic defined the Five-Year Plan as the first stage in the
technical reconstruction and set the task of laying the basis of
socialist industrialization in this period to solidify more firmly the
foundations of an independent national economy and create condi-
tions for equipping all branches of our people's economy with
modern technique in the future . 14

At its Fourth Congress (September 1961), the Workers
Party of Korea summed up the results achieved by the fulfill-
ment of the Five-Year Plan and adopted a long-range Seven-
Year Plan for promoting socialist construction. The Seven-Year
Plan called for equipping all branches of the people’s econ-
omy with up-to-date technology by realizing socialist in-
dustrialization, for radically improving the people’s living

FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK

61

conditions and culture and for achieving socialism. The ful-
fillment of all these tasks would convert Korea into a socialist
state with modern industry and an advanced agriculture.
This was the aim of the Seven-Year Plan.

Thus, it can be said that the Seven-Year Plan was a stage in
the overall technical revolution.

Technical revolution [said Kim II Sung] is a momentous evolu-
tionary task which will relieve our people, now free from exploitation,
of arduous labor, enable them to produce more material wealth while
working with ease, and ensure them a more bountiful and cultured
life. Accomplishment of the technical revolution will solve the most
important problem for the ultimate victory of a new social system in
our country, which inherited centuries-old backward productive
forces . 15

To accomplish an all-round technical revolution in the
northern part of the Republic was of particularly great sig-
nificance. Because of the long colonial rule by Japanese
imperialism, Korea was unable to carry out an industrial
revolution and to go through the stage of capitalist develop-
ment in a normal way. Consequently, it had inherited back-
ward productive forces from the old society.

If this were not the case, if Korea were an advanced capital-
ist country, the technical revolution would not have been so
important for the building of socialism. In an advanced
capitalist country, people produce a great deal of social
wealth as a result of having achieved industrialization through
an industrial revolution. Machinery and techniques have been
developed considerably, and the question of technical
revolution is comparatively simple to solve if the working
class were to win state power and socialize the means of
production.

However, in a backward agricultural country like Korea,
which did not follow a normal course of capitalist develop-
ment, the question of technical revolution is extremely impor-
tant and very difficult to solve, even after the seizure of state

62

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

power by the working class and socialization of the means
of production. Carrying out a technical revolution and training
as many technicians as possible, after all, boils down to a
single objective -completely wiping out the backwardness
inherited from the old society and converting Korea in a short
period of time into a rich, advanced and strong industiial
state.

The successful completion of a technical revolution pre-
supposes the achievement of a cultural revolution. In other
words, unless the ranks of scientific and technical cadres are
expanded greatly and unless all the working people are
equipped with knowledge and skill sufficient for the effective
operation of modern machinery, a technical revolution cannot
be carried out successfully. Thus there is a close relationship
between a technical revolution and a cultural revolution and
therefore it was decreed in the Seven-Year Plan that these
two revolutions be carried out simultaneously.

In order to fulfill the long-range tasks of the Seven-Year
Plan successfully, the Party constantly reiterated the need to
adhere to the basic line for postwar economic construction
the preferential development of heavy industry, while at the
same time developing light industry and agriculture in order
to achieve all-round scientific and cultural development.

The entire working people of the Republic struggled to
accomplish the program put forward by the Party in the Seven-
Year Plan. However, for several years following the Caribbean
crisis in October 1962, U.S. imperialists’ aggressive machina-
tions became much more open and the internal and external
situation of the Republic also became extremely tense.

In order to meet this situation. Premier Kim II Sung, at the
fifth plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee held at
the end of 1962, proposed to push forward economic construc-
tion parallel with a defense buildup. On the basis of this line,
the Party and the government hammered out a series of im-
portant measures aimed at reorganizing economic construc-

FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK

63

lion generally and at decisively strengthening defense capac-
ity as well. Kim II Sung pointed out:

What is most important for our revolutionary struggle and con-
struction is to reorganize the work of socialist construction in general
in keeping with the actual situation and to accelerate both economic
construction and defense buildup, in parallel, so that our defense
capabilities may be increased further to cope with the aggressive
maneuvers of the enemy. This is the basic strategic line which our
Party has already been implementing for several years in accordance
with the change in the situation. It is necessary for us in the future,
too, to adhere firmly to this policy of the Workers' Party and develop
our work accordingly . 16

The problem of how to combine economic construction
with defense buildup is fundamental, having direct bearing
upon success or failure in building socialism and communism
in a country. The problem is based on the objective fact that,
while imperialism still exists, the proletariat after gaining
state power has to carry out the revolution and construction
under conditions of encirclement by international capitalism.

Under these circumstances, it is inevitable that imperialism
should resort to all forms of aggression, direct or indirect, as
well as to various subversive activities. Therefore, after gain-
ing state power, the proletariat must concentrate its efforts on
building up powerful defense capabilities to defend its gains
against imperialist aggression and subversive machinations,
while energetically promoting economic construction to im-
prove material and cultural standards.

It is important to guard against possible deviation either to
economic construction or to defense buildup, correctly to
combine the two. It is an ultra-leftist deviation to emphasize
only defense buildup without economic construction on the
grounds that should war break out, everything will be de-
stroyed. And it is a right-wing revisionist deviation to over-
emphasize economic construction, on the presumption of
peace, without boosting defense capability to a sufficient

64

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

level. A correct combination of economic construction and
defense buildup is a necessary requirement of Marxism-
Leninism.

The parallel promotion of economic and defense construc-
tion required that the long-range tasks of the Seven-Year Plan
he carried out completely and that the quality of production
and construction be improved decisively in all fields thiough
effective utilization of the existing economic foundations. The
Plan called for strengthening the national defense capability
to provide an impregnable fortress and for all necessary
arrangements to cope with any surprise attack by the U.S.
imperialists and their underlings. For this purpose, the line
decreed that the military plan of the Party fully be carried out
— the line of arming the People’s Army and the entire people,
politically and ideologically first of all, and turning the
People’s Army into a modernized cadre army, and also of
converting the whole country into a fortress.

Subsequent developments proved the correctness of the
line. Today, North Korea has been converted into an impreg-
nable fortress fully capable of coping with any armed aggres-
sion by the U.S. imperialists and their underlings, and a
powerful defense setup, encompassing all the people, has
been completed.

In the field of socialist economic construction, too, the
northern half of the Republic has again entered a period of a
great upsurge. In fiscal 1967, for example, total industiial
output recorded a growth rate of 17 per cent as against the
target figure of 12.8 per cent. Further, the growth rate of in-
dustrial production was set at 24 per cent for fiscal 1968. How-
ever, even according to a preliminary survey, the growth rate
of industrial production in 1968 far exceeded that of 196 / and
is expected to overfulfill the target figure.

In the plan for 1968, the year of decisive significance for
the fulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan, targets for a series of
industries, such as coal, chemical fertilizer, nonferrous metals

FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK

65

and timber, were attained one after another, all ahead of
schedule, and it is expected that all the production targets for
industry will be fulfilled completely by the end of 1969. In
the held of agriculture, grain production increased 16 per
cent in fiscal 1967 over fiscal 1966, and in fiscal 1968 it rose
11 per cent over fiscal 1967.

It is obvious that when fulfilled, the Seven-Year Plan will
be a significant event. Successful fulfillment of the plan will
not only strengthen the socialist system of the Republic, but
will also bring about a great advance in the struggle for the
complete victory of socialism and create favorable conditions
foi the Korean people s struggle for the reunification of their
country. Successful accomplishment of the Seven-Year Plan
will convert Korea into a socialist industrial state.

Let us now review some of the indices showing the principal
results achieved by the government and by the people in the
northern half of the Republic during the 20-odd years of revo-
Jution and construction since the founding of the DPRK.

In the field of socialist economic construction, a strong
foundation has been laid in the sectors of heavy and light
industry resulting in a big leap in industrial production.
2 ind us*ia] Production in 1967 increased 22 times over
1948. Specifically, total output in 1967 of the machine-tool
industry, the core of heavy industry, increased 100 times, and
the share of output of the machine industry in total industrial
production rose from 7.4 per cent to 31.4 per cent. As a result
insofar as machinery and equipment are concerned, Korea has
nearly attained self-sufficiency.

The rapid progress made in heavy industry, particularly in
he machine-tool industry, means that there is a nucleus fora
n m base of a powerful independent national economy. It is a
great victory for the economic policy of the Workers Party of

orea, which constantly has given priority to the development
ot heavy industry.

A powerful light industrial base has also been established

66

THEORY AMD PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

and is being developed rapidly. Today in North Korea all the
people’s consumer goods are domestically made. For the de-
velopment of light industry, the development of local indus-
tries is important. Today, in the northern half of the Republic,
local industries are producing half of the total consumer goods,
thus playing an important role in promoting the general de-
velopment of the economy. Compared with the period right
after the Liberation, when there was hardly any light industry
and when Korea was still unable to produce even very simple
light industrial products, this rapid development of light in-
dustry is of great significance.

In the sphere of agriculture, thanks to the completion ot
collectivization and subsequent technical improvements, the
agricultural productive forces have made striking progress. In
1967, grain production registered a 2.7-fold increase over the
period after the Liberation. As a result, today North Korea not
only has become completely self-sufficient in food but also
has a considerable amount of food in reserve. This means that
even though North Korea’s geographical and natural condi-
tions are inferior to South Korea’s for agricultural production,
these handicaps have largely been overcome.

Thus, during these 20-odd years, the building of a socialist
economy in the northern half of the Republic has made amaz-
ing progress.

In the sectors of education and culture, the nine-year com-
pulsory technical education system took effect in 1967. Today,
one-fourth of the entire population in North Korea, or 2,690,000
persons, are studying at schools of varying levels. Tuition is
completely free. Further, at present the number of engineers,
technicians and specialists working in all sectors ot the peo-
ple’s economy has reached 425,700, representing a 19 °
increase over the period just after the armistice (July 1953). In
this way, in the northern half of the Republic, powerful ranks
of technical cadres have come into being and continuously
are being expanded. This is a great victory for the Party s
policy of concentration on the training of national cadres.

FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK

67

The rapid progress in economic construction has brought
about a decisive improvement in the material and cultural
standards of the people. For example, national income per
capita in 1967 showed a nine-fold increase over 1946, a 4.4-
fold advance over 1949. In 1968, the average amount of dis-
tiibution per farm household increased 14 per cent in grain
and 13 per cent in cash over the previous year. If the following
facts are taken into consideration— complete abolition of tax
payment in kind, establishment of a free medical treatment
system, implementation of the nine-year universal compul-
sory technical education system, and so on — it is clear that
there has been rapid improvement in the material and cultural
standards of the people.

As for results in the field of national defense, these were
shown to the entire world by our victory in the recent Pueblo
incident.* Today, in the northern half of the Republic, an effec-
tive national defense setup has been completed and the whole
country has been converted into a steel-walled fortress. As
was demonstrated by the Pueblo incident, the heroic Korean
People s Army has developed into a strong cadre army, with
modern equipment and military technique.

Thanks to our achievements in all fields of socialist con-
struction, in the field of national defense, in the consistent
stand of the Republic against U.S. and world imperialism and
in its upholding an independent and principled foreign
policy, the embodiment of the Juche idea of Premier Kim 11
Sung— thanks to all these factors the international prestige of
l lie Republic has been heightened as never before. This fact
is eloquently demonstrated by the statements made by many
el the representatives from various foreign governments,
lorcign political parties and social organizations who attended
I lie ceremony held to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the
founding of the Republic.

I In* Pueblo , a U.S. spy ship which had intruded into North Korean waters,
" » s captured with its crew by the armed forces of the DPRK in January 1968.

68

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

All this demonstrates, on the strength of the realities of the
Republic, the correctness of the ideas and theories of Kim 11
Sung on the direction of the revolution and construction, as
well as the correctness of the line and policies of the Workers
Party of Korea under his leadership. Historical experience in
the development of Marxism-Leninism clearly teaches that
the validity of a theory is always tested by the touchstone of
revolutionary practice.

CHAPTER II

The Transitional Period and
the Historical Mission of
Dictatorship of the Proletariat

In his works, particularly in Section 2 of On the Further
Consolidation and Development of the Socialist System in the
/ emocratic People’s Republic of Korea, his report at the 20tli
Anniversary of the DPRK, Premier Kim II Sung made a Marx-
ist-Lenimst analysis of the progress of socialism in the
northern half of the Republic, the present state of the revolu-
tion and construction in socialist countries and other questions,
and on this basis he clarified the most pressing problems of
the world revolution.

To achieve the complete victory of socialism, the working
class must overthrow the bourgeoisie, seize power and estab-
. the dictatorship of the proletariat, making the transition
I mm capitalism to socialism. The dictatorship of the proletar-
iat will be converted into a world system through a series of
socialist revolutions in various countries and through the
expansion and development of the socialist camp on a world
scale. In other words, this is a question of the relation between
I ie transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat,
fundamental to Marxism-Leninism. Such problems are not
only very difficult and complex, but are the most pressing and
practical ones confronting the socialist countries today in
i evolution and construction.

For countries such as Korea, where the working class has
conquered power and established a dictatorship of the pro-

69

70

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

letariat, it is vital to the success of the revolution to work ou
correct theoretical propositions concerning the transitional
period: How to understand the significance and nature of the
transitional period, how to set the various tasks of the transi-
tional period according to its different stages, an 0
analyze inter-relationships between the transitional period
and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Despite the importance of these questions to the revo u ion,
there has been insufficient clarification and various deviations
have been committed, with the result that immeasurable
damage has been done to the practical struggles for socialist
and communist construction. This urgent pro em e ‘
solving correctly, theoretically, the question of the transitional
period and the dictatorship of the proletariat- was accom-
plished by Kim 11 Sung, in detail, on the basis of the revo u
tionarv principles of Marxism-Leninism.

His ideas and theory were developed in his work, On
Questions of the Transitional Period from Capitalism to
Socialism and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. In this wor

lie said:

As with all other scientific and theoretical questions, questions

/J*— p™* 1 »" d diM r h ; p °V ri,

should be solved on the basis of the ]uche idea of our Part*. We
should never try to solve these questions dogmatically by becoming
slaves to the classical propositions on this question, nor should we be
influenced by subservient ideas and follow others in the solution
these questions. 1

In the interpretation of classical propositions it is essential
to understand the historical circumstances and the premise on

which the classical works were based. Only on this basis is
possible to understand the content of

and to grasp their revolutionary meaning. If the historical
“ImstancL are ignored, it will lead inevitably .0 a one
sided and dogmatic interpretation or to a revisions
pretation that seriously distorts the revolutionary content.

THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

71

Specifically, if a classical proposition is applied mechani-
cally to a changed situation, wthout considering the historical
circumstances and theoretical premises related to the proposi-
tion, not only will a fundamental error be committed in the
theoretical solution of the question but a decisive error in
practice will also result. Thus, to solve the problems of the
transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat, it
is necessary to base ourselves firmly on the revolutionary
propositions of Marxism-Leninism and, at the same time, to
uphold the Juche idea of applying them creatively to suit the
constantly changing and developing actual conditions of the
revolution.

1. THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

In the historical process of revolutionary transition from
capitalism to socialism or communism there is inevitably a
certain period of time usually referred to as the transitional
period.

There is no doubt of this, either theoretically or practically.
There is no doubt that the overthrow of the bourgeoisie by the
working class and the seizure of power by the workers does
not mean the immediate and complete realization of social-
ism or communism.

As Kim II Sung explains: “The conquest of power by the
working class is only the beginning of the socialist revolution,
mid in order to build a complete socialist society, it is neces-
sary to work for the revolution continuously and to lay the firm
material foundations for socialism.” 2

To assure the total victory of socialism, the working class
must complete, within a certain historical period of time, a
sm ies of tasks defined by the concrete historical conditions of
nvspective countries as well as by the general revolutionary
principles of Marxism-Leninism.

72

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

What, then, is the most fundamental characteristic of this
transitional period? Premier Kim 11 Sung says: “The historical
process of transition from capitalism to socialism is accom-
panied by sharp class struggles.” 3

It is clear that the transitional period from capitalism to
socialism must combine characteristic features of the two
socio-economic systems. Hence sharp struggles are inevitable
between the newly born socialism and capitalism, which was
defeated but not yet completely eliminated.

The capitalist class is stripped of its political power and
means of exploitation by the first onslaught of the working
class, and it suffers a decisive defeat. But this does not mean
the elimination of the capitalist class as a class. Some of the
socio-economic foundations of the capitalist class and its in-
ternational base still remain, and resistance continues, much
stronger than before. Small-scale commodity production, still
widespread in towns and villages, continues to furnish a
socio-economic foundation for capitalism, and vacillating
peasants and lower middle class people provide an important
potential political foothold that can be used for the revival
of capitalism.

The socialist transformation of the relations of production
in the town and countryside, or the complete victory of the
socialist revolution, smashes this resistance of the capitalist
class and completely does away with its economic base. This
means complete elimination of the capitalist class as a class.

However, we cannot say even after this that capitalism has
been eliminated completely or that socialism has triumphed
completely. Even at this stage, remnants ot capitalism and
hostile elements of the exploiting class still remain, and they
constantly conspire with foreign imperialism to revive
capitalism. Further, as long as old ideas still deeply rooted in
the consciousness of the working masses — individualism and
egotism — remain, it cannot be said that capitalism has been
eliminated completely, since these ideas are ideological
survivals of capitalism.

THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

73

Where there are still distinctions between the town and the
countryside and class distinctions between the workers and
peasants, we cannot say that vacillations among lower middle
class people, including the peasantry, have been overcome
completely. Therefore we cannot say that the proletariat has
completely won over the petty bourgeoisie. Kim II Sung says:

We cannot say that socialism has been strengthened, nor can
we say that socialism has completely triumphed until the petty
bourgeoisie ceases to waver and comes to support us com-
pletely. We can say we have realized socialism completely
only when the petty bourgeoisie has come to support us
positively.” 4

From the standpoint of productive forces, we cannot say
that the establishment of the socialist system is followed
immediately by complete socialist industrialization, apart
Irom what may occur in some developed capitalist countries.
A certain period of time is still needed to develop productive
loices to the high level required for socialism.

In the final analysis, we cannot say that socialism has tri-
umphed completely over capitalism even where the socialist
revolution has completely triumphed and the socialist system
has absolute power. Even in this stage, struggles between
socialism and capitalism continue.

The entire historical period of transition from capitalism to
socialism is one of sharp struggles between socialism and
capitalism, a period of class struggle in its sharpest form. This
is the fundamental characteristic and, consequently, the
important content of the transitional period. As Kim 11 Sung
states: ‘ Struggle between the new and the old, between prog-
ress and conservatism, between positive and negative, be-
tween collectivism and individualism, and, in general,’ be-
tween socialism and capitalism -these are the content of the
revolutionary struggle we wage.” 5

Other questions, too, concerned with the transitional period
■md the dictatorship of the proletariat, can be solved correctly
on the principles of Marxism-Leninism only when the essen-

74

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

tial content of the transitional period and its basic character-
istics are understood from the standpoint of class struggle and
uninterrupted revolution.

The focal question of where the transitional period ends
naturally should be approached from this standpoint. If the
basic characteristic of this period is sharp class struggle
between emerging socialism and moribund capitalism, the
most important task in the transitional period should be not
merely the defeat of capitalism but its elimination, that is, the
end of capitalism in all domains -politics, economy, culture
and ideology— and the complete victory of socialism. It is
clear that the period of transition ends when this task has

been carried out successfully. .

When we say “complete victory of socialism, what do we
mean? What will be the content of such a society? A complete
socialist society should include all sectors: politics, economy,
culture and ideology, as well as productive forces, relations of
production, the base and the superstructure.

However, the decisive index encompassing all elements
and the only index is “elimination of classes,” or the realiza-
tion of a classless society. To achieve a classless society, it is
necessary not only to defeat the exploiting classes, expropriate
their property, and abolish them as a class, but also to abolish
private ownership as a whole, eliminate distinctions between
town and countryside, and erase class distinctions between

workers and peasants.

The entire society will have become the working class and
the proletariat will finally have won over all the petty bour-
geoisie only when class distinctions between workers and
peasants have been eliminated and the petty bourgeoisie,
including the peasantry, have been converted into the work-
ing class. Kim 11 Sung states:

The complete victory of socialism will be realized only when
class distinctions between the worker and the peasant have been
eliminated and when the petty-bourgeois strata of people, particular-

THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

75

ly the farming masses, have come to support us positively. Until the
peasantry has been transformed into the working class, their support
for us cannot be firm enough, even when they say they support us,
and vacillations to a certain extent among them will be unavoidable. 6

A complete socialist society is, therefore, one in which
classes have been eliminated completely — that is, a classless
society. However, elimination of classes requires not only the
powerful material basis of socialism, that is, industrialization,
but also presupposes the ideological remolding of all members
of society to the progressive ideas of the working class —
collectivism and communism.

For instance, elimination of class distinctions between
worker and peasant will be possible only when agriculture
has been mechanized, electrified, chemicalized and irrigated,
leading to a rapid development of agricultural productive
forces. Kim II Sung says:

A society — where the hostile classes persist in sinister activities
and the corrosive action of old ideas continues, where there still
remain distinctions between towns and countryside and class dis-
tinctions between the working class and peasantry, where indus-
trialization of the country has not been realized fully and the material
and technical bases of socialism have not been laid firmly — cannot
yet be called a wholly triumphant socialist society. 7

Thus, in referring to a complete socialist society, its overall
scientific content should be defined not only from the stand-
point of production relations, nor of development of produc-
live forces, nor of the superstructure, but from a standpoint
encompassing all these aspects, and especially the realization
of a classless society.

Basically, transition from capitalism to socialism entails
all-round transition from one socio-economic formation to a
new socio-economic formation essentially different in quality.

I he transition should be carried out in all areas of politics,
economy, culture and ideology. Since the transitional period
contains features of both capitalism and socialism, the transi-

76

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

tional period will end when the characteristic features of
socialism are victorious, or at least have attained decisive
superiority over the capitalist system in all sectors. Kim 11
Sung says:

We may say that the tasks to be carried out in the transitional
period from capitalism to socialism have been realized when we have
won the petty-bourgeois strata of people to our side by advancing
socialist construction and when class distinctions between the work-
ing class and the peasantry have been eliminated.

In this way, unlike right and left deviationists, it seems to be
correct for us to set a line of demarcation for the transitional period
at classless society. 8

This applies to all countries. But each country will have
specific tasks to carry out in keeping with its historical
conditions.

For instance, in some capitalist countries, most peasants
have already been converted into agricultural proletarians,
and the productive forces of agriculture are on the same high
level as those of industry, although significant differences in
working conditions remain. In such conditions, it is possible
in a comparatively short transitional period to realize a class-
less society, following the overthrow of the exploiting classes
through a socialist revolution, their expropriation, and trans-
formation of their property to people’s property.

Under such conditions, there is not a great distance separat-
ing the complete victory of the socialist revolution and the
realization of a classless society or the complete victory of
socialism, because the difficult and long-term task of eliminat-
ing class distinctions between workers and peasants is not a
requisite in the transitional period. But, it goes without
saying, in this case, too, it is necessary to liquidate the rem-
nants of the exploiting classes and of the old ideas still remain-
ing in the consciousness of people. Unless this task is fulfilled,
it cannot be said that socialism has triumphed completely or a
classless society has been realized, nor can it be said that the
transitional period has come to its end.

THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

77

The situation is more complex in a backward capitalist
society. Such a country is characterized by the fact that the
peasantry comprises a large majority of the total population
and a peasant economy carries predominant weight in the
national economy. Also, industry is markedly backward.
Under such historical conditions, the tasks to be solved in the
transitional period are naturally more difficult and complex.

In the first place, the working class, which has overthrown
the exploiting classes and expropriated their property, is not in
a position to expropriate the property of the petty bourgeoisie,
including the peasantry. Furthermore, even rich farmers are
excluded from the scope of expropriation, with only restric-
tive measures applied to them.

Consequently, the victorious working class is required to
absorb small-scale commodity production and capitalist
enterprises gradually into large-scale socialist cooperative
(arms and other enterprises through all forms of positive aid
by the dictatorship of the proletariat, on the basis of free
choice and example, and also by determined struggles. In
other words, the working class has a task of unparalleled
difficulty— the transformation of small-scale commodity pro-
duction and capitalist enterprises into large-scale socialist
enterprises, establishing the undivided sway of the socialist
system.

The problem of eliminating class distinctions between
workers and peasants and between town and countryside is
posed for the first time in the transitional period, under the
socialist system.

Theie are other problems during this period: liquidating
remaining segments of the exploiting classes, smashing the
machinations of hostile elements, eliminating the corrosive
action of old ideas and substituting progressive ideas, col-
lectivism and communism, and raising substantially the level
ol the productive forces of agriculture.

Thus the establishment of a socialist system in a backward
capitalist country in the transitional period to socialism, fol-

78

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

lowing the socialist transformation of relations of production,
does not immediately mean the realization of a complete vic-
tory of socialism or of a classless society. It is necessary to
continue the revolution after the establishment of the socialist
system in order to eliminate class distinctions between work-
ers and peasants and distinctions between town and country-
side. Only then can it be said that the transitional period has
come to its end. Consequently, the transitional period of a
backward capitalist country is necessarily longer than that of a
developed capitalist country. Where people have cast off the
colonial yoke of imperialism, the problem is particularly
difficult and complex.

It is an irrefutable law of historical development that a
people who have emerged from imperialist colonial subjuga-
tion must traverse the road of socialism in order to march
toward freedom and happiness, national independence and
prosperity. Kim 11 Sung says: “Historical experience shows
that a people who have gotten rid of the colonial yoke of
imperialism must take the socialist path.” 9

A backward colonial or semicolonial country is character-
ized not only by the dominance of the peasantry and of back-
ward farms in its total economy, but also by the fact that
its industry is colonial in character. Such a country has to
carry out the tasks of the transitional period without having
gone through the normal development of capitalism and with
the backward productive forces of a colonial agricultural
country.

Because of this, the characteristics of its transitional period
are distinct from those of a developed capitalist country 01
even a backward capitalist country. In the first place, the
country has to pass through a preparatory stage before going
into the transitional period to socialism. In other words,
people who have won independence have to crush all lesist-
ance and subversive maneuvers of foreign imperialists and
domestic reactionary forces, shatter the colonial imperialist
agencies of domination and, at the same time, sweep away all

THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

79

the economic footholds of imperialism and domestic reaction,
laying the foundations for an independent national economy
and a progressive social system, a people’s democratic sys-
tem, under the leadership of the working class.

The most important of these tasks in this stage is to over-
throw imperialism and the domestic reactionary forces — land-
lords and capitalists and eliminate their socio-economic
basis. To do this, land reform and nationalization of key in-
dustries are of decisive significance.

When key industries are nationalized, a socialist economic
system will be established which will gradually increase its
leading role in the economy, and all conditions for entering
the period of transition to socialism will have been created.
This preparatory period is known as the stage of the people’s
democi atic Tevolution , and its form of power is called the
dictatorship of people’s democracy. It is led by the working
class and is based on a worker-peasant alliance. In this sense,
it may be said to perform essentially the function of a dicta-
torship of the proletariat, relying on a broad united front,
including even national capitalists, spearheaded by a worker-
peasant alliance.

In short, in the stage of the people’s democratic revolution,
liquidation of the capitalist class in general is not a prerequi-
site; the important task is elimination of the comprador
capitalists who are in collusion with imperialist forces.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is established when all
the tasks of the people’s democratic revolution are fulfilled
and new tasks to be carried out in the transitional period to
socialism are posed: socialist transformation of relations of
production, rapid development of backward productive forces,
and socialist construction to achieve rapid industrialization.
National capitalists are to be educated and remolded into
socialist working people. And private ownership of the means
ol production, including especially capitalist ownership, is
lo be abolished completely, as are distinctions between work-
ers and peasants and between town and countryside.

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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

The tasks to be carried out under a socialist system by a
backward colonial or semicolonial country have characteristic
features distinct from those of a backward capitalist country.
These features are related, first of all, to the fact that it has
inherited the backward productive forces of a colonial, agri-
cultural country. Thus development of the productive forces,
which should have taken place under capitalism, has to be
undertaken by the socialist system, a situation that will
affect greatly the task of eliminating distinctions between
workers and peasants and between town and countryside.
Referring to this question, Kim 11 Sung says:

Because we failed to experience the stage of capitalist develop-
ment in a normal way, we have to fullill in our era of socialism the
task of developing productive forces, which ought to have been car-
ried out under capitalism. There is no need, however, to make our
society capitalist, to foster capitalists, to overthrow them and then,
after that, to construct socialism, because we failed to solve the task
which ought to have been solved in the capitalist stage. The working
class that has seized power is required, instead of reviving capitalist
society, to carry out under the socialist system the tasks that ought
to have been carried out in the bourgeois revolution to provide the
basis for constructing a classless society.

We must by all means lay the material foundations of socialism
firmly, raise the level of productive forces at least to that of de-
veloped capitalist countries and completely eliminate distinctions
between the working class and the peasantry. For this purpose, we
have to carry out a technological revolution to the extent reached in
countries which have developed capitalist relations in the country-
side, to mechanize farm work and carry out chemicalization and ir-
rigation, and enforce a system of eight working hours. 10

Because of the extremely difficult and complex nature of
the problems facing a colonial or a semicolonial country, its
period of transition to socialism will be comparatively long.

As has been made clear, the tasks to be carried out in the
transitional period and its duration are naturally different
according to the concrete, historical conditions of each coun-

THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

81

try, or depending upon whether it was a developed capitalist
country, a backward capitalist country, a colonial country or
a semicolonial country. It is also clear that the tasks to be
carried out in the transitional period have to be defined cor-
rectly according to the stage of historical development of the
transitional period in each country.

Then, the question naturally is presented: When all these
tasks in the transitional period have been carried out success-
fully and when, as a result, a classless society has been real-
ized, what is the relationship between such a classless society
and the higher stage of communism?

Realization of a classless society following the transitional
period does not mean immediate realization of the higher
level of communism or the start of a transition to it. Kim II
Sung says:

Needless to say, the end of the transitional period does not im-
mediately lead to the higher stage of communism. Even after the
end of the transitional period, it is necessary to continue the revolu-
tion and construction and to develop productive forces to a level
where each works according to his ability and each receives accord-
ing to his needs, so that we may pass on to the higher stage of com-
munism. 1 1

By the higher stage of communism is meant not only a class-
less society where class distinctions no longer exist between
workers and peasants, but also a highly developed society
where each person works according to his ability and each
receives commodities and services according to his needs.
In a completely successful socialist society, a classless so-
ciety, there still remain distinctions between mental and
physical labor, and differences in the quality of labor between
workers and peasants, although class differences between
them have been ended. The criterion for the pace of progress
at this stage is related primarily to the level of development
of the productive forces.

The order in which these remaining distinctions will be

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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

eliminated so far has hardly been discussed and remains to
be solved. But, apparently, distinctions between mental and
physical labor will last longest, and will be ripe for elimina-
tion only after the other distinctions mentioned have been
abolished. This distinction will disappear only in the higher
stage of communism, when the productive forces ot society
have reached a maximum, w'hen all branches of the economy
have been mechanized and automated, and when all woiking
people have achieved the levels of engineers and technicians
and have been educated and remolded into highly cultured
and conscious communists.

To determine scientifically the demarcation between a
classless society and the higher stage of communism, and con-
sequently to define scientifically the content of each, is of
great theoretical and practical significance. The conceptual
content of scientific distinctions between classless society and
the higher stage of communism can be defined only when the
process of the historical development of the transitional period
is analyzed concretely and a clear prospect is opened, scien-
tifically, for a period beyond the transitional period 01, in
other words, when the overall construction of socialism and
communism is placed on the order of the day.

The question of the relationship between the transitional
period and the dictatorship of the proletariat is most acute in
the present stage of development of the world revolution.
Today, these factors are considered simultaneous and in-
separable from each other by some who mechanically repeat
classical propositions of Marxism-Leninism and disregard the
concrete, historical conditions of the present stage of the
world revolution.

Though closely related, the transitional period and the dic-
tatorship of the proletariat are independent questions and
strict distinctions should be made between them.

So long as a revolutionary transition from capitalism to
socialism is a historical process accompanied by sharp class

THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

83

struggles, and the tasks of the transitional period can be
achieved only through such sharp class struggles, the dicta-
torship of the proletariat, as the most powerful weapon of
class struggle, is the form of power most suited to the char-
acteristic features of this transitional period. It is clear both
theoretically and practically that the form of power of the
working class in the transitional period must be the revolu-
tionary dictatorship of the proletariat.

However, the transitional period does not necessarily coin-
cide in time with the historical period of the dictatorship of
the proletariat. The transitional period covers the entire
historical period from the establishment of the dictatorship
of the proletariat to the realization of a classless society. But
the dictatorship of the proletariat has to be continued as long
as the revolutionary struggle of the working class continues,
even after all the tasks of the transitional period have been
carried out successfully and the transitional period comes to
an end. On this, Kim II Sung says:

The historical mission of the dictatorship of the proletariat lies in
liquidating the exploiting classes and putting down their resistance
and in gradually eliminating all class distinctions and building
communism by educating and remolding all the working people to
revolutionize and working-change them . 12

Thus, the historical mission of the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat is not only to overthrow the exploiting classes and
suppress their resistance, not only to eliminate all class dis-
tinctions, but precisely to realize communism, the highest
ideal of mankind.

The working class is faced with the historic task of establish-
ing a dictatorship of the proletariat not only within national
borders but also on a worldwide scale and of constructing
communism and socialism in an all-round way. Where the
proletariat has won power, is accelerating the revolution and
construction, is constantly confronting imperialism under

84

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

conditions of encirclement by international capitalism; even
when the tasks of the transitional period have been carried out
successfully within the national borders of one country or the
higher stage of communism has been reached, aggressive and
subversive acts will be continued by capitalism and impel ial-
ism as long as they remain on earth. Consequently, a dictator-
ship of the proletariat is an absolute necessity. Kim II Sung
writes :

Under conditions where world revolution has not yet been
achieved and where capitalism and imperialism remain, even if
communism is realized in one country or in one legion, such a
society would not be free from the threat of imperialism 01 from the
resistance of internal enemies who are in conspiracy with external
enemies. Under such conditions, the state will not wither away even
if the higher stage of communism is attained, and the dictatorship
of the proletariat must continue. If revolutions are carried out in all
the countries of the world in succession and when capitalism is
destroyed on a worldwide scale and the socialist revolution triumphs,
the transitional period will coincide with the dictatoiship ol the
proletariat, and when the transitional period ends, the dictatorship
of the proletariat will no longer be necessary, with the result that the
functions of the state will wither away. However, so long as we
subscribe to the theory that it is possible to construct communism in
one country or in one region, it is entirely correct to consider the
transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat separately . 13

Thus, while the questions of the transitional period and the
dictatorship of the proletariat are closely related and insepai-
able, their scientific content should be dealt with separately.
If one disregards these distinctions and expects the end of the
transitional period to be followed immediately by the comple-
tion of the tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat, thus
weakening its functions or negating them, irretrievable loss
will be caused to the revolution and construction.

Specifically, it is erroneous to say that the transitional
period ends with the completion of socialist transformation of
the relations of production and establishment of a socialist
system. Kim 11 Sung says:

THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

85

It is wrong to think that the dictatorship of the proletariat has be-
come unnecessary before class distinctions between the working
class and the peasantry are obliterated, before ideological survivals
of the old society are eradicated, and particularly at a time when the
enemies at home and abroad continue to intensify their aggressive
and subversive activities against socialism . 14

The mission of the dictatorship of the proletariat under
socialism is, first, to abolish completely internal and external
class enemies and smash their resistance and subversive
maneuvers; second, to advance the ideological revolution
vigorously in order to revolutionize all working people and
convert them into the working class, and, third, to promote
economic construction and further accelerate socialist and
communist construction. These tasks result from the undeni-
able fact that class struggle continues even under the socialist
system as well as from the need for the working class, which
has acquired power, to push economic construction and
realize socialist and communist construction.

It is clear that the class struggle under the socialist system
is necessarily different in form and content from the class
struggle under the previous system. The object of class
struggle during the socialist revolution is to eliminate the
capitalists as a class. Under the socialist system the class
struggle is carried out against internal and external enemies.
But its most important, main content is the ideological revo-
lution through which workers, peasants and working intel-
lectuals are remolded. This is done mainly through coopera-
tion in labor, to establish the unity and cohesion of the people.

The ideological revolution aims to transform all members of
society into the working class — particularly the petty bour-
geoisie, including the peasantry, intellectuals and the urban
lower middle class. From this standpoint, it may be said that
aid of the socialist state to the countryside and of the working
class to the peasantry is a form of class struggle. The supply to
I he working class of machinery and to the peasantry of chem-
ical fertilizer and large-scale irrigation projects is aimed at

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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

eliminating the peasantry as a class and converting it into the
working class.

At a time when left and right opportunist deviations are
cropping up on this question, it is of special practical signifi-
cance to understand correctly the characteristic features of
the form and content of class struggle under socialism.

Apart from deliberate counter-revolutionary views, various
theoretical and practical deviations in connection with the
questions of the transitional period and the dictatorship of
the proletariat spring mainly from the dogmatic or revisionist
interpretations of classical propositions. It goes without saying
that a thorough stand of Juche should be maintained in
approaching the classical propositions on these questions. In
other words, it is necessary to evaluate correctly the historical
circumstances and the theoretical premises on which a
classical proposition was based, to grasp its revolutionary
essence and to apply it creatively to the new, changed and
developed, concrete historical conditions of the revolution.

When Marx defined socialism and introduced the question
of the transitional period, it is clear that he had in mind
developed capitalist states such as Britain. These developed
states were completely capitalist, not only in the cities but
also, largely, in the countryside, and capitalist relations pre-
vailed in the whole society. In England for example, there
were no peasants; and there were agricultural laborers in the
countryside side by side with workers in towns. Thus, there
were no class distinctions between the working class and the
peasantry.

Under these historical conditions, the elimination of class
distinctions between workers and peasants was not posed as a
task to be carried out in the transitional period. But in this
case, too, the historical necessity for a transitional period
could not be denied; the elimination of the remnants of the
exploiting classes and the old ideas in the consciousness of
people was posed as the task to be carried out.

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87

On this premise, Marx thought that when the proletariat
overthrew the capitalist class by a socialist revolution and
expropriated their property for all the people it would be
possible to carry out the tasks of the transitional period in a
comparatively short time and to proceed to the higher stage
of communism. In other words, Marx regarded the period
from the conquest of power by the proletariat in a developed
capitalist state to transition to socialism as comparatively short.

Marx also presented the questions of the transitional period
and the dictatorship of the proletariat from the standpoint of
an uninterrupted revolution.

Thus, Marx presented these questions on the premise that
proletarian revolutions would occur almost simultaneously
and continuously in the principal capitalist countries of
Europe and that the world revolution would triumph in a
comparatively short period of time. Living in the pre-monopo-
ly capitalist era, Marx was unable to see clearly the uneven
political and economic development of capitalism. On these
premises, he thought that the dictatorship of the proletariat
corresponded in time to the transitional period or, in other
words, that the transitional period and the dictatorship of the
proletariat were inseparably related to each other.

On that theoretical premise, Marx’s classical propositions on
the transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat
were wholly correct. And Lenin’s views on the transitional
period and the dictatorship of the proletariat were basically a
continuation and extension of Marx’s proposition, developed
to correspond to the more complex conditions of monopoly
capitalism, of the stage of imperialism.

Lenin, continuing Marx’s stand on the historical necessity
for a transitional period, deduced that theoretically there
was no doubt that there would be a certain period of transition
from capitalism to communism, and he exposed sharply the
counter-revolutionary nature of arguments which denied the
historical necessity for such a transitional period.

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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

Lenin also grasped the essential content of the transitional
period from the standpoint of class struggle, regarding the
period as one of struggle between moribund capitalism and
emerging communism and, consequently, as a period of un-
precedentedly sharp and acute class struggle.

Continuing Marx’s revolutionary stance, Lenin never inter-
preted the classical propositions in a dogmatic way or applied
them mechanically. In interpreting and applying Marx s
propositions, Lenin started from the concrete, historical con-
ditions of Russia, a backward capitalist state, whose peasantry
comprised an overwhelming majority of the total population
and whose peasant farms contributed an overwhelmingly
large weight in the economy. In other words, class distinctions
between the working class and the peasantry had not been
eradicated.

Under these circumstances, Lenin regarded the elimination
of class distinctions between workers and peasants as a diffi-
cult and complex task to be carried out in the transitional
period. According to Lenin, despite the fact that the working
class had overthrown the capitalist system and seized power,
there were still class distinctions between workers and peas-
ants. Such a society was not a complete socialist society, still
less a communist society; it was precisely a transitional
society.

Consequently, Lenin considered that in order to realize
socialism it was not sufficient to overthrow the capitalists as
a class, but it was also necessary to eliminate class distinctions
between the working class and the peasantry. He regarded
socialism as a complete abolition of classes. It is clear that
Lenin regarded the period from the establishment of the
dictatorship of the proletariat to the realization oi a classless
society as a transitional period from capitalism to socialism
or communism.

Needless to say, this definition of Lenin’s on the transitional
period was fundamentally correct. And the propositions pre-

THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

89

sented in Marxist-Leninist works were all correct in the light
of then prevailing historical circumstances and of their
theoretical premises.

Today, however, right and left opportunists, completely
disregarding the historical circumstances and theoretical
premises of classical propositions, are greatly distorting their
revolutionary content and are causing serious confusion by
interpreting them in a dogmatic or a revisionist way.

The right opportunists regard the transitional period as the
time from conquest of power by the working class to the
victory of the socialist system and consider that this period
coincides with the dictatorship of the proletariat. Starting
from this, they consider that the historical mission of the
dictatorship of the proletariat ends with the completion of the
transitional period.

According to the right opportunists, socialist tasks tend to
be confined to the areas of economic construction, with the
result that the abolition of class distinctions and the victory of
an ideological revolution, and other tasks, are neglected
completely. This means abandoning the class struggle and
surrendering to counter-revolutionary economism.

The counter-revolutionary character of right opportunism is
expressed in mechanically equating in time the transitional
period and the dictatorship of the proletariat, in considering
that the function of the dictatorship of the proletariat ends
with the establishment of socialism and in denying the role of
the dictatorship of the proletariat under the socialist system.

This results in emasculating the functions of the dictator-
ship of the proletariat as the most powerful weapon of class
struggle and for building socialism and communism, the most
essential functions of a socialist state, and is, in effect, an
abandonment of the revolution.

It is clear that such a right opportunist view is diametrically
opposed to Marxism-Leninism and is based on a counter-
revolutionary idea and standpoint. Kim II Sung says:

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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

To regard the transitional period at an end when the socialist
system triumphs issues from the ideological attitude of discontinuing
class struggle with the remnants of the overthrown exploiting classes
at home, and of carrying on the world revolution while living in
peace with world imperialism. Further, an argument is advanced
that the dictatorship of the proletariat ceases to exist with the end of
the transitional period. But how can it be so?... This is fundamentally
wrong. 15

On the other hand, left opportunists, starting with the idea
that communism will be attained only many generations
ahead, regard the transitional period as one that extends from
capitalism to the higher stage of communism. This view is
practically the same as not drawing any line of demarcation
for the transitional period at all.

What is necessary is to grasp correctly the characteristic
features of each historical stage of development up to the
higher stage of communism, to analyze scientifically the con-
crete historical conditions of each stage, and to define correct-
ly the revolutionary tasks for each of these stages. Herein lies
the revolutionary significance of the transitional period. If its
termination is obscured by extending its duration to the higher
stage of communism, the working class will not be able to have
correct, Marxist- Leninist strategy and tactics in each historical
stage in the development of the revolution during the long
period of time up to the stage of communism.

Furthermore, left opportunists not only consider that the
transitional period will extend to the higher stage of com-
munism, but also assert that communism cannot be realized in
a single country. According to them, it will be impossible to
realize communism before the world revolution is completed.
The left opportunists, therefore, scream about “class struggle,”
but ignore the concrete tasks of elimination of class distinc-
tions, construction of socialism, and advance to communism.
They end up in confusion in practice.

As is already clear, the form and content of class struggle

THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

91

are defined differently according to each stage of the develop-
ment of the revolution, and it is impermissible to regard them
as the same under any circumstances. Left opportunists,
failing to understand the dialectic development of the form
and content of class struggle, confuse the class struggle under
the socialist system with class struggle in the stage of the so-
cialist revolution, with the result that the working masses are
pitted against each other, greatly damaging the political and
ideological unity of the working masses, which should be the
basis of social relations under socialism.

Kim II Sungs clarification of the question of the transi-
tional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat demolishes
these right and left opportunist deviations, which already have
pioved bankrupt in practice. His theory on these questions is
not only a creative development of Marxism-Leninism, but
also is of piactical significance for the international commu-
nist movement, and particularly the practical struggle of the
working class for the construction of socialism and commu-
nism.

2. THE COMPLETE VICTORY OF SOCIALISM

(1) Superiority of the Socialist System

Capitalism is the road of exploitation and oppression, sub-
jugation and decline. Socialism is the only way to eliminate all
forms of class exploitation and national oppression, to guar-
antee real freedom and happiness for all people, and to realize
complete national independence and prosperity. Therefore,
socialism and communism represent the bright future of man-
kind. This is the irrefutable truth, completely borne out in
theory and practice. This truth has been demonstrated fully
by the experience of the Korean people in their revolutionary
struggle. All the great victories won by the Korean people
during the past 20 years in revolution and construction under

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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

the banner of the Republic have been achieved because they
have advanced steadily along the road of socialism. All the
achievements of the Korean people demonstrate clearly the
essential superiority of the socialist system over the capitalist
system.

In defining the socialist system, Kim 11 Sung says:

The socialist system is the most advanced social system, under
which power is in the hands of the masses of the people; production
is developed steadily in a planned way, on a high scientific and
technical foundation, for the purpose of systematically enhancing
the welfare of the people on the basis of public ownership of the
means of production; all kinds of exploitation and oppression have
been abolished for all time; and each works according to his ability
and takes his share according to the quality and quantity of his work . 16

Socialism from the standpoint of power is the state and
social system whose political power is firmly held by the
popular masses, headed by the working class. Thus, viewed
from the relations of production, it is the social system in
which all private or capitalist ownership of the means of
production has been eliminated completely and social
ownership is in control. Therefore, under these conditions,
the prime motive of production is systematically to increase
the welfare of all the people. The most modern scientific and
technical facilities are provided in order to supply the ever-
increasing material and cultural demands of the masses and,
on this basis, production is developed in a planned way at a
rapid pace. Herein lies the basic characteristic of socialist
production. The argument that the tempo of economic develop-
ment is slowed down under the socialist system as its eco-
nomic development and scale expand has nothing in common
with the Marxist-Leninist view on the nature of socialist
production.

Finally, if viewed from the relations of distribution, in the
socialist system the right to work is guaranteed to all and the
socialist principle of distribution is enforced: Each works

THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

93

according to his ability and receives according to the quality
and quantity of his labor; all exploiting classes have been
liquidated and their socio-economic foundations have been
wiped out; profit from the labor of others and their oppression
have been abolished for all time. The fruits of all labor, direct-
ly or indirectly, belong to the workers themselves. Therefore,
socialism is the most advanced social system, whose realiza-
tion mankind has desired for many centuries, superior in all
respects to the capitalist system.

First, it is superior in regard to the fact that the people hold
political power, that the masses enjoy completely guaranteed
democratic rights. In the northern half of the Republic, all
people participate in the country’s politics freely, exercise
their sovereign political rights for their revolutionary cause,
have free choice of jobs according to their ability and aptitude,
work and learn to their hearts’ content, and live happily. Con-
versely, under capitalism, where capitalists, landlords and
other exploiting classes hold power, no political rights or
freedoms are securely guaranteed for the majority of the peo-
ple. Historical experience demonstrates that bourgeois
democracy is essentially a democracy for the capitalists and
landlords, and means dictatorship to the overwhelming major-
ity of the masses.

Second, concerning the means of production under social-
ism, working people are not only in control of the government
but also are the masters of production and labor. There is no
“alienation of labor” because the proletariat works for their
state, for their society and for themselves. This is the powerful
basis that enables the masses to give full scope to their
creative capacity and talent and to increase production rapid-
ly. As against this, under capitalism, the means of production
are owmed by capitalists and landlords and the purpose of
production is to bring them more profit. The masses work to
sustain a bare living. Labor presupposes exploitation and,
consequently, workers are alienated completely from the

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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

products of their labor, which belong to the capitalists.
Workers are guaranteed the right to live only on the premise
that they are exploited. Under such conditions, it is clear that
the producing masses have little interest in production tech-
nique.

Third, in the socialist system, all sectors and enterprises of
the people's economy are linked together, have a common
purpose and interest, and are directed in a unified and
planned way by the central economic planning body. Con-
sequently, it is possible to develop a planned and balanced
economy, to mobilize and utilize all human and material
resources and the production potential of the state effectively
and to a maximum. Under capitalism, there is anarchy of pro-
duction, and economic crises due to overproduction are
inevitable.

Fourth, under socialism, production is used entirely to
improve the welfare of the people and, as a result, this system
is characterized basically by a continual improvement in the
people's living standard together with rapid development of
production. As against this, the inevitable result of capitalism
is the starvation and poverty, unemployment and pauperiza-
tion of a substantial part of the working masses, an increasing
gap between rich and poor, between the workers needs and
their satisfaction. The above is the basic content of the
superiority of socialism over capitalism.

Since socialism and capitalism are as described, it is
historically necessary for a people liberated from colonial
enslavement to press ahead on the road to socialism. Histoiical
experience clearly shows that if people, freed from imperialist
exploitation and oppression that has continued for scores of
years or for centuries, hope to realize complete national in-
dependence and liberation, real freedom and happiness for
the people and autonomy and prosperity for the nation, there
is no alternative for them but to march along the path of
socialism.

THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

95

In order for a liberated people to realize complete national
independence and liberation, it is necessary for the masses,
headed by the working class, to hold political power firmly.
And it is necessary for them to use it as a powerful weapon to
smash the subversive activities of foreign imperialists and
domestic reactionaries if they are to eliminate the colonial
domination and eradicate all the economic foundations of
imperialism and domestic reaction. They are required to
strengthen their revolutionary forces and establish a pro-
gressive social system, while socializing the principal means
of production, and striving to construct a powerful indepen-
dent national economy and culture. Only by so doing, can the
liberated people take the shortcut to freedom and happiness
and to national independence and prosperity without going
through the trials and struggles unavoidable under capitalism.

It is important for people who have won political indepen-
dence to never allow domestic reaction to wrest political
power away from them. If domestic reactionaries should gain
control, they will ally themselves with foreign imperialists
and surrender national independence and freedom, returning
the country to a declining neo-colonial status. This has been
borne out by history.

The historical experience of the Korean people in their
long revolutionary struggle demonstrates the irrefutable
truth that a people liberated from imperialist colonial enslave-
ment should advance steadily toward socialism and commu-
nism, the future of mankind.

(2) Requirements for Complete Victory of Socialism

It is the task of the working class and the socialist state, after
the foundations of socialism have been laid, to carry on the
revolution in politics, economics, culture and all other areas
and to realize the complete victory of socialism. Today, the
Korean people are facing this great, still unattained revolu-
tionary task.

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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

The continuation of the revolution in all areas after the
socialist system has triumphed and the foundations of social-
ism laid is the objective law of the development of socialism.

First, even after the victory of the socialist system it is
necessary to wage a continuous struggle against the remnants
of the deposed ruling classes. Experience of the revolutionary
struggles in Korea teaches that the overthrown ruling classes
continue to resist for a long time. They never abandon their
dream of regaining power, even after they have been liqui-
dated as a class and deprived of their bases. Their resistance
is due to the class nature of the exploiters and, at the same
time, is related to the fact that while imperialism still exists
they receive positive support from foreign imperialists.

Second, even after the socialist system has been established,
age-old, feudalistic, bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideas,
which are ideological survivals of the exploiting classes, still
remain deeply rooted in the ideology and consciousness of
the masses. These ideas are a negative factor in the develop-
ment of revolution and construction.

They take the form of “excessive centralism, localism and
other egocentric tendencies in the control and management
of socialist economy. Needless to say, these ideas peitain to
the main factors which determine the changed character ol
the socialist society and it requires obstinate struggles to root
up these ideas completely and to remold the ideology and
consciousness of the working masses to collectivism and
communism. The control of socialist production relations
creates material conditions decisively favorable for furthering
the ideology and consciousness of communism. It is true that
the dominant ideas of a socialist society are communist ideas.
But this does not mean that the struggle to remold the ideology
and consciousness of the working people in a socialist society
can be weakened. On the contrary, the historical experience ol
socialist countries shows that the political and ideological
education of the working people should be strengthened
constantly and decisively.

THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

97

Third, even after the victory of the socialist system, there
remain for a considerable period distinctions between town
and countryside and between the working class and the
peasantry. The principal class distinctions remaining in a
socialist society are those between the working class and the
peasantry. These distinctions are also a main factor determin-
ing the transitional nature of socialism. Consequently, the
working elass can say that a completely classless society has
been achieved only after the peasantry has been elevated to
its level in ideology, consciousness, culture, morality and
other areas.

Fourth, even after the victory of the socialist system, it is
necessary for the working class to continue to develop socialist
production to a level suitable for socialist and communist
society and to improve the living standard and culture of the
people. In order to establish socialism firmly, it is necessary,
above all, to lay the proper socialist material and technical
foundations. Generally speaking, socialism demands that
productive forces be raised to a level of development far
higher than the material and technological levels inherited
from capitalism.

All-round development of all kinds of machinery and
technology and full development of productive forces are
possible only in a socialist system that has destroyed the
narrow framework of capitalist relations of production.
Machinery, technology and productive forces are placed
under the direct control of man himself in a socialist system
and fully serve the happiness and progress of mankind. In
other words, the role of machinery and technology under the
capitalists — to control, destroy and exploit man — comes to an
end when capitalism is abolished.

This is particularly important to a country like Korea, which
lias taken the path of socialism without going through the
normal development of capitalism and industrial revolution.
Regarding the living conditions of the people, the social
sources of exploitation and poverty have been eliminated

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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

and the most basic problems in the material and cultural life
of the people have been solved. But the task of continuously
and decisively raising the living standard of the people still
remains. Therefore, what is the task facing a state of the dicta-
torship of the proletariat and how can this task be realized?

In order to achieve the complete victory of socialism and accom-
plish the historical cause of the working class [Kim II Sung says], the
state must further strengthen its role as a weapon of class struggle,
a weapon for the building of socialism and communism. In other
words, the socialist state should strengthen the dictatorship ol the
proletariat, carrying on the class struggle on the one hand and vigor-
ously pushing ahead with the building of the socialist economy on
the other. 17

Only by continuously and decisively strengthening the
dictatorship of the proletariat can a socialist state occupy the
ideological and material fortresses that have to be occupied
for the complete victory of socialism and the advance to
communism.

It is important to carry out the task of occupying the ideolog-
ical and material fortresses in a unified way, simultaneously.
Overestimation or understatement will lead to deviations of
left or right opportunism and there will be an irretrievable
loss to the general course of socialist construction. Actually,
these two tasks are inseparably interrelated and it is thus
necessary to carry them out in an integrated way.

In other words, if the dictatorship of the proletariat and the
ideological revolution are underestimated and the class stiug-
gle is weakened, it will be impossible for the working masses
to give full scope to their creative capacity and conscious
enthusiasm and to carry out the tasks of economic construc-
tion and technical revolution successfully.

On the contrary, if the class struggle and ideological revolu-
tion are overemphasized, and economic construction and the
technological revolution are underestimated, it is difficult to
ease the onerous working conditions of the people, to raise

THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

99

their living standards and to carry out the ideological revolu-
tion itself successfully. Ideology and consciousness are deter-
mined by material conditions and, even in a socialist country,
these depend to a great extent on technological development
and improvement of living standards. We must man the ideo-
logical and material fortresses in a closely related and inte-
grated way, through the dictatorship of the proletariat, for the
complete victory of socialism.

It is important to combine the class struggle against a hand-
ful of enemy elements with the struggle to educate, remold
and unite the masses who constitute the overwhelming ma-
jority of the people.

If one loses sight of the fact that under socialism unity and
cooperation among the working class, peasantry and intellec-
tuals are the basis of social relations, and if the class struggle is
overemphasized and exaggerated, the error of leftism is com-
mitted. Conversely, if one ignores the fact that hostile ele-
ments and old ideology survive and that the class struggle
continues under socialism, and if all the people are permitted
to enjoy “pure democracy” or what is called “freedom” the
serious rightist error is committed.

Democracy as a political concept assumes class character
under any circumstances. All dictatorships of the exploiting
classes are dictatorships against the exploited classes, and
their democracy is democracy for the handful of people of the
exploiting classes. In contrast to this, a dictatorship of the pro-
letariat is a dictatorship of the exploited against the exploiters
and democracy for the benefit of the masses of the people. Just
as there has never been a state without a ruling class, so there
lias never been a democracy devoid of class character and
I here will never be such a democracy. In any state, democracy
is democracy for the class in power, and goes along with dic-
tatorship against the enemy classes.

In conditions where remnants of the deposed exploiters are
active and where class struggles continue, there can be no

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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

“pure” democracy or “complete freedom” for all people.
Bourgeois democracy is the freedom for millionaires to exploit
and plunder the working people and to earn profits, allowing
the working people only the freedom of poverty. If one should
fail to recognize the class nature of democracy in socialist
society and assert that all people should enjoy pure democra-
cy” and “complete freedom” under the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat, this will be tantamount to imposing bourgeois democ-
racy and slavish freedom on the people. We are opposed to an
abstract and supra-class interpretation of demociacy.

Next, it is necessary to solve the rural and agrarian questions
in order to realize the complete victory of socialism. As Kim 11
Sung says:

To solve the rural question finally and to raise cooperative proper-
ty to the level of public property is one ol the most important tasks
confronting the dictatorship of the proletariat after the triumph oi the
socialist system and one of the basic conditions for the complete
victory of socialism. Only when the rural question is solved and the
backwardness of the countryside is eliminated completely can the
socialist state make a clean sweep of the reactionary bourgeois hang-
overs and footholds fostered from outside and of the remnants of the
overthrown exploiting classes that plant themselves and engage in
insidious maneuverings. And only when cooperative property is
raised to the level of public property can the agricultural productive
forces be developed to a high degree, can selfish ideas remaining in
the minds of the peasants be rooted out, and can all the woiking
people be led unswervingly along the path of collectivism, which
will result in their working for the whole society and the entire
people with a high degree of conscious zeal . 18

It is clear that the rural and agrarian questions finally will be
solved, in the complete sense defined by Kim 11 Sung, in the
stage of social development when the ideology and conscious-
ness of the peasantry are remolded into the ideas of the work-
ing class or the ideas of communism, when agriculture will be
equipped with modern machinery and cooperative ownership
has been turned into ownership by the whole people. To

THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

101

realize this, it is necessary, above all, to carry out energetically
three revolutions — technical, cultural and ideological — in the
countryside, on the basis of the rapid development of socialist
industry and towns. At the same time, it is necessary for the
working class to strengthen greatly its assistance to the peas-
antry, to raise agriculture to the advanced levels of industrial
management and control and to strengthen relations of produc-
tion between ownership by the entire people and cooperative
ownership, and to bring them together.

Only when this task has been accomplished successfully
can the working class complete one of the main tasks to be
carried out in the transitional period, that is, winning the in-
termediate classes, especially the farming masses, a basic
principle presented by Kim II Sung for solving the rural and
agrarian questions under socialism.

For a complete victory of socialism, it is essential to advance
socialist economic construction, to raise productive forces to a
level high enough to satisfy the requirements of socialism and
communism, and to attain a high level of material and cultural
life for the working people.

The communists not only fight for the freedom and liberation of
people, but also strive for their happiness [says Kim II Sung]. An im-
portant task confronting communists after they have overthrown the
old system and liberated the people from exploitation and oppression
is to build a satisfactory socialist economy. Concern for the enhance-
ment of the welfare of the people is the supreme law governing the
activities of the Party and state of the working class . 19

This concern is the prime principle consistently upheld by
(be Workers Party of Korea and the government of the Repub-
lic in their activities. To implement it, it is necessary to pro-
mote socialist economic construction. The task here is to lay a
I inn material and technical foundation of socialism by carrying
out industrialization, technical and cultural innovations, and a
program to train all the working people in the skills and tech-
niques of operating modern machinery. In other words, it is

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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

necessary to develop a rapidly expanding modern industry
and advanced agriculture by equipping all sectors of the econ-
omy, including agriculture, with advanced techniques and to
remold all people into capable all-round builders of commu-
nism. It is necessary in this way, to liberate the working class
from exploitation and from onerous and exhausting labor, to
eradicate distinctions between industrial and agricultural
labor, heavy and light labor, manual and mental labor, and
to produce more material wealth with easier work. Further, it
is necessary to raise decisively the material and cultural levels
of all working people, based on the rapidly developing indus-
trial and agricultural production. This is the meaning of lais-
ing productive forces to a level of development commensurate
with socialism and communism. This is the realistic basis for
fully realizing the highest principle governing the activities
of the Party and state of the working class. This is also the
basis for realizing the communist principle of distribution;
where people voluntarily work for society and commodity
circulation is transformed into distribution in kind.

The complete victory of socialism, as defined by Kim II
Sung, is not only wide in scope but also very high in quality—
a complete transformation of the socio-economic formation.

Thus, socialism triumphs completely when the remnants of
the exploiting classes have been demolished and liquidated
completely; when distinctions between town and countryside
and between the working class and the peasantry have been
eradicated; when all the members of society have been trans-
formed into conscious communists by having been converted
into the working class; when the rural question has been
solved so that there are no longer distinctions between co-
operative property and property of the entire people so that
ownership by the entire people, the highest level of social-
ization, holds undivided sway; when the technological 1 evo-
lution and socialist industrialization have been realized fully;
when the material and technical foundations of socialism firm-

THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

103

ly have been laid by equipping all sectors of the people's
economy with modern technique; and when material and
technical foundations have been completed for the full de-
velopment of individuals and for the gradual elimination of
distinctions between industrial and agricultural labor, heavy
and light labor, manual and mental labor.

Only when these conditions are fulfilled can socialism have
the requisite material and technical foundation, and commu-
nism will begin to develop. It is at this stage that a full reali-
zation of communism will be posed as a concrete and realistic
task.

3. TOWARD WORLD SOCIALISM

The revolutionary struggles of the proletariat in countries
where they have conquered power should be part of the revo-
lutionary struggles of the international proletariat to overthrow
capitalism and imperialism on a worldwide scale and to
guarantee the ultimate victory of socialism and they should
ho developed in connection with the revolutionary struggles
ol the international proletariat in an integrated way. Only in
lliis way can the revolutionary struggles of the proletariat
in individual countries win ultimate victory. This necessity
is related to the fact that the revolutionary struggles in coun-
li ies where the proletariat has seized power are being waged
under encirclement of international capitalism and in direct

• onlrontation with imperialism. Kim 11 Sung says:

Where the proletariat has seized power in an individual country

• ueircled by international capitalism, there cannot he freedom from
I lie danger of imperialist aggression and capitalist restoration till

• •mnnunism is realized on a worldwide scale. Therefore, to win the

• ill i mate victory in revolution, the proletariat of each country that
Ini', assumed power should consolidate its own internal revolutionary
Inires in every way and, at the same time, should be given the posi-

104 THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

tive support of other contingents of the world socialist revolution
and should cement true international solidarity with the working
classes in all countries and with oppressed peoples all over the
world. 20

Consequently, the proletariat that has assumed power in
individual countries is faced with the revolutionary task of
decisively strengthening and vigorously advancing the world
revolution. The strengthening of the internal revolutionary
forces and the victory of the revolution should be considered
in their relation to the ultimate victory of the world revolu-
tion. In other words, the victory of the revolution and socialist
construction in each country decisively strengthen the forces
of the world socialist revolution, which, in turn, creates a
condition decisively favorable for carrying out the revolution
and construction in each country. This is the unitary rela-
tionship between the victory of the revolution in one country
and the final victory of the world revolution.

The ultimate victory of the world revolution will be real-
ized, says Kim 11 Sung, <l in the course of the outbreak of the
socialist revolution and its complete victory in many coun-
tries, and the gradual expansion, consolidation and develop-
ment of the socialist camp.”

The ultimate victory of the revolution will be achieved as
a result of the process by which revolutions will continue to
occur in a large number of countries in the world, and espe-
cially in countries in proximity to those where the proletariat
has conquered power; where imperialist encirclement is
converted into socialist encirclement, breaking down the
walls of imperialist encirclement of socialist countries and
opening up a prospect for the transformation of the dictator-
ship of the proletariat into a world system; where the isolation
of the bastions of individual socialist countries encircled by
imperialism is prevented; and where strong ties of militant
solidarity between the working class and the oppressed peo-
ples of the world have been formed precisely through this
historical process.

THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

105

Only when these conditions are realized can it be said that
socialism is completely free from armed intervention by the
imperialists and attempts to revive capitalism, and only then
will the ultimate victory of socialism be secured. This is the
concrete process of realizing the ultimate victory of the world
lev olution as made clear by Kim II Sung — the great historical
and actual process of revolutionary transition from capital-
ism to socialism on a worldwide scale, the concrete process
of realizing the ultimate victory of socialism.

The socialist camp is the invincible revolutionary base of the
intei national working class for the ultimate victory of socialism and
communism, the reliable bulwark of victory for the oppressed peo-
ples and all progressive peoples throughout the world, and the
powerful fortress of world peace. 21

The existence of the socialist camp and its united strength
are important factors determining the destiny not only of the
socialist countries and peoples, but also the destiny of all
mankind. The solution of all questions of world revolution
today depends to a large extent on the united strength of the
socialist countries. It is because of this that world reaction,
led by U.S. imperialism, fears the existence of the socialist
camp more than anything else, and continues plots and activi-
ties to undermine it.

Specifically, U.S. imperialism is following a two-pronged
slrategy of armed aggression and internal subversion through
ideological and cultural infiltration to destroy the socialist

■ amp. It is a policy of directly attacking, one by one, the coun-
tries that are taking a revolutionary road, holding high the
banner of anti-imperialism. At the same time, the United
Males is intensifying ideological and cultural infiltration into
countries that are not carrying out the revolution actively,
.pleading illusions about capitalism among the people and

■ tiling for unprincipled compromises with imperialism in
older to undermine these countries from within. Under the

■ Ireumstances, it is necessary for all the socialist countries

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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

to unite to defend the socialist camp from the allied forces
of imperialism. Thus, if it happens that a country of the social-
ist camp is exposed to serious danger because of the subver-
sive activities of imperialism and domestic reactionary forces
allied with it, the proletariat of the country concerned should
receive active support from other contingents of the world
socialist revolution. All the revolutionary forces of the world,
including the socialist countries, should give all-out, active
assistance to it. This problem affects not only the revolution
of one particular country but also the destiny of the world
revolution generally and the existence of the entire socialist
camp. Since the socialist camp is the bastion of world revolu-
tion, it is clear that the failure of the revolution in any country
will result in a major setback for the power and strength of the
entire socialist camp.

Further, the existence of the socialist camp is a great com-
mon revolutionary gain for the working class of the entire
world. Accordingly, its defense should be shared not only by
the proletariat that has gained power but also by the prole-
tariat that has not. It is a historic fact that the very existence
of the socialist camp has opened a decisive phase for the revo-
lutionary struggles of the proletariat in different countries
for the conquest of power. It is only imperialism that is afraid
of the expansion of the socialist camp — and consequently of
the victory of the revolution in individual socialist countries —
and it is because of this that imperialist reaction is making
desperate efforts to frustrate the revolution and construction.
In order to strengthen the power of the socialist camp, it is
necessary for the socialist countries to uphold the class posi-
tion in solving questions, starting from the basic interests of
the revolution and the essential requirements of the socialist
camp as a class alliance.

The socialist countries are opposed to imperialism and
colonialism and are fighting together for the construction of
socialist and communist society where people can live freely

THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

107

and happily. Herein lies the common political, economic and
social basis and class content of all the socialist countries.
This is the reason the socialist camp is not artificial, a creation
of some international treaty. It is not a temporary alliance. It
is a permanent alliance created by the need for class soli-
darity of the working class of the world, which has been vic-
torious in shaip revolutionary struggle against international
capital.

Consequently, it is impossible to exclude a country that has
the prerequisites of a socialist state from the socialist camp
because of differences of opinion, nor is it possible to include
a country that is no longer a socialist state as part of the social-
ist camp.

Differences between fraternal parties and countries arise
Irom different historical and geographical conditions, and
ho m their different national tasks. Differences also arise from
the failure to understand correctly the principles of Marxism-
I ieninism and to uphold a completely revolutionary stand. But
these differences do not reflect contradictions between state
and social system nor do they reflect basic differences between
hostile classes. However sharp they may be, such differences
are the internal affairs of the socialist camp and the inter-
national communist movement. It is not permissible to pre-
sent these differences as contradictions between hostile
classes. Therefore, the way to overcome such differences
should be essentially different from the method of solving
contradictions between hostile classes. They should be
solved by means of ideological struggle based on the desire
lor unity among class brothers. A basic principle of commu-
nists that should be observed in all circumstances is to dis-
tinguish clearly between class brothers and class enemies.
As long as this class position strictly is adhered to, difference
nl opinion surely will be overcome.

In order to achieve real unity among fraternal parties and
•lutes, it is necessary to observe strictly the norms of inter-

108

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

relationship among fraternal parties and fraternal states —
complete equality, mutual respect for independence, non-
interference in internal affairs, and comradely cooperation.

It is especially important for all socialist countries and com-
munist and workers’ parties to adhere strictly to a position of
independence under all circumstances. Needless to say,
socialist countries and communist and workers parties are
completely equal and independent. They are all inseparably
linked by the class solidarity of the working class and they
are responsible not only for the revolution in their countries
and for their people as completely equal and independent
contingents in the militant ranks of the world revolution,
but they are responsible for the world revolution and for the
people of the entire world.

In this sense, distinctions between the parties of large and
small countries, between the parties of long established
and newly formed revolutionary countries are entirely
meaningless. No country is permitted to claim special privi-
leges in the ranks of the world communist movement because
of such distinctions. None can claim a privileged position
in the ranks of the communist movement and there can be
no question of a higher or lower country in the socialist camp.
The question is whether a party adheres strictly to the revolu-
tionary principles of Marxism-Leninism, whether it is respon-
sible for successfully promoting the revolution and construc-
tion, and whether, in so doing, it performs its international
duties in the world revolution.

However, it is impossible to maintain independence apart
from economic independence. Only after it has constructed
a firm national economy can a socialist country not only main-
tain political independence but also contribute to the strength-
ening of the socialist camp as a whole. In other words, the
economy of each socialist country as a unit of the world social-
ist economic system develops in close relation and coopera-
tion with other units. Consequently, the socialist economic

THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

109

system is strengthened as each unit comprising it is strength-
ened. Further, the strength and effectiveness of the socialist
economic system as a whole necessarily deepens the general
crisis of imperialism and, consequently, of the capitalist
woild economic system and accelerates the ultimate down-
lall of world imperialist reaction. This, in turn, creates con-
ditions more favorable for revolution and construction in
each socialist country. In this way, it is necessary to under-
stand correctly the interrelations between the construction
of an independent national economy in each country and the
general strengthening of the socialist economic system.

Today, the formation of the socialist market has dealt a
severe blow to the imperialist monopolies and billionaires
that dominated markets and controlled the world economy
in the past. It has damaged gravely the expansionist policy
ol U. S. imperialism, which leads modern imperialism, and
tries to monopolize overseas markets, plunder the raw ma-
terial resources of the world at will, and establish a world
market of its own. This has deepened decisively the general
crisis of imperialism in economic matters.

In this situation, it is of decisive significance to expand
and strengthen the socialist market in order to weaken im-
perialism and accelerate the world revolution. Consequently,
i! is of primary importance for the socialist countries to
strengthen and develop their foreign economic relations.

I .< onomic lelations with capitalist countries can have onlv
secondary significance in the foreign trade of the socialist
eountries. In other words, the socialist countries are required
,<) s h c k to their class position even in their foreign economic
relations.

Construction of an independent national economy is the
icalistic basis for eliminating national inequality — the actual
Uisis for national inequality is economic backwardness. The
• obstruction of socialism and communism is aimed at elimi-
naling not only class distinctions but also national inequality.

110

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

National inequality cannot be eliminated immediately after
the socialist revolution is carried out in a specific country,
nor can such inequality be eradicated by integrating nation-
alities in one way or another.

In order to eliminate national inequality, all nations must
become socialist, but all nations must develop with full free-
dom. This is the realistic way to do away with national
inequality.

Maintenance of independence should be based firmly
on the principle of proletarian internationalism and should
be carried out so as to strengthen internationalism decisively.
Just as there can be no internationalism apart from inde-
pendence, so there can be no independence apart from
internationalism. If this interrelationship is ignored, inde-
pendence apart from internationalism will have nothing in
common with Marxism-Leninism but will be merely narrow
bourgeois isolationism or bourgeois nationalism.

If someone ignores Marxism-Leninism and proletarian inter-
nationalism and takes to national egoism under the pretext of main-
taining independence, he is gravely mistaken. What is more, it does
not befit a Communist to renounce the principle of class solidarity
and reject joint action and joint struggle of class brothers under the
slogan of independence. Such an act will do enormous harm to the
development of the world revolution, and more, result in ruining
the revolution in his own country, too . 22

CHAPTER III

Socialist Economic Management

Organization and perfection of economic management
under a socialist system is a pressing theoretical and practical
question in the construction of socialism and communism.
Kim II Sung wrote:

Following the completion of the socialist reorganization of pro-
duction relations and the establishment of the socialist system, the
successful building of socialism and communism depends largely
on how socialist production relations are adapted to the ever-
developing productive forces and how they arc implemented; on
how the superstructure is perfected to suit the foundations that are
established; and finally on how the reverse influence of the super-
structure on the foundations is to be stimulated . 1

This quotation refers to the most fundamental area of Marx-
ism-Leninism: the interrelation between productive forces
and production relations, and between the base and the
superstructure. It is a problem that can be solved only by
bold, creative development.

The general proposition is: In any society the form of pro-
duction relations and economic structure must correspond
to the level of development of productive forces and the na-
lure of the economic base of society. How to apply this princi-
ple in a socialist society? How to insure correspondence be-
tween the constantly developing productive forces to the
relations of production? How to perfect the superstructure,
in particular the planning and management of state and eco-
nomic organs, how to best adapt it to the socialist base, how
lo strengthen its positive influence on the base?

112

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

Solution of these questions is necessary to give full play to
the essential superiority of the socialist system, whic ias
completely liberated productive forces from the shackles ot
capitalism, and has opened a broad vista for free development,
as well as for expansion and strengthening of the socialist
base through state planning and management.

This means, primarily, that socialism enables millions of
working people, liberated from all forms of exploitation and
suppression forever -and thus absolute masters of social
production -to display their revolutionary zeal and creative
initiative and powerfully to promote socialist and communist
construction.

In the final analysis, the problems boil down to the inter-
relationship between productive forces and production rela-
tions, and between the base and the superstructure. Under
capitalism, these interrelationships are formed spontaneous y.
When they have reached a certain stage, contradictions and
conflicts become their basic content. These contradictions
finally are resolved only by the abolition of the capitalist
production relations and superstructure thiough ie\o ution.

Under the socialist system, these interrelations should ie
planned and purposeful. The slightest error may cause grave
damage to the revolution and to construction. To form such
interrelationships correctly, it is necessary scientifica y to
analyze the changing and developing situation and to apply
the Juche principle. Several socialist countries suffered con-
fusion and grave losses from failure to solve this question

correctly.

In the DPRK this most difficult and complex question was
solved by application of the Chongsanri spirit and the Chong-
sanri method created by Premier Kim 11 Sung, and the Daean
work system, to industry and agriculture, and by the new sys-
em of guiding agriculture. The correctness of the Daean work
system and the guiding system of agriculture, which are new
socialist systems of economic management established in

SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

113

North Korea, has been demonstrated clearly and their vitality
is being displayed fully in the form of a great upsurge of
socialist construction.

L ESSENCE OF THE CHONGSANRI SPIRIT
AND METHOD

In the northern half of the Republic, the socialist transfor-
mation of the relations of production in industry and agricul-
ture was completed in August 1958. This was a decisive factor
in vigorously advancing socialist construction. The productive
forces, freed from old relations of production, began to develop
rapidly, and the workers' revolutionary enthusiasm and will to
produce rose to new heights, while a technological revolution
began in all branches of industry and agriculture. Along with
the rapid economic development, the scale of production was
expanded greatly and relations among different branches of
production became more complex.

This development required reorganization of the state and
economic planning organs in adaptation to a changed situa-
tion — that is, the creation and completion of a new socialist
system of economic management related to the socialist sys-
tem. In other words, it became impossible to accelerate the
development of productive forces more positively and power-
fully under the existing system of economic management
which, though essentially a socialist system of economic man-
agement, was plagued by not a few survivals of capitalism.

For instance, the existing state agricultural bodies were
organized mainly for the purpose of directing private farms.
Needless to say, this direction reflected the realistic require-
ments in the stage where private farms played an overwhelm-
ing role in agriculture. However, this system proved inade-
quate when private farms were transferred into socialist coop-
erative farms and when the scale of cooperative farms was
greatly expanded through merger of agricultural cooperative

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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

association into ri-unit farms, and also when the technological
revolution was beginning in agriculture in real earnest.

The gap between the completely new situation in the
countryside and the existing operation of the state organs for
directing agriculture resulted in the political and practical
inability of the government bodies to cope with the rapid
development of the economy. As Kim 11 Sung pointed out:

The rate of progress of our national economy is unusually high.
The successes we have scored in economic construction in the six
years following the war are such as could hardly be achieved, even
in scores of years, under the capitalist system. We have advanced in a
spirit of taking ten steps while others take one.

Our economy has developed at a very high rate, but we can hardly
expect people’s knowledge and capacity to progress as rapidly . 2

On-the-spot guidance given by Premier Kim II Sung in
February 1960 at Chongsanri, Kangso county, South Pyongan
province, was of decisive significance for establishing a social-
ist system of economic management adapted to the entirely
new situation, inasmuch as it solved this urgent revolutionary
task and radically improved the system of direction and
method of work of the Party, state and economic organs in
the economy.

Through this historic guidance, Kim II Sung analyzed the
economic situation created after the socialist transformation
of the relations of production and originated the Chongsanri
spirit and the Chongsanri method as a new socialist system of
economic management in North Korea, boldly applying the
revolutionary mass line. This is explained by him as follows:

The essentials of the Chongsanri method are that the higher organ
helps the lower; the superior assists his inferiors and always goes
down to work areas in order to get a good grasp of actual conditions
and to find correct solutions to problems. This method gives priority
to political work or work with people in all activities, giving full
play to the conscious enthusiasm and creative initiative of the masses
so as to ensure the fulfillment of revolutionary tasks. This is not only

SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

115

a powerful method of work, enabling us to carry out immediate
revolutionary tasks successfully and substantially, but also a power-
ful method of education that enhances the ideological and political
level and the practical ability of functionaries and revolutionaries . 3

To mobilize to a maximum the inexhaustible creative capac-
ity of the masses, to rely on their strength, and to lead them to
give full play to their revolutionary enthusiasm, creative
capacity and talent or, in other words, to follow a consistent
mass line, are of decisive importance for promoting the
revolution and construction.

The mass line, reliance on mass participation and initiative,
is particularly urgent in a newly established socialist system,
in which the levels of work of cadres were inadequate to cope
with the rapidly changing reality. Cadres of the Party, of the
state and economic organs, were relatively backward political-
ly and practically in relation to the complicated problems
posed. In addition, there were various strains which developed
in economic control and management. These problems could
be solved only by carrying through the revolutionary mass line.

It is true that vigorous promotion of a cultural revolution
was a basic solution, but it would not overcome immediately
the obstacles that were the source of the defects and short-
comings. The only immediate solution was to change the
system of work and method of direction in economic affairs. In
other words, it was necessary to establish a method of work
whereby the center could help the provinces, counties and
the ri. It was particularly important to radically change the
method of guidance by counties to the ri. This required a
changed orientation in the work of the county people’s com-
mittees.

As a result of the merger of agricultural cooperatives into
ri-unit associations, the ri became a production unit rather
than an administrative one. Under these circumstances, a
county people’s committee was required to change its func-
tions radically from directing lower administrative organs to

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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

organizing and guiding the work of agriculture cooperatives
established in each ri as a production unit.

Thus it became necessary for the county people's committee
to be wholly responsible for the agricultural production of
cooperative associations organized on a ri basis, as direct
participants in them, and to bring its guidance decisively
closer to the agricultural production of each cooperative. At a
time when private farms dominated, the county people s com-
mittee used to guide private farms by administrative means
through ri people's committees. However, now that a ri as a
whole had become a production unit in the form of a coopera-
tive, that system of guidance became extremely unrealistic.

In connection with the new system of guidance, by county
people's committees to the ri directly, the structure of county
people's committees was also improved substantially by
adapting them to agricultural production by cooperatives.
Thus, a county cooperative farm management committee was
established independent of the county people's committee,
as a special organ for the guidance of cooperatives' agricultural
production. This new body later became the core of the new
agricultural guidance system in North Korea.

The next task was to improve the method of guidance and
operation of county Party committees — to get rid of formalistic
administrative and bureaucratic work methods and to stick
firmly to the basic line of Party work in order to increase its
leading role. Kim 11 Sung put it this way:

The basic method in Party work is not to give orders but to per-
suade and educate

You should have frequent talks with the Party members, lecture to
them, induce them to read books, and direct their meetings so that
all Party members will have a clear understanding of the intentions
of the Party Central Committee, wholeheartedly uphold the Party s
policies, and go through thick and thin to carry them out. Such is
Party work, political work. By giving precedence to politics, which
we have been calling for, we mean doing the political work well first,

SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

117

then other work. When political work is done well, administrative
work will naturally go well, too 1

In the final analysis, this means political and ideological
work should be given priority in all areas so that the Party's
policy will be brought to broad sections of the working masses,
rousing them to implement the proposed revolutionary tasks.

In connection with this, a series of questions were also pre-
sented. Included was the question of county Party committees
directly leading all the lowest level Party organizations in the
counties as the Party's terminal leading organs; the further
strengthening of the system of collective consultation; es-
tablishment of correct business-like relations between the
county Party committee and the county people's committee;
raising the political level and business-like conduct of county
committees and practical leaders.

Posed as important tasks in strengthening the collective
leadership of county Party committees were, first, the prob-
lem of organizing the sections of collective leadership firmly
and, second, the job of mobilizing the wisdom of broad sec-
tions of the masses. Creative, alive wisdom always comes from
among the masses.

For all party activists to go to the masses to draw from their
inexhaustible initiative and capacity, to formulate ideas
through collective consultation, and to return these concepts
to the masses, thereby organizing and enlisting all workers in
the execution of revolutionary tasks — herein lies the most
fundamental content of the Chongsanri spirit and the Chong-
sanri method.

Finally, in the field of economic activities, priority was
given to the task of elevating decisively the level of economic
management and planning. Where agricultural cooperatives
were merged into ri-unit farms and were transformed into
large-scale socialist collective farms, planned management
and control of the cooperative associations became a pressing
requirement.

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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

In the control and management of the economy it was also
necessary for the work method to locate a central link in the
chain of activities and to concentrate all energy on it. For
instance, in the northern half of the Republic, grains are the
basis of agricultural production. Consequently, in the activi-
ties of the agricultural cooperatives, all energy had to be con-
centrated on production particularly of grains, without dis-
persing labor power, materials, funds, etc., to other second-
ary sections.

It was further proposed as an important task correctly to
carry through the socialist principle of distribution and
effectively to stimulate the material interest of farmers. As
Kim 11 Sung explained:

Although the means of production have been socialized, differ-
ences in skill and intensity of labor still remain, and the people s
consciousness is not yet up to the communist standard. Under such
conditions, the enthusiasm of the working people for production can
be raised and the productive forces developed rapidly only by dis-
tribution according to the work performed. This is an objective law
of the socialist economy and an important principle that must be
adhered to in running it . 5

This does not mean a one-sided emphasis on material in-
centives. The basic policy remains to educate the working
people in the ideas of communism, raise their voluntary en-
thusiasm, and to link this with material incentives. Evaluation
of working days in agricultural labor was proposed as the best
means of measurement for applying material incentives.

A major change was effected in the work of the Party, state
and economic organs during the application of the Chongsanri
spirit and method in all areas of the country. Guidance was
brought closer to the people, higher bodies helped lowei, and
leaders made direct contact with the masses and established a
revolutionary course for educating, remolding and uniting
them and for solving all problems by encouraging everyone to
give full play to his revolutionary zeal and creative initiative.

SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

119

2. THE DAE AN WORK SYSTEM -MANAGEMENT
FOR INDUSTRY

The Daean work system, evolved by Premier Kim II Sung
through his on-the-spot guidance (in December 1961) at
Daean Electric Machine Factory, was an embodiment of the
Chongsanri spirit and method in the area of industrial man-
agement.

The Chongsanri spirit and method applied to the field of
industrial management means to implement the mass line —
i.e., to give prime importance to ideological, political and
moral stimuli and to combine these stimuli with material
incentives in order rapidly to develop production.

To strengthen political and ideological understanding of the
working masses, priority should be given to raising the leading
role of the vanguard party as well as of political and other
work with the people. At the same time, it is essential to estab-
lish a closer relationship between higher and lower organs
and for all leaders to make direct contact with the masses, to
learn from them and to teach them, and to improve their
revolutionary consciousness and enthusiasm.

In this way, the essence of the Daean system of economic
management is that it relates most successfully to the nature of
socialist society. It is a system of mobilizing the masses con-
sciously for economic construction by strengthening political
education as well as political and ideological stimuli and by
adhering thoroughly to the principle of collective life. It is
also a system of collectively managing and controlling the
economy on the basis of the principle of democratic central-
ism under the leadership of the vanguard party, with the par-
ticipation of the masses, learning from them and teaching
I hem, higher organs directly helping lower organs.

The construction of socialism and communism is the great

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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

revolutionary cause of the masses themselves. It can be
realized only through their creative labor. Consequently,
ideological stimulus to arouse this revolutionary conscious-
ness and enthusiasm is of decisive significance. And only
when there are socialist relations of production, free from all
forms of exploitation and oppression, is it possible for millions
of working people to display this zeal. Consequently, ideo-
logical stimuli fully reflect the objective requirements of
socialist development.

Along with this, the essential superiority of socialist pro-
duction relations must be brought out fully through economic
control and management. The socialist economy, by its nature,
is a highly organized, planned economy, which constantly
develops at a rapid pace, according to schedule. This is the
necessary law of the development of the socialist economy.
At the same time, the more the economy is developed and
the more its scale is expanded, the more complex will be the
internal structure of the economy, with the result that a higher
level of organization is required.

Planned management and control of a highly developed
and organized socialist economy cannot be carried out
successfully by a handful of specialists without the advice
and cooperation of the people. Thus, to strengthen their
ideological understanding and attain their participation in
economic control and management is in accord with the ob-
jective development of the socialist economy.

(1) Essence of the Daean System

The Daean work system means, in a word, to embody the
mass line in economic control; to get rid of survivals of
capitalism in economic management such as bureaucracy,
over-centralization and individualism, and to implement the
Chongsanri spirit and method, enabling workers to contribute
to the maximum in accelerating socialist construction.

SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

121

In any kind of social system, economic management cor-
responds to that system and reflects its essential requirements.
Under the capitalist system industrial management is adapted
to that system and reflects its essential requirements. All the
means of production are in the hands of capitalists and the
organization, control and management of production are con-
trolled by them. Needless to say, workers are completely
alienated from the control and management of production. In
the final analysis, the motivation, management and control
of capitalist production are devoted to the search for surplus
value and profit. It is obvious that labor and material controls,
as well as distribution of funds, are subordinated entirely to
the quest for profit. If a factory or enterprise is unable to
realize these objectives, it will be shut down. The sole aim of
lationalization and scientific methods of management and
control is to intensify the exploitation of workers and achieve
a maximum return with a minimum of materials and funds -
that is, to squeeze out maximum surplus value and profit.

In this sense, the capitalist system of industrial management
fully reflects the fundamental law of capitalist production -
the law of surplus value; and completely serves the essential
demand of the capitalist system -surplus value and profit.
Thus, it is quite natural that workers have no direct material
interest in the results of, nor do they care about, capitalist
production. Their interest is confined to the fact that the
management and control of capitalist production results in an
intensification of their exploitation.

Thus, the capitalist system of industrial management inten-
sifies class antagonisms between the worker and the capitalist.
The more rational and scientific the system is, the more inten-
sified will be the class antagonisms between workers and
capitalists, until the capitalist system will be overthrown. This
is the inevitable contradiction inherent in the capitalist sys-
tem of industrial management, which is, after all, a reflection
of the essential contradiction in the capitalist system itself.

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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

The capitalist system of industrial management is fated for
ultimate destruction following the collapse of the capitalist
system itself. But this takes time, because the socialist society,
newly born following the collapse of capitalism, unavoidably
is plagued to a considerable extent by the survivals of capital-
ism. Before the establishment of the Daean work system, this
was the case with the system of industrial management in the
northern half of the Republic. Kim 11 Sung put it this way:

It must be admitted that the old system of factory management,
though socialist, still retained many capitalist elements. Bureaucracy,
departmentalism, and individualism were found in large measure.
Superiors shouted commands at their subordinates in a bureaucratic
manner instead of going to help them; a spirit of cooperation between
workshops was lacking; and among some people there was a ten-
dency toward individualism of the “You attend to your business, I’ll
stick to mine!” variety. Therefore, under the old system of work,
it was not possible to give full play to the activity and initiative of
workers, people busied themselves for nothing, and no sizable
achievements were made in production. 0

Capitalist survivals found their concentrated expression in
factories administered exclusively by managers. They were
vested with sole decision-making powers and responsibility
for production. Under such conditions, arbitrary control, sub-
jective discretion, and other bureaucratic methods flourished.
And where managers were not controlled by the Party, the
damage was greater.

Workers participated insufficiently in factory control and
management. It was impossible to stimulate their political,
moral and material interest. They were little concerned with
whether production was going well or not. Their job was to
work for eight hours, as assigned, and then go home. Needless
to say, this system did not reflect the essential superiority of
the socialist system.

It could not be said that this was a socialist system of factory
management, in the fullest meaning of the word, operating in

ll

SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

123

accordance with the essential requirements of the socialist
system. In conditions of expanding production and more com-
plex and varied organic relationships among different branches
of production, where more scientific and rational economic
control and management were required, it became all the
more evident that a system of control and administration of a
factory at the discretion of a manager or a group of several
specialists did not fit in with the new circumstances.

After the completion of the socialist transformation of pro-
duction relations in town and countryside, and after the estab-
lishment of the socialist system, it was quite natural that a
system of industrial management fully reflecting the essential
requirements of this system, characteristic of this system and
socialist in the fullest meaning of the word, had to be estab-
lished.

The content of socialist system of industrial management is
defined primarily by the essential requirements of the social-
ist system itself. It has to faithfully reflect the superiority of
the socialist system and satisfy completely the requirements
of the fundamental law of socialist production.

The socialist system, in which the masses of people have
power, own all the means of production and are complete-
ly liberated from all forms of exploitation and oppression,
makes it possible for everyone to give rein to his creativity
and talent and to develop production constantly and rapidly.
It also enables the economy to develop in a planned and bal-
anced way, mobilizing and utilizing effectively and to a maxi-
mum all human and material resources, and the full production
potential. Kim 11 Sung explained:

The working masses create history, and socialism and communism
can be built only by the creative labor of millions of working peo-
ple. Labor power is the most active and decisive element of produc-
tion. Technology is developed by man, and machinery, too, is made
by man and is operated by man. All precious and beautiful material
and all cultural wealth are made by the labor of the working people.

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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

After all, it may be said that whether we can construct socialism
and communism faster and better depends on how the working peo-
ple can give full play to their creative capacity and talent, on how
we organize social labor and utilize it, and on how rapidly we can
increase labor productivity. 7

To achieve this, the vanguard party decisively should
heighten its leading role and priority should be given to politi-
cal work. At the same time, this must be linked with economic
and technical work and with the material interest of the work-
ing people. This approach helps raise the level of conscious-
ness of the working people, imbues them with collectivist and
communist ideas, and ultimately converts them into commu-
nist men and women who devote themselves voluntarily, with-
out any social compulsion, to the cause of society and the
revolution. This will help guarantee democratic centralism,
scientific quality and rationality in economic control and
management.

The Daean work system evolved by Kim 11 Sung is a creative
Marxist-Leninist system of industrial management, completely
equipped with the essential conditions for a socialist system
of industrial management. Its essential content is, first, to give
priority to political and ideological work with people, to
strengthen ideological stimuli and thereby thoroughly to
eradicate individualism and egotism and to enable people
to give maximum play to their revolutionary enthusiasm and
creative talent — all this for the purpose of economic manage-
ment and control.

Above all it is vital in this connection to evaluate the peo-
ple's ideology and understanding of economic control and, on
this basis, to inform them about the economic policy of the
Party. It is necessary for the people to participate in working
out production plans and measures and to display their
political enthusiasm and creative capacity. They should
participate in production, control and management so that
their enthusiasm for work and their creative talents will

SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 125

continue. Achievements should be evaluated politically,
before being evaluated materially, to strengthen ideological
stimuli.

Second, the essential purpose of the Daean work system is
to increase production and to control and to manage the econ-
omy by applying the principle of collectivist and communist
life through promoting comradely accommodation and close
cooperation among producers and also among producing units.
Thus, the Daean work system not only fully reflects the super-
iority of the socialist system and the fundamental law T of
socialist production but also amply contains in it elements of
communist economic management. These elements are ex-
pressed in the fact that the producers consciously and positive-
ly participate in economic management and that their econom-
ic control and management is carried out on the basis of a high
level of consciousness and revolutionary enthusiasm. It is
clear that economic management in a communist society will
take the form of collective management by millions of con-
scious, communist working people.

Consequently, the Daean work system is the prototype of
communist economic management.

Furthermore, the people cooperate with each other and all
work units help one another in economic management, and in
this way the principle of collective and communist life is
being implemented.

Finally, this system also helps train people as excellent and
cultured producers and as able managers:

The Daean work system is radically different from the old; it is an
advanced system with many factors of communist industrial manage-
ment. This new system of work is an excellent embodiment of the
principle of collective, communist life: “One for all and all for one.”
In this system, superiors help their subordinates, the well-informed
leach the less-informed, all the people help each other as comrades,
and all workshops cooperate closely. 8

Third, the essential meaning of the Daean work system is

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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

that economic management and control are carried out through
aid by higher to lower organs and by superiors to their sub-
ordinates.

(2) Superiority of the Daean System

The Daean work system will prove superior in all respects
in the actual management and control of the socialist econo-
my, in the first place, because it completely guarantees col-
lective leadership of the Party committee, the highest organ of
the economic unit concerned.

It also ensures the principle of democratic centralism in
socialist economic management, makes it possible to link
centralized and unified leadership with democracy in the
economy and, on this basis, to realize an effective economy.
The unification and detailing of plans is precisely the focal
point of the superiority of the Daian work system. Better plan-
ning of integrated production is based on the principle of
superiors helping subordinates.

The most important point of the Daean economic manage-
ment system is that it strengthens the Party’s leading role in
the economy and fully ensures collectivism in the control
and management of factories. Under the previous system, the
director was responsible for the factory and workers had
hardly any interest in its control and management. No real
material conditions were guaranteed for workers and thus
they had no interest in whether production and management
at their factories were successful.

In these circumstances, workers were not masters of produc-
tion but only inactive employees obeying bureaucratic orders
and directions. This situation was not in accord with the nature
of socialism, nor could the workers display their initiative and
play a positive role.

The new Daean work system removed these fundamental
defects. In the new system, the factory Party committee

SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

127

directly and collectively controls and manages the factory as
the highest leading body enabling all Party members, workers
and engineers to participate actively in factory management.
Consequently, one particular person is not responsible for
production, as in the old factory management system, but all
Party members, workers and engineers are responsible, and,
above all, the factory Party committee is responsible as the
collective leading body. According to Kim 11 Sung:

All the successes scored at the Daean Electrical Machine Factory
have once again clearly demonstrated that the first and foremost
task in the leadership of production is to strengthen the work of the
Party committee and to enhance the vanguard role of the entire Party
membership in the factory. 9

If the Party committee does a good job in carrying out col-
lective leadership, it encourages all Party members to be more
active, and if all Party members become active, all people
can be influenced to work with enthusiasm. All Party mem-
bers and workers will work consciously to increase pro-
duction and to manage and control the factory better; no
collective leadership is more complete than this, nor is there
greater proof of a factory’s collective capacity. In addition,
the Party’s leading role guarantees that all work is political
work and the production battle is a battle of the masses
themselves.

The essential of Party leadership is not to give administra-
live orders or instructions or to exercise control, but to per-
suade and educate. The more complex and difficult the job,

I lie more it is necessary to educate and transform the people
so that they become conscious, learn the correct way, and
forge ahead with conviction. Party and political work entails
leading all Party members to grasp the intentions of the Party
r(‘nter correctly, to support Party policy wholeheartedly, and
lo concentrate on its realization.

The policy of giving priority to political work, which the
I ’arty has consistently upheld, attaches prime importance to

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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

this work and subordinates all other activities to it. If the
political work is done correctly, there will be no spread ot
administrative or bureaucratic methods. At the same time, the
smooth execution of administrative control will be ensured.

The new Daean work system is superior, secondly, because
it is most effective in managing industry in a planned way.
Planning is the most important part of, and one of the keys to,
the success of socialist economic construction.

Under socialism, all equipment, supplies and raw materia s
are used according to plan and all economic life, including
production and consumption, is planned. In such conditions,
if planning is not carried out smoothly, large quantities ot
equipment, material and labor power are wasted and grave

loss is caused to the socialist economy.

And the most important part of planning is to ensure a
balance among different sectors of the economy. In other
words balance must be maintained between accumulation
and consumption, between industry and agriculture, between
the industrial sector and other sectors, i.e., between heavy-
industry and light industry, between ore extraction industries
and processing industries, etc. Balanced development of the
economy is in itself the law of development of socialism.

However, smooth planning is not a simple task, but veiy
difficult and complex. For planning work to be carried out
successfully according to the scientific laws of economic
development, it is necessary, above all, to make accurate
judgments and calculations about the conditions of equipment
and supply of materials, and especially with regard to labor
power, the most decisive element of productive forces, i.e.,
the health, ideological level, awareness and skill of workers.

Without correct information on all these factors, it would be
impossible to draw up a realistic scientific mobilization plan.
However, a handful of specialists or members of planning
committees cannot possibly grasp all these complex factors ot
production. Herein lies the decisive significance of mobiliz-

SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

129

ing broad masses for participation in planning work, relying
upon their creative capacity and talent.

Needless to say, it is the workers directly engaged in pro-
duction who are most familiar with all the special problems of
their factory, whether sufficient materials are supplied, and
whether machinery operates properly. Therefore, to work out
an objective and realistic plan, planners must consider pro-
duction factors constantly and draw on workers’ knowledge
and creativity. It is impossible to evolve a practical plan if
one juggles figures on one’s desk without holding discussions
with others who are directly engaged in production. Kim 11
Sung says:

The present textbooks on political economy set forth many condi-
tions for ensuring good planning. But they do not give importance to
the problem of the mass line in planning. I think it is necessary to
complete a new textbook on political economy in conformity with
the mass line. 10

To avoid bureaucracy and subjectivism in planning, col-
lective efforts are required. A plan drawn up without participa-
tion of production workers is necessarily subjectivist, and
bureaucracy results when such plans are imposed upon the
masses. All plans — from the state, control bureau, factory,
down to the workshop — should be drawn up after discussion
with those who are directly engaged in production, taking
into consideration the revolutionary initiative and experience
of workers.

The basic content of the Daean work system is to strengthen
the leading role of the Party in the economy, to draw broad
working masses into active management and control of fac-
lories, and to encourage them to display their creative capaci-
ly and talent to the fullest extent. This system has opened
I lie way for broad working masses to participate actively in
planning and to contribute their creative capacity and talent.
Kim II Sung said: “Presented as the most important problem
m the direction of the Daean Electrical Machine Factory was

130

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

the question of getting rid of bureaucracy and subjectivity in
planning work and of thoroughly carrying through the mass

line.” 11 ,

Third, the superiority of the Daean work system lies m the
fact that it has established a system by which technological
direction can be strengthened in production and by which
production can be guided in an integiated way.

Complex technological production processes naturally
require integrated direction by specialists who have mastered
the required techniques, from the formulation of production
plans down to technical preparations and control of produc-
tion processes.

In the old work system, many production processes were
separated from each other and there was no general staff that
could direct production in an integrated way. In the new
Daean work system, there is a unified general staff, with the
chief engineer at the center, to guide the whole production
process, including the planning of production and piepaia-
tions, in a unified way. This makes it possible to suboidinate
all problems in the factory to the struggle to guarantee pro-
duction.

Fourth, the new Daean work system is decisively superior
to the old in that it has improved radically the role of each sec-
tion responsible for guaranteeing production. By overcoming
the old bureaucratic and subjectivist method of work it guar-
anteed the supply of materials. This made it possible for those
directly engaged in directing production, including foremen,
to concentrate on their proper work -preparing equipment
and production, raising the level of consciousness of the work-
ers, and guiding production.

Further, in order to increase production, a community sup-
ply system was established to guarantee the living conditions
of workers. For instance, at the Daean Electric Machine Fac-
tory a management committee was organized, consisting of
the assistant director in charge of community supply work

SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 131

and representatives of the administration of the factory work-
ers’ living quarters, general stores, state farms and livestock-
breeding farms, cooperative farms and of the organizations
engaged in public supply work.

The decisive superiority of the Daean work system in
arousing enthusiasm and initiative among the working masses,
in strengthening leadership in production and in guarantee-
ing production and supplies for the workers is being demon-
strated clearly in actual life through a great upsurge of socialist
construction in the northern half of the Republic.

(3) Significance of the Daean System

The Daean work system was a clear-cut answer to the most
difficult and pressing question confronting socialist and com-
munist construction — how should socialist economic manage-
ment be organized after the establishment of the socialist sys-
tem ? In this sense, it w 7 as an entirely new and original frontier
reached in the Marxist-Leninist theory of economic manage-
ment. The most essential requirement of the Daean work sys-
tem is decisively to increase the leading role of the vanguard
party in economic management, to strengthen collective
leadership, to draw broad masses into production and eco-
nomic management, to rely on their capability and to lead
I hem to give full play to their inexhaustible creative capacity
mid revolutionary enthusiasm, i.e., to implement collective
notion — the mass line.

In a socialist system, all forms of exploitation and oppres-
sion are eliminated, all the means of production are socialized
ni< I all production is managed only for the improvement of
i he material and cultural life of all the people. But the ques-
tion remains, how can the superiority of the socialist system
Inlly be displayed, how should the economic management
\ '.tom be organized collectively?

I he continued development of planned and balanced pro-

132

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

duction, based on socialized means of production, is a law.
The question is, how can subjectivism be overcome in eco-
nomic management and how can planning be organized cor-
rectly?

The Daean work system answers these questions. It fully
reflects the essential superiority of the socialist system.

If workers are to be encouraged to give full play tQ their
inexhaustible vitality and initiative, priority in all activities
should be concentrated on Party and political work. Material
incentive plays its proper role only on condition that priority
be given to political and ideological education and that the
material incentive be organically linked to this education.

The Daean work system gave a decisive blow to the theory
which maintains that as the economy develops and as its scale
expands under socialism, its growth rate declines. Such a
theory is reactionary and is absolutely incompatible with the
law of development of the socialist economy. The socialist
economic system has the potential for economic development
at a rate undreamt of in capitalist society, and as the economy
develops and expands, this potential becomes greater.

For example, in capital construction, the principle means of
realizing socialist expanded reproduction and one of the fac-
tors determining the rate of economic development, socialism
is decidedly superior to capitalism. The socialist state, which
is in a position to control production and distribution, accumu-
lation and consumption according to a central plan, has the
possibility of investing tremendous funds in capital construc-
tion.

Further, as the foundation of the socialist economy is ex-
panded and strengthened, the scale of accumulation is in-
creased, with the result that expenditures for capital construc-
tion can be increased systematically and at a rapid rate. This
provides a realistic possibility of speeding up the tempo of
socialist expanded reproduction.

SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

133

With regard to increasing labor productivity, which is
anothei decisive factor for determining economic develop-
ment under socialism, it may be said that reserves in this field
are still greater. The working people have unlimited capabil-
ities and talents, and if their political and ideological aware-
ness is raised constantly, and if their experience and enthu-
siasm are encouraged, labor productivity will continue to
lise. And if this is combined with a technological revolu-
tion, if machinery and automated equipment are introduced,
there is no doubt that labor productivity will be all the more
enhanced.

Tims, the greater the scale of the economy and the more de-
\ eloped the production, the faster will be the rate of economic
development. This is the law of the development of the so-
cialist economy. The question is how to interpret this law,
how to manage and control the economy, and how the system
of economic management should be organized rationally.

The decisive significance of the Daean work system lies in
the fact that it is based on this objective law of development
and that it is adapted to socialist production relations — the
economic management system best suited to the expanding
productive forces — and that it perfects the superstructure,
the administrative system oi the Party, state and economic
organizations in such a way that these may be adapted fully
to the established base.

further, as mentioned earlier, the Daean work system in
many respects has ample factors of communist enterprise
management. This system is permeated by the principle of
collective and communist life. Its most essential content
is that people work for society and for the community con-
sciously and in a communist way, voluntarily and without any
compulsion, helping each other in a comradely way. Conse-
quently, this system is of decisive significance in educating
•md remolding people in a communist way. Kim 11 Sung wrote:

134

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

When the communist principle is strictly observed in work, bu-
reaucracy and egoism naturally disappear. Innovations in production
have been made by many comrades, and they have worked devotedly
solely in the interests of the state and the people, not merely to get
more wages. If we allow people to become mercenary, it will be im-
possible to realize the transition to communism. Transition to com-
munism requires not only economic development, but also the re-
molding of the old ideologies in mens minds. It is important above
anything else for people to work voluntarily and consciously.

Our system of work is one where people work and live in a com-
munist way. It unites all the people without exception, and brings
their devotion and creative ability into full play, enabling them to
bring about greater results in production.

The great power of the new system of work is the great power of
unity and cooperation, the great power of the vitality and creativity
of the awakened masses; it is the great power which is born when
Party leadership penetrates deeply into the lower units . 12

The Daean work system, which basically and decisively
strengthens the leading role of the vanguard party and the
socialist state in the economy and realizes the piinciple of
democratic centralism in economic management, is of great
importance in strengthening the function of the dictatorship
of the proletariat.

The socialist economy develops according to a planned and
balanced law and it requires centralized and unified direction
by the vanguard party and the state. 1 he basic concept of a
socialist economy precludes individual factories and enter-
prises from being managed and controlled spontaneously. The
unified and detailed system of planning which is an important
part of the Daean work system, reflects this basic concept of a
socialist economy and ensures that the unified socialist state
can provide direction and control even to the smallest section
of each sector of the economy.

The Daean work system relies completely on the principles
of Marxism-Leninism, and is an economic management sys-

SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

135

tern creatively adapted to the concrete conditions of the
revolution and construction in the country. It is a great victory
for the Juche idea and for the mass line of the Workers Party.

3. A NEW SYSTEM OF AGRICULTURAL GUIDANCE

After the completion of agricultural collectivization in
August 1958, a decision was made (in October of the same
year) to merge agricultural cooperatives into ri-unit farms.
This was a very complex task. However, it was completed
smoothly in a short period of one to two months in a great up-
surge of political enthusiasm among the peasants as a result
of their active struggles. The merger of cooperatives wrought
a major change in the countryside. The number of cooperative
farms was reduced from 13,309 to 3,843. The average size was
increased from 80 to about 300 households and the average
acreage from 130 to 500 hectares, or about four-fold.

The mergers created objective conditions for promoting
land adjustment in earnest, for introducing modern farm
machinery and advanced agricultural techniques, for utilizing
natural and economic conditions more rationally, for develop-
ing diversified cooperative farms, for eliminating inefficient
use of labor and materials and for promoting prompt and
planned rural construction.

As a result of the merger of cooperatives, the chairman of the
ri people’s committee also assumed the post of chief manager
of the cooperative. This meant that the local administrative
body was brought closer to production and its leading role
and functions in the economic and cultural construction of
the countryside were strengthened.

Simultaneously with the merger of the cooperatives, meas-
ures were taken to transfer the stores of consumer coopera-
I ives and of mutual-aid credit associations to the agricultural

136

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

cooperatives. As a result, the agricultural cooperatives had
control not only of agricultural production but also of circula-
tion and credit so that their economic activities could be
managed according to plan.

Technological agricultural innovation thus arose as a serious
task in the early part of 1959. Kim II Sung saw it this way:

Today our basic task in the domain of agriculture is to realize a
technical revolution and a cultural revolution in the countryside
in several years and thereby to strengthen further socialist coopera-
tive farms politically and economically and to develop our rural com-
munities into prosperous and cultured socialist communities
equipped with modern techniques. 1 '*

In only several years after this task was proposed, irrigation,
mechanization and electrification projects, which are the mam
aspects of the technological revolution in the countryside,
were carried out on a large scale and, as a result, the material
and technical foundations of agriculture were strengthened
further.

As a result of the rapidly increased material and technical
assistance by' the state to the countryside, at the end of 1962
Sukchon county, for example, completed a large-scale iriiga-
tion system. Its channels had a total length of 400 kilometers
and it was equipped with 262 water-lifting pumps. The county
also acquired 200-odd tractors, trucks, different kinds of farm
machinery, transformers, electric motors, pumps and various
other technical equipment. The county now had machinery
and equipment comparable to that at a first-rate state-run in-
dustrial enterprise in those days.

Together with the completion of agricultural collectiviza-
tion, the technical, cultural and ideological levels as well as
the level of consciousness of the peasants were also raised.
Farmers who had had only small farm implements, such as
sickles and hoes, were now engaged collectively in agricul-
tural production using tractors and other large-scale farm

SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

137

machines. These conditions necessarily brought about a major
change in their ideology and consciousness.

Thus, objective conditions were created for educating and
remolding peasants with ideas of collectivism and commu-
nism. Moreover, as a result of the merger of agricultural co-
operatives into ri-unit farms, a radical change was effected in
the functions and role of the ri people’s committee as an ele-
mentary unit of state administration. After the merger, the ri
became a large agricultural production unit rather than an ad-
ministrative unit. Formerly, individual farms had one or two
hectares of arable land. After the merger, when the basic farm
unit comprised more than 300 households and had an average
of 500 hectares of arable land, the business of the ri people’s
committee became more complex and diversified. Before,
each individual farmer was responsible for his farm, and the ri
people’s committee was the administrative director. However,
after the merger it became necessary for the people’s com-
mittee to control its farm directly and to manage it according
to plan.

With the new and complicated situation created after the
completion of collectivization and merger, a tremendous task
laced agriculture, since the old system of management was no
longer adequate. Consequently, establishment of a socialist
system of agricultural management completely adapted to this
new situation, a system and method of controlling and man-
aging the new agricultural cooperatives, fully in accord with
socialized agriculture, was presented as an urgent revolu-
tionary need. Together with this was the need to overcome as
soon as possible the backwardness of agriculture as compared
with advanced industry, regarding relations of ownership and
levels of economic management, as well as production.

I h rough his on-the-spot guidance of agricultural work in
Sukchon county. South Pyongan province, in December 1961,
kirn II Sung scientifically analyzed the new situation created
hi the countryside. Creatively applying the general principles

138

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

of Marxism-Leninism, he founded an entirely new socialist
system of agricultural management, with the county coopera-
tive farm management committee as its main pivot. This agii-
eultural guidance system is an embodiment of the Chongsann
spirit and method in the domain of agriculture and of the
Marxist-Leninist system of guidance, reflecting the basic su-
periority of socialized agriculture and the fundamental law of
socialist agricultural production.

Essentially, improved methods of control and management
of socialist agriculture in North Korea were in the direction of
raising their level closer to the advanced methods of industrial
management. Counties were defined as strategic strongholds
for the guidance and management of socialist agricultuie and
county cooperative farm management committees weie es-
tablished. At the same time, provincial rural economy com-
mittees were created as leading organs for county coopeia-
tive farm management committees; simultaneously, the Min-
istry of Agriculture was reorganized into the Central Agri-
cultural Commission.

The creation of county cooperative farm management com-
mittees and provincial rural economy committees was an im-
portant measure to improve radically the direction of agricul-
ture in accordance with the realities of the changed countiy-
side. And it was, at the same time, the most appropriate meas-
ure to solve various problems that had to be solved for the
development of socialist agriculture.

The most important role in the new agricultural guidance
system belonged to the county cooperative farm management
committee. It controlled in a unified way the state-iun
enterprises and the personnel serving agriculture, including
technicians, as well as machine shops, farm-implement fac-
tories and irrigation control offices; it also organized and
guided the work of cooperative farms directly. It was a special-
ized body which had the dual functions of directly guiding co-
operatives and of providing them with material and technical

aid.

SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 139

The county cooperative farm management committee has
the following tasks. First, it must strengthen its leadership
with agricultural specialists and expand the ranks of agricul-
tural engineers, to assign them to each work team on the co-
operative farms and to institute a system of chief engineers
on the farms. Especially important for all active workers is to
follow the Chongsanri spirit and method in the management
committee, and to introduce the Daean work method into the
guidance of farm production and management. Following
these methods, the task of the committee is to control produc-
tion, to raise the level of planning and to secure more materi-
als, fertilizer and agricutural chemicals.

Second, there is the matter of increasing decisively the utili-
zation rate of machinery and equipment, especially tractors.
The realization of mechanization in agriculture depends to a
large extent on the rational utilization of tractors, and the man-
agement committee is required to assure the greater utiliza-
tion of tractors in a variety of ways.

Third, an effort has to be made to improve seed constantly
and to select superior seed best suited for the soil so as de-
cisively to increase agricultural production. This is an es-
pecially important question in intensive farming, which is the
basis of socialist agriculture.

Fourth, in addition to these technical matters, the manage-
ment committee is required to raise the planning levels in
agriculture. It is basic to the management committee’s plan-
ning activities to have direct control over all planning, to
draw up plans after direct and thorough consultation with the
masses, and to explain to the masses fully the plans thus
worked out.

Fifth, it is urgent to improve the administration of labor,
which is a question of rationally organizing the labor force, of
preventing its outflow and of persuading workers to settle in
• he countryside. It is also a task of labor administrators to set
rational work norms in the countryside, and to evaluate ac-
curately the quality and quantity of work, thereby enforcing

140

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

the principle of socialist distribution and increasing material
incentives.

Sixth, there is the job of correctly directing and supervising
the financial affairs of cooperative farms and of establishing a
complete system of control over their property. Here the im-
portant question is to set a correct balance between the con-
sumption and accumulation of the cooperative farm, to con-
sider the living conditions of farmers, and to guarantee a
proper level of joint accumulation.

Seventh, is the task of raising the technical education of
farmers and concentrating on training technical cadres. This
task is more and more urgent, along with the problem of the
technical revolution in the countryside. The county Party
committee has the responsibility for the political education of
farmers in order decisively to raise their ideology and con-
sciousness.

The advantage of the county cooperative farm management
committee lies primarily in the fact that it can use industiial
management techniques. Formerly, the county and ri people s
committees directed agriculture by administrative means. As
collectivization was completed and the scale of cooperative
farms expanded, and as agriculture gradually was mechanized,
administrative methods of guidance became ineffective. New
socialist farms equipped with machinery and technological
equipment need direction through industrial management
methods.

The industrial method of management consists in directly
controlling, organizing, and giving concrete leadership in all
the activities of an enterprise -from planning to the organiza-
tion of production, technical progress, supply ol materials, allo-
cation and organization of the labor force, financial activities
and so forth. According to Kim 11 Sung:

The fundamental element in leadership by the industrial method
of management is the technical guidance of production.

SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

141

Agricultural production, like industrial production, is a technical
process. When farming was done by manual labor without the use of
machinery, technology did not seem to count for much in agriculture.
But as the technical reconstruction of agriculture forges ahead, it has
become more and more obvious that agricultural production must
also go through technical processes.

Not only have advanced irrigation systems been established today,
but numerous tractors and other farm machines are being introduced,
step by step, in our countryside. Without industrial management and
without technical guidance, it is utterly impossible to administer this
agricultural production. 14

Administration of agriculture through industrial manage-
ment thus means the rational and scientific organization and
control of all sections of agriculture and providing modern,
scientific techniques and advanced technical methods, in-
cluding rational utilization of all sorts of agricultural equip-
ment as well as irrigation, electrification, chemicalization and
other improvements.

An important question is the proper size of enterprises. The
county was set as the basic unit because within it there are
available technical and management cadres, farm workshops
and agricultural machinery repair shops, irrigation control
oil ices and other state-run enterprises serving agriculture. The
area of land under cultivation in a county is around 10,000
hectares, considered a proper size in all respects. In this sense,
cooperative farms did not meet these conditions and the prov-
ince was too large a unit.

Another advantage of the county cooperative farm manage-
ment committee is that it is suitable for organically linking
ownership by the whole people with cooperative ownership
■md for strengthening the aid of the state to cooperative farms.

Formerly, in many socialist countries, the strategic meeting
point between joint ownership by all the people and coopera-
tive ownership was the tractor station, through which techni-

142 THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

cal aid was given to cooperative farms to promote the techni-
cal revolution in the countryside. However, although this
could extend technical assistance to farmers, it could not regu-
late the production of cooperative farms directly and in an
integrated way. This limited the role of the tractor station. Fur-
ther, in some countries, tractor stations have been reorga-
nized as tractor repair shops, with cooperative farms purchas-
ing agricultural machinery on their own. Under these condi-
tions, differentials are created between collective farms well-
to-do enough to purchase agricultural machinery and others
that are not. Further, when a farm purchases a tractor, it has
to have a fairly high economic and technical level to utilize it
fully.

In contrast to this, the county cooperative farm manage-
ment committee has unified control of state-owned enter-
prises, technical equipment and capacity in agriculture, in-
cluding farm machinery workshops, farm machinery factories,
irrigation control offices, and livestock inoculation centers.
It uses industrial management techniques to direct coopera-
tive farms and, in this way, links state and cooperative owner-
ship in an organic way in production so that the technical and
economic assistance of the state to cooperative farms may be
increased decisively.

A technical revolution in agriculture, which requires tre-
mendous sums and advanced techniques, cannot be carried
out successfully by individual cooperative farms; the active
financial and technical aid of the state is necessary.

Rice is the main crop in the northern half of the Republic.
It is extremely difficult to mechanize its culture. However, a
clear-cut policy for the solution of this problem was presented
after the creation of the county cooperative farm management
committee, which strengthened cooperative farms not only
materially and technically but also organizationally. Thus,
shortcomings in agriculture were largely overcome.

The provincial rural economy committee, which controls

SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

143

farm machinery factories and repair shops and helps county
coopeiative farm management committees in their work,
directly guides all work in its province related to agricultural
production technically. It draws up production plans and
supervises their implementation, it supplies agricultural ma-
chinery, parts, fertilizer, agricultural chemicals and other ma-
terials to counties, selects proper crops and seeds, establishes
fertilizer application systems, selects seed-sowing seasons,
adjusts labor forces, etc.

Further, the provincial rural economy committee is obliged
to report to the Cabinet and the Central Agricultural Com-
mission regarding questions raised in the course of the
fulfillment of production and production plans. In other
words, the provincial rural economy committee completely
lakes over the job formerly done by the Ministry of Agricul-
ture.

The most important task of the Central Agricultural Com-
mission is to work out measures to develop agricultural tech-
niques. It gives concrete guidance to all programs related to
the development of agriculture, including studies on agricul-
tural machinery, on the improvement of seed, on measures
and efforts for land improvement, on long-term perspectives
for land reclamation, on fertilizers and soil, on improvement of
animal stock and stock-breeding, and on measures for the de-
velopment of other activities in the countryside, as well as
providing the wherewithal to guarantee this research and
study.

In addition, the work of the Central Agricultural Commis-
sion includes the following: preparation of measures to guar-
antee the supply of materials and agricultural machinery, sub-
mission of final plans, supervision of the enforcement of cur-
■'‘•iil plans, submission to the Party Central Committee and the
< .abinet of opinions about long-range agricultural plans,
guidance of large-scale land reclamation projects, and training
ol cadres, including engineers and scientists.

144

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

Thus the provincial rural economy committees are entrusted
with all administrative work related to the guidance of pro-
duction and the Central Agricultural Commission is required
to guide agriculture throughout the country from a general and
long-range standpoint. It is now possible under the new sys-
tem of agricultural guidance to set up a strong and direct sys-
tem of guidance at the level of production, with counties as
the main points, and to direct agriculture in the northern half
of the Republic in a unified way according to a long-range plan
for the future of agriculture. The new system is excellent not
only for raising the management and control of agriculture to
the level of advanced industrial management, but also for or-
ganically linking ownership by all the people to cooperative
ownership, and for solving immediate and future problems of
agricultural development by correctly linking them together.

As is well known, even under the socialist system the coun-
tryside is more backward than the urban areas not only in
culture and ideology but also in ownership relations and in the
level of economic management. These distinctions between
industry and agriculture, arising from different relations of
ownership, are the real basis that determines class distinc-
tions between the working class and the peasantry. Distinc-
tions on the level of economic management are also impor-
tant.

Consequently, to eliminate distinctions between the town
and the countryside and between the working class and the
peasantry, it is necessary to overcome the backwardness of
the countryside not only in technology, culture and ideology,
but also in the relations of ownership and, particulaily, the
level of economic management.

Using industrial management techniques to direct agricul-
ture is of decisive significance in overcoming backwardness
in the level of economic management. Further, the new sys-
tem plays an important role in determining the direction of the
future development of socialist cooperative farms, particularly

SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 145

with regard to the transformation of cooperative ownership
into ownership by the entire people. When the technical trans-
formation of agriculture is carried out, when machinery re-
places human labor in agriculture as in industry, and when all
people can live in abundance and enjoy their work, coopera-
tive farms will be transformed into all-people’s ownership.

This transformation is one of the most fundamental ques-
tions in the construction of communism. It is the basis for
erasing distinctions between town and countryside and be-
tween the working class and the peasantry. The new system of
agricultural control indicates clearly a realistic approach
toward solving this question. Wrote Kim II Sung:

Some people hold that the transition to communist society is possi-
ble even if the cooperative economy is retained, and go so far as to
say that the tiansition to communism is feasible even if private econ-
omy is left intact. This is all wrong.

Of course, it is not my intention to dwell here on what stages the
socialist economy has to go through to achieve the transition to com-
munism. But, at any rate, there is no doubt that in order to attain
communism the country's economy should be merged into one under
a single form of ownership, namely, ownership by the whole people,
and that, accordingly, cooperative ownership must be converted into
ownership by the whole people.

The organization of the county cooperative farm management
committees is the most rational way of bringing cooperative owner-
ship constantly closer to ownership by the whole people by further
strengthening the leading role of state ownership over cooperative
ownership, and by establishing a closer relationship between these
two forms . 15

To transform cooperative ownership into all-people’s owner-
ship, it is necessary not only to increase further the role of the
county cooperative farm management committee and to
mechanize agriculture on a large scale, but also to remold the
ideas and consciousness of peasants by decisively strengthen-
ing communist education among them. This is the shortest
and most correct way to attain communism.

146

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

In this way, the new system of agricultural control estab-
lished in the northern half of the Republic, together with the
Daean work system in industry, is of great significance for
the future construction of socialism and communism. In 1966,
Kim II Sung created the group management system, which is
significant for further strengthening and developing the new
direction of agriculture. This is a system whereby cooperative
farm members are formed into groups of 15 to 20 members,
and a certain area of land, a labor force, draft animals and other
means of productions are assigned to each group. Under this
system, a quota of harvest per chongbo is set for each group
according to the state plan, and the number of work days for
each group member is measured in accordance with his tempo
of work.

Before the introduction of this system, the elementary unit
of agricultural production was the cooperative farm work team.
Consequently, work team members, participating in work or-
ganized on a work team basis, were unable to settle down to
specific fields.

However, under the group management system, it is pos-
sible to organize production and labor according to the char-
acteristics of each plot of arable land on the cooperative farm
so as to make it most productive, and each farm member is
able to work a specific field during the whole cycle of produc-
tion. A member’s work is evaluated and he is remunerated
not only according to the number of days worked, but also ac-
cording to the size of the harvest. Thus the quality and effec-
tiveness of work are considered as well as quantity.

The first advantage of this system is that all peasants not
only participate in production with the collective group, as a
unit, but that political work can be conducted in the form best
suited to their actual conditions. In this way political and
ideological education, arming peasants with ideas of collec-
tivism and communism, is developed more vigorously in
close and direct connection with production activities. Also,

SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

147

under this system, the Chongsanri spirit and the method -the
revolutionary mass line -can be more thoroughly carried
tin ough in the socialist management of the countryside and,
particularly, in the management and control of cooperative
farms.

In other words, the introduction of this system has made it
possible for the broad masses of peasants to participate posi-
tively in all the management activities of cooperative farms
and to reflect fully their revolutionary enthusiasm, creative
capacity and constructive opinions in the general work of then-
cooperative farms. At the same time, this has resulted in
raising the level of political and practical work of leading ac-
tivists of cooperative farms and county cooperative farm
management committees.

Moreover, this system breaks down the state plan into work
learn and group levels of cooperative farms and enables each
larm member to link his work directly to the concrete tasks
ol the state plan. This means that the principle of centralizing
and detailing plans was carried through in the domain of agri-
culture.

Another advantage is that this system makes it possible to
utilize land, the basic means of production in agriculture, and
I lie other means of production more effectively. It greatly
improves work in labor administration, which is of central
importance in the management and control of cooperative
liinns. The system enables farm members to work a specific
»uca in groups, putting a stop to the labor turnover in the
countryside. Further, with the labor force mobilized in a
planned and organized way, efforts can be concentrated on
llie basic area of production, e.g., on the production of grains.

1 he gioup system also makes it possible to define work
norms and evaluate work days on the farm more correctly and
malistically; it provides a base for the correct realization of
i In* piinciple of socialist distribution. The group management
s slum already has demonstrated its advantages by strength-

148

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

ening and developing the new agrieultural controls and, es
pecially, by sharply developing agricultural production and
raising the standard of living of the cooperative farm members
in the northern half of the Republic.

For instance, on the Pochon cooperative farm, Hyang
county, Kangwon province, where the group managemenl
system was first introduced, grain production rose in 1967 In
166 per cent over 1965, before this system was introduced
On a county basis, grain production rose 133 per cent in the
same period and, on 523 cooperative farms in 17 counties,
where statistical returns arc already available, average grain
production rose more than 20 per cent on each farm in 1967
as compared with 1965, and the amount distributed to each
farm household rose from 2,364 kilograms in 1965 to 2,99b
kilograms in 1967, while cash income climbed from 642 iron
to 733 icon.

At the same time a new upsurge was seen in the political
and ideological life of peasants after the introduction ol llns
system. The elementary production units of agriculture and
of the collectives, as well as the activities of peasant masses,
were organized more rationally. This meant that the guidann
system, extending from the Central Agricultural Commission
to county cooperative farm management committees, was
firmly rooted in the places of production and among tin
peasant masses.

Further, the group management system ensured that I In
strategic points of political and ideological education ol I In
peasant masses with ideas of collectivism and communism
were established directly at the places of production. And
this, in turn, meant that a powerful stronghold for ideological
as well as material victory —a stronghold that must be caplin e< I

in the course of transition to socialism and communist

agriculture — was secured.

It may be said that the group management system is tin
prototype of an agricultural guidance system in commune, l

SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

149

nciety. It is run on the principle of collective and communist
lilc and of such production units a communist society will be
< miiposed.

In this way, the new agricultural guidance system estab-
lished in the northern half of the Republic, on the basis of

>ly cooperative farm management committees and the

management system, not only strengthens the socialist

of agriculture and greatly develops agricultural pro-

• luclion, but also is a powerful weapon to guarantee the eom-
I'l. le victory of socialism and its transition to communism in

• In I ield of agriculture.

4. UNIFIED AND DETAILED PLANNING

In a system in which all means of production are socialized,
economy can be developed only in a planned and bal-
way. The planned and bal ance d development of the
• uiiomy is a fundamental law of socialism. Without a plan,
economy cannot move a step. All production equipment,

'• (, es and raw materials are set into motion according to a

I 1 " 'lie Plan, and economic life, starting with production and

sumption, is conducted according to the plan. If the plan-

mug is incorrect, large amounts of equipment and material

■ II hr wasted and precious labor will be lost. The basic
"l" uority of a socialist economy can be displayed fully only
>» In n planning is done correctly.

I herefore, planning is one of the keys to success in socialist
. "mimic construction. It is most important for a plan to
" H" * correctly the objective and balanced development of
■i" economy and fully to mobilize the workers to fulfill it.
i In |ilan should rely on the economic policy of the Party and
»i". nl. I reflect it, because the economic line and policy of the
1 iil\ are rooted in the scientific laws governing the develop-
"" nl nl the socialist economy.

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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

On the basis of planning, Kim II Sung wrote: “A planned
development of the economy means, before anything else, a
correct balance among different sectors of the people’s
economy. To secure such a balance is the basis of planning
and the most important task of planning organizations. ” ,fi

To maintain a correct balance between accumulation and
consumption, it is necessary to combine expanded reproduc-
tion (for a planned development of the people’s economy) and
consumption (the people’s requirements). This is the most
difficult and complex question in socialist economic con-
struction.

In addition, various other complex problems are posed,
including the question of maintaining a balance between
industry and agriculture, and among various branches of
industry, e.g., between heavy industry and light industry
and between ore extraction industries and processing in-
dustries. Under conditions of an expanding economy and
larger economic units, the job of balancing these different
sectors is even more difficult.

However, that does not mean that it is impossible to guaran-
tee a correct balance. Kim II Sung wrote:

It is not only possible but also necessary to develop a balanced
economy under socialism. Whether it is possible to draw up a scien-
tific, realistic and mobilizing plan, to secure a correct balance and to
develop the economy at a rapid rate depends to a large extent on how
the functions and role of the economic and, particularly, planning
organizations are expanded and the work methods of personnel
engaged in planning work are improved . 17

The role of Juche in planning work is extremely important
in implementing the mass line.

The first contradiction in the old system of planning was
between the instructions of the state planners and the de-
mands of the direct producers. The planners assigned maxi-
mum production tasks while guaranteeing minimum supplies;
the producers tried to get by with minimum output tasks,

SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

151

while obtaining maximum guarantees of supplies. This con-
tradiction reflected bureaucratism and subjectivism of state
planners, and local patriotism and undue dependence on
central organs by the producers.

The second contradiction derived from the fact that although
state planners had a fairly good knowledge of the general
economic conditions and the prospect for economic develop-
ment, they had no concrete knowledge of actual conditions
and production reserves. On the other hand, producers were
well informed of the concrete conditions and production re-
serves at their enterprises, but had insufficient understanding
of the general economic conditions or of the general perspec-
tive of economic development. Consequently, it was neces-
sary to take these two factors into consideration in planning.
If this had been done, it would have been possible to draw up
a scientific and coordinated plan based on a nationwide pro-
gram. However, this was not done correctly in the old planning.

To overcome this contradiction and draw up a scientific,
realistic and coordinated plan, it was necessary for planning
personnel to acquire a good grasp of the objective conditions
and the realities of production reserves — the labor force, ma-
terials and other factors of production. However, these pro-
duction factors are complex and diversified, and it is impos-
sible for planning personnel to grasp them fully with their
limited data. So we have the problem of involving the broad
working masses in planning and of mobilizing their creativity
and talent fully, achieving mass participation in planning.

It was on this point that the question was posed of com-
pletely overcoming bureaucracy and subjectivity in planning,
of gaining mass participation -the question presented as the
most important in Premier Kim 11 Sung’s on-the-spot guidance
at Daean Electrical Machine Factory.

The problem is to get rid of the subjectivity and bureaucracy
ol the state planning organizations while also strengthening
slate control and guidance of planning, and overcoming undue

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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

dependence on higher bodies and the local patriotism of
producers so that economic planning may be developed cor-
rectly. The only way is on the basis of centralized plan-
ning. Kim 11 Sung says: “By centralized planning is meant the
inclusion of state planning organizations and planning units
scattered throughout the country into a single system of plan-
ning and a guarantee of a unified plan under the guidance of
the State Planning Committee.” 18

With the establishment of a newly unified system of plan-
ning, several regional planning committees were set up in
each province under the direct control of the State Planning
Committee. The tasks of the state planning organizations at
different levels are to supervise planning in the districts and
sectors, to investigate production reserves, to provide guid-
ance and aid in the formulation of objective and scientific
plans. Further, the state planning bodies at all levels are re-
quired to report from time to time to their superior organiza-
tions and the Cabinet on defects, such as failure to organize
production rationally, wasteful use of labor and materials, and
the like.

At the same time, the planning departments and sections
of the ministries, central organs, provincial people's commit-
tees, provincial rural economy committees and other economic
organizations, as well as of factories and other enterprises,
were defined as “hands and feet” or “cells” of the State Plan-
ning Committee. In this way, it is intended to strengthen the
links between the state planning organizations and the plan-
ning departments of the ministries and enterprises, as well as
the guidance of the state planning organizations to the “hands
and feet.” These are the essentials of the new unified system
of planning.

Along with the unification of planning, a system of detailing
plans was also established. This means the drawing up of con-
crete and precise plans covering all facets of the branches and
enterprises of the economy on the basis of strict scientific
calculations and a good grasp of the objective conditions.

SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

153

Under the old system of planning, scientific calculations
were not sufficient since concrete substantiation was lacking,
so that the plans did not cover all aspects of all branches of the
economy. For instance, plan figures for the production of
ores, iron and steel, cement, automobiles, tractors and other
key products were available, but plans for the production of
small items, such as bolts, were not spelled out. Similarly,
in the production plan of tractors, the number of tractors to be
turned out was specified, and the “fund” materials such as
steel plate and other steel products required for production
were reflected in the plan, but hardly any non-“fund” ma-
terials, such as screws, valves and bearings were included.
Plans for non-“fund” materials were arbitrarily drawn up by
ministries, and since there was no system of detailing plans,
the responsibility of planning personnel could not be clearly
set. Further, such plans were not plans in the strict meaning
of the word.

In the socialist system, it is necessary for a plan to coordi-
nate the details of economic activities. For instance, the provi-
sion of non-“fund” materials must be sufficiently reflected.
Needless to say, this is a tremendous job, requiring an increase
in the number of plan indices. However, under the new sys-
tem, detailed plans must be drawn up even if the number of
plan indices reaches several scores of thousands of items.
The scope of the plans is defined for the State Planning Com-
mittee, local planning committees and ministries. However,
whatever the scope, and by whatever planning unit it is
worked out, once a detailed plan is drawn up it assumes a
legal character without exception, and is not permitted to be
altered arbitrarily.

The new system reflects the Juche system of planning in
which the general principle of Marxism-Leninism is applied
creatively to the concrete realities of the country. It is the
embodiment of the great Chongsanri spirit and method in
economic planning, the system which combines centralized
guidance and local initiative.

154

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

5. THE CHOLLIMA MOVEMENT

“The Chollima* movement is the general line of our Party
in socialist construction. The essence of this line is to educate
all working people in communist ideas, to remold them and
rally them more firmly around the Party, and to give full scope
to their revolutionary zeal and creative talents so as to build
socialism better and faster.” 19

The great upsurge in socialist construction, based on the
revolutionary consciousness and creative labor of millions of
workers who are making history, the rapid development of the
socialist economy, is a law of socialism. This is the true mean-
ing of the essential superiority of the socialist system.

However, the advantages of the socialist system and the
people’s keen interest and creative ability do not occur spon-
taneously, but are developed through stubborn and purpose-
ful struggles based on full scientific calculations of the sub-
jective and objective conditions. These aims can be realized
only through outstanding political leadership in the revolu-
tion and construction and through the constant struggle of the
vanguard party.

The Chongsanri spirit and method, the Daean work system,
the new system of agricultural guidance, the group manage-
ment system, and the system of centralizing and detailing
plans encompass the traditional mass line and the basic
method of the Party in organizing and mobilizing the masses
for revolution and construction.

* According to Korean legends, Chollima was a winged horse capable of bear-
ing those fortunate enough to mount it at great speed toward the land of
happiness.

SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

155

The basic method our Party employs in mobilizing the masses for
socialist construction [Kim II Sung emphasizes] is to raise the Party's
leading role and always to give priority to political work, combining
this properly with economic and technical work, steadily to enhance
the political awareness and the level of consciousness of the working
people and properly to combine this with material interest . 20

North Korea’s historic Chollima movement combines the
traditional mass line of the Party and the outstanding leader-
ship of Kim II Sung. It is also an entirely logical development
of the socio-economic transformation realized in the northern
half of the Republic in the postwar period and of all the ma-
terial and spiritful factors accumulated in the course of the
long, bitter struggles. But since socialist construction does not
advance automatically, even under the best conditions, for a
real upsurge to take place in socialist construction there must
be a subjective factor, a subjective force: apolitical leader and
a vanguard party capable of organizing and enlisting millions
of working people for the great upsurge in the revolution and
construction. At the same time, the masses must firmly resolve
to realize completely the aims and policies of the Party.

Of decisive importance for the start of the Chollima move-
ment were the plenum of the Central Committee of the
Workers Party of Korea in December 1956, and Kim 11 Sung’s
on-the-spot guidance at the Kangson Steel Works. At that time,
as indicated previously, North Korea was faced with serious
difficulties. Immediately after the plenum, Kim 11 Sung ap-
pealed directly to the workers of the Kangson Steel Works,
telling them about the grave internal and external situation
and the intentions of the Party, and he called on all workers to
forge ahead at the speed of the Chollima horse. He also ap-
pealed directly to the workers of the Hwanghae Steel Works
on January 4, 1957, to the workers of Haeju in February and
to the workers of Hungnam and Shinpo in March. Later, the
Premier appealed to the workers of Hwangchoryong, the

156

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

Nampo districts, the construction workers of Pyongyang, as
well as to the workers in the coal-mining areas in the west.

The workers responded to the appeal, effecting a great in-
novation in socialist construction. They discovered items in
short supply, created goods that were non-available, destroyed
old standards and designs, and established new standards.
They built a blast furnace with an annual capacity of 300,000
to 400,000 tons in less than a year, laid over 80 kilometers of
wide-gauge railway in 75 days, and built a large-scale vinylon
factory in a little more than one year on a broad expanse of
wasteland. They developed a “machine-tool-to-beget-ma-
chines” movement and produced some 13,000 machine tools
in excess of the state plan; they constructed over 1,000 local
enterprises, utilizing idle local materials and labor, and they
carried out a large-scale reclamation project to irrigate 370,000
hectares of farmland in only six months. Countless other ex-
amples could be cited. In this way, the flames of the Chollima
movement, kindled among the workers of the Kangson Steel
Works by Kim II Sung, spread like wildfire over all areas,
factories and enterprises in the northern part of the Republic.

While this was going on, Kim II Sung again visited the Kang-
son Steel Works in February 1959, and suggested that the
workers initiate a Chollima work team movement to strength-
en the Chollima movement in a more organized way.

So the Chollima movement was raised to a new stage of de-
velopment in the form of the Chollima work team move-
ment. Its central task was to do political and ideological work
among the people, to arm them with the ideas of collectivism
and communism, to eliminate the old ideas still found among
the masses, in order to revolutionize them and convert them
into a fully conscious proletariat. In other words, the main
task of the movement was to carry out an ideological revolu-
tion among the masses. The second task was to forge a cultural
revolution. The Chollima work team movement is a school of
communist education, created by the workers themselves for
their own education in the ideas of collectivism.

SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

157

Thus, the important characteristic of the Chollima work
team is its effective development of a collective innovation
movement in production by emphasizing and strengthening
the education and remolding of working people, and by
directly linking these educational activities with the fulfill-
ment of production assignments:

1 he main feature of the Chollima work team movement, which is
being extensively unfolded among our working people [wrote Kim II
Sung] lies in the close combination of the mass innovation drive in
pioduction with the education and remolding of the working people.

1 his woik team movement, as an intensified and developed form
of the Chollima movement, has become not only a powerful impetus
to the development of the national economy and an ideal form of
mass economic management by the working people, but also consti-
tutes an excellent medium of mass education for remolding every-
body into a person of a new communist type. Our Chollima riders
are not only innovators in production, but also able management
personnel, expert organizers and real communist educators. 21

The Chollima work teams rapidly spread and developed,
embracing industry, agriculture, construction, science, educa-
tion, health preservation and other areas, and in August 1960,
the first national conference of Chollima Work Team Riders
was held.

As of August 1961, or just before the historic Fourth Con-
gress of the Workers Party of Korea, more than two million
working people were participating in this movement, and
4,958 work teams, comprising 125,028 persons, had the title
Chollima Work Team.” Fifty-five work teams, comprising
1,459 workers, had the title “Double Chollima Work Team.”

By May 1968, when the second national conference of
Chollima Work Team Riders was held, the number of Chol-
lima work teams had risen 21-fold and the number of double
Chollima riders 23-fold since the first national conference.
The Chollima work team movement developed into a na-
tional, large-scale innovation movement, embracing millions
of working people in the northern half of the Republic. That

158

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

is why the Chollima movement is the general line of the
Workers Party of Korea in socialist construction.

The most important political and economic significance of
the Chollima movement is that it guarantees the rapid tempo
of socialist economic construction. After the start of this move-
ment, industrial production in North Korea developed rapidly,
recording an annual growth rate of 40 to 50 per cent, and the
overall Five-Year Plan was successfully fulfilled in only two
and a half years. A rapid growth rate of industrial production
is being maintained in fulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan.
For instance, with economic construction and defense build-
up developing simultaneously, the northern part of the Repub-
lic retained its remarkable growth rate in industrial production
in 1967 and 1968.

Rapid expansion of the economy is a requirement of socialist
society, a requirement rooted in the essential superiority of
the socialist system. It is a direct reflection of the desire of
the masses of people to construct socialism and communism
better and more quickly. This desire is particularly keen
among the working masses. The revolutionary tasks imposed
on them — eliminating the remnants of the colonial economy,
rehabilitating and constructing the war-destroyed economy,
unifying the fatherland, etc. — demand that North Koreans take
ten steps forward for every step others take. It is because of
this that the masses accepted the Chollima work team move-
ment wholeheartedly and developed it effectively as their
own, all-people innovation movement.

What is especially important in this connection is that, al-
though this movement was created by the masses from among
themselves according to the necessary law of development of
socialist society, it would have been impossible to develop it
into a dynamic national movement if it were not for the out-
standing leadership of the vanguard party and the leader who
took hold of it, reflected it correctly in policy, and mobilized
the masses positively to carry it out. The historical experience

SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

159

of the Chollima work team movement clearly demonstrates
this. Kim 11 Sung says:

The wise leadership of the Party, its firm unity with the people,
their firm resolve to advance rapidly and their revolutionary zeal —
these are the foundations for the great upsurge in socialist construc-
tion and the Chollima movement and constitute the decisive guaran-
tee for all our victories. 22

CHAPTER IV

Some Theoretical Problems
of Socialist Economy

Premier Kim II Sung made public a new work entitled "On
Some Theoretical Problems of Socialist Economy” on March
1, 1969 in answer to questions submitted to him by scientific
and educational workers through the Science and Educational
Department of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of
Korea.

In this work, the Premier gave clear-cut theoretical ex-
planations on the question of the correlation between the scale
of the economy and the rate of development of production, the
question of the means of production in the form of commodi-
ties and the application of the law of value, and on the prob-
lem of the peasant market and the way of abolishing it in a
socialist society. These are the most fundamental questions
in the area of the economic theories of Marxism-Leninism,
particularly as they pertain to a socialist economy. The theo-
retical elucidation of these issues is urgently required because
of their practical importance.

The problem of the correlation between the scale of the
economy and the rate of development of production in a so-
cialist society is fundamental to the law of the whole process
of development of a socialist economy. The attitude toward
this question clearly determines whether the position is a
revolutionary and principled one based on Marxism-Leninism
or reflects left or right opportunism. It is already known how
right and left opportunist views have caused serious confusion
and loss in the practical struggle for socialist and communist
construction.

160

SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS

161

The problem of the means of production in the form of com-
modities and the application of the law of value, as well as the
problem of the peasant market, reflect the basic characteristics
of a socialist economy as a transitional economy.

A very practical problem in a socialist economy is that of
commodity-money relations. 1 his should be solved effectively
in relation to the problem of securing a constant and rapid
development of the socialist economy in the transitional pe-
riod from capitalism to socialism. However, this problem has
been regarded as very complex and difficult and repeatedly
has been discussed internationally over scores of years. No
clear-cut conclusion was reached. The recent theoretical work
of Kim II Sung has presented a solution.

While fully explaining the characteristics of the transitional
economy and economic laws that operate in the transitional
period, Kim 11 Sung has given lucid explanations on the cor-
relation between the base and the superstructure, on the posi-
tive role of the Marxist-Leninist party and the state of the prole-
tarian dictatorship in the development of socialist economy,
and on the functions of the dictatorship of the proletariat as
the organizer of the economy. By doing so, he has made clear,
iheoretically and practically, the unified relations between the
working masses as the vanguard in the historical development
of socialist society, on the one hand, and the Party and its
political leadership on the other.

In this way, Kim 11 Sung’s recent theoretical work on the
central problems of the economic theories of socialism is of
great significance for the creative development of the econom-
ic theories of Marxism-Leninism and for the completion of
llio entire system of the political economy of socialism. Fur-
Ihermore, it is also a powerful theoretical weapon in the rev-
olutionary struggle of the proletariat for the complete victory
ol socialism and the realization of communism.

162

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

1. PROBLEMS OF CORRELATION BETWEEN
THE SCALE OF THE ECONOMY AND THE RATE
OF DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTION

In the first part of his work, Kim 11 Sung presents a new and
original theory on the correlation between the scale of the
economy and the rate of development of production in a so-
cialist society. He writes:

In a socialist society, the great revolutionary zeal of the people
is the decisive factor which impels the productive forces to germi-
nate. The intrinsic superiority of the socialist system lies in the fact
that the working people, freed from exploitation and oppression,
work with conscious enthusiasm and creative initiative for the
country and the people, for society and the collective, as well as for
their own welfare. 1

It is due to this basic factor that the development of the so-
cialist economy according to scientific laws results in the
possibility of greater expansion of production as socialist
construction proceeds and as the scale of the economy is in-
creased, and that production expands at a rate of development
undreamt of in capitalist society.

It has been generally conceded for a long time that the rate
of development of socialist production is higher than that of
capitalist production. This is a natural corollary of the general
proposition that socialist production is based on the abolition
of capitalist relations which have become fetters preventing
the further development of production.

Today, however, the questions are: What should be the
proper level for the rate of development of production in a
socialist society? Should we regard the proper rate of develop-
ment as much higher than that of capitalist production, or only
slightly higher? Even when we admit the proposition that the
rate of development of socialist production naturally should

SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS

163

be far higher than that of capitalist production, should we
regard this revolutionary proposition as generally valid for
all stages of development of a socialist economy? In other
words, should we regard this proposition as applicable only
to a certain stage in the development of a socialist economy,
i.e., to the initial stage or recovery period, and as not applica-
ble to a more developed stage or a period of technological in-
novation in the development of socialist economy?

Today, right opportunists admit that the economy grows
constantly under socialism but at the same time they argue
that when the economy has reached a certain stage, it is im-
possible to raise the rate of development of production above
four to seven per cent, since the scope for the growth of pro-
duction narrows, the possibility of further expanding produc-
tion decreases, as the economy increases. According to this
view, then, the rate of development of socialist production
not only differs little from the growth rate of capitalist pro-
duction when a socialist economy has reached a certain level,
but also it may lag behind the rate of development in some
capitalist countries.

If this were true, the intrinsic superiority of the socialist
system over the capitalist system (the higher rate of develop-
ment of socialist production over capitalist production is pre-
cisely a concentrated expression of this superiority) would
display its vitality in the initial stage or in a recovery period
but would become untenable when the socialist economy
reached a certain level of development.

Furthermore, if it were true that as a socialist economy ex-
pands and its scope for further development gradually dimin-
ishes as the rate of development of production decreases,
•ben we have to admit that it would be impossible to complete
die material foundation of socialism or, if not impossible, it
would be possible to do so only gradually. This means that
it would take several centuries to realize communism.

Tims, continuously maintaining a high rate of development

164 THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

throughout the entire period of socialist and communist con-
struction by analyzing correctly the correlation between the
scale of the economy and the rate of development of produc-
tion would confirm the scientific basis of the economic de-
velopment of socialism. This concerns the intrinsic superior-
ity of the socialist system and is a key question that determines
the future of socialist and communist construction.

Kim II Sung’s original theory on the correlation of the scale
of the economy and the rate of development of production in
a socialist economy is a Marxist-Leninist answer to this press-
ing problem and a refutation of left and right opportunist
views. He holds the principled position that this question
should be tackled in its relation to the decisive and intrinsic
superiority of socialism over capitalism.

The crux of the problem is to determine the scope of ex-
pansion of the scale of the economy, or the possibility of fur-
ther increasing production. In other words, should we con-
sider that the scope diminishes or increases with the expan-
sion of the scale of socialist economy? And, if we consider that
it increases, where should we look for the greater scope?

In a socialist society there is unlimited scope for developing
production, unlimited possibility for increasing it. Certainly
it increases along with the strengthening of the economic
foundations and the consolidation of the economy-organizing
functions of the proletarian dictatorship. These potentials lie
in socialism, in the objective intrinsic superiority of the so-
cialist system. The problem is to analyze correctly the various
factors determining these potentials in relation to the essential
superiority of the socialist system and how to relate them to
the rapid development of production expansion.

These factors are, first, the planned and balanced develop-
ment of a socialist economy; second, the planned and rapid
development of technology in a socialist society; and third,
the unlimited revolutionary enthusiasm and creative initia-
tive of the working masses which can be given full play only
in socialist society.

SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS

165

Planned and balanced development of the economy is a law
applicable only to a socialist economy and is the most funda-
mental characteristic of the process of socialist reproduction.
Further, it operates as an important factor for rapidly de-
veloping socialist production. As Kim 11 Sung says:

In capitalist society production cannot grow steadily, the process
of repioduction being periodically interrupted and much social
labor wasted owing to crises of overproduction. In a socialist society,
however, all the labor resources and natural wealth of the country
can be used efficiently, and production can be raised incessantly ac-
cording to plan. 2

Capitalist society, where private or capitalist ownership of
the means of production prevails, is characterized by the
anarchy of production. The crises of overproduction caused
by the contradictions between the social nature of production
and the private or capitalist form of ownership interrupt and
destroy the process of capitalist reproduction periodically,
with the result that tremendous amounts of production ma-
terials and products are wasted.

This cyclical interruption and destruction of production and
its chronic stagnation are a law characteristic of capitalist
production. However, in a socialist society, where capitalist
ownership has been abolished completely and socialist owner-
ship of the means of production established, this law disap-
pears. The anarchistic and abnormal development of produc-
lion is replaced by planned and balanced development, and
I ho cyclical interruption, destruction, and chronic stagnation
o! production, by its constant and rapid development. The
development of socialist production is based primarily on
(he social ownership of the means of production, on the seiz-
ure of power by the proletariat.

Under these conditions, the proletarian dictatorship can
achieve a planned and balanced economy by utilizing to a
maximum all the economic levers, which it controls, and by
dislributing the social means of production and labor power to
\.uious economic branches according to the law of develop-

166

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

ment of a socialist system. As the organization functions of the
state are strengthened and as economic control and manage-
ment are extended to maintain and coordinate a rational
balance among different branches of the people's economy,
scope for the growth and potential of production is greatly
increased.

This is not affected by the factor of the expanded scale of the
economy. In other words, however much the scale of the
economy is expanded, scope for further growth will increase
if the economic planning bodies of the state are strengthened
and the planning levels raised.

The fact that the state controls distribution, accumulation
and consumption in a unified way and according to a plan
makes it possible to develop socialist expanded reproduction
on a larger scale by channeling more funds to accumulation.

Planned, rapid development of technology is possible only
in a socialist economy, and this, in turn, raises labor produc-
tivity which becomes a factor also for developing socialist
production rapidly. Kim II Sung observes:

. . . The production relations of socialism give a broad scope for
the unrestricted development of productive forces, and the socialist
state, by making use of this potential, rapidly can develop technology
according to plan. It is an economic law of socialist and communist
construction that outmoded technique is replaced by new technique,
and the new one by an even newer one; that manual labor is mech-
anized, mechanization becomes semi-automation, and semi-automa-
tion becomes full automation. It is a demonstrable truth that in so-
cialist society, with the rapid development of technology, labor pro-
ductivity increases constantly and production develops at a high
rate . 3

In capitalist society, machinery and technology made and
developed by man are turned into instruments to dominate
and oppress man; the capitalist utilizes machinery and tech-
nology to exploit and oppress workers. Under such conditions,
the development of machinery and technology intensifies

SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS

167

the exploitation of workers and alienates them from the pro-
cess of direct production. Machinery and technology are used
in production only insofar as they increase profits. If the
equipment fails to serve this purpose, it is discarded, however
excellent it may be. The development of technology is hin-
dered by capitalist production relations themselves.

Machinery and technology are controlled by the people only
under socialism and then they are used in the interest of the
masses, for their happiness and improvement of living condi-
tions. In a socialist society, all machinery and technology are
utilized fully as a powerful means to liberate the worker from
difficult manual labor and to improve productivity. Full and
rapid development of modern equipment and technique is
the direct concern of the state and the masses. Machinery and
technology are developed not only by a handful of scientists
or engineers but also by the unlimited creativity of the people.

The decisive factor in expanding and developing socialist
production should be sought in the revolutionary awareness
and creativity of the liberated masses. As Kim II Sung puts it:

In a socialist society, the great revolutionary enthusiasm of the
people is the decisive factor which actively encourages the produc-
tive forces to spread. The intrinsic superiority of the socialist system
lies in the fact that the working people, freed from exploitation and
oppression, work with conscious enthusiasm and creative initiative
lor the country and the people, for society and the collective, as well
us for their own welfare . 4

I bus, labor power is the most active and determinant ele-
ment of production. Technology is developed by man, ma-
eliinery is made by man, and it is man that operates it. All
precious and beautiful material and cultural products in the
world are made by the labor of working people. Man himself
i'. I he basic element of productive forces, the human power
dial conquers nature, and man plays a decisive role in the
development of productive forces. The issue is the ideology
and consciousness of man.

168

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

Under capitalism, workers are exploited and oppressed be-
cause they do not possess the means of production and they
are forced to work to live; therefore they take no interest in
the development of machinery and technology since all the
fruits of production belong to the capitalist and the develop-
ment of technology results only in increasing a worker's ex-
ploitation. Under socialism where the means of production
belong to the society the worker, as direct producer, is com-
plete master of the state, society and production. The results
of production belong to him directly or indirectly and serve
to improve his material and cultural life. Machinery and tech-
nology are developed to lighten his labor and to improve his
living standard. In these circumstances, the development of
production and technology is of direct and great concern to
the worker. This is the decisive condition that enables the
masses in a socialist society to give full scope to their inex-
haustible creativity and talent, and this, too, is the basic
content of socialist relations of production, with the working
masses freed from all exploitation and oppression.

These factors make it possible for a socialist society to ex-
pand production constantly, however much the scale of the
economy may be increased. There is an unlimited scope and
potential for expanding production that is derived from the
intrinsic superiority of the socialist system itself.

For production constantly and rapidly to develop so as to
realize socialism and communism successfully, the socialist
state first must strengthen decisively the functions of the pro-
letarian dictatorship, continue the class struggle with this as a
weapon, remold the consciousness of the people by carrying
out an ideological and cultural revolution, and raise technical
and cultural levels, thus implementing the task of revolution-
izing the entire society. Kim 11 Sung says:

The more the Party and state of the proletariat, in conformity
with their proper functions, strengthen the ideological revolution
among the working people and gradually eliminate the survivals of

SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS

169

old ideologies from their minds, the more the working people will
devote their talents and stamina to the development of socialist pro-
duction . 5

In a socialist system the working masses can be encouraged
to show their awareness and creativity only when the state
actively promotes an ideological struggle to uproot individual-
ism and egotism — the ideological survivals of the old society —
and arm all people with the advanced ideas of the working
class, that is, the ideas of collectivism and communism.

For a constant and rapid development of socialist produc-
tion, the socialist state must strengthen the economic plan-
ning functions of the proletarian dictatorship as a weapon of
class struggle. The socialist system has created all the objec-
tive conditions for developing a planned and balanced econ-
omy. The socialist state is required to raise decisively the plan
level on the basis of these conditions to prevent a waste of
labor power and materials and to mobilize maximum produc-
tive reserves.

W hen the ideological revolution, carried out by the prole-
tarian dictatorship, is joined with a powerful technical revolu-
tion it can become a decisive propelling force for developing
socialist production rapidly. There is no doubt that when all
the branches of the people’s economy are equipped with the
latest machinery and technology and when this equipment is
operated by ideologically inspired workers, socialist produc-
tion will develop rapidly. As Kim II Sung says: “All this shows
that we can develop the economy as fast as we want, no matter
how large its scale if we, by conducting political work success-
hilly in accordance with our Party’s program, enhance the
political consciousness of the masses, arouse their revolution-
ary zeal and constantly improve techniques.” 6

The famous proposition put forward by Lenin after the vic-
torious October Revolution, “Communism is Soviet power
plus the electrification of the whole country,” should be inter-
| noted as demonstrating this requisite for proletarian dictator-

170 THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

ship and technological revolution. Lenin’s proposition indi-
cates that communism can be realized only when the proletar-
ian dictatorship is strong enough to carry out ideological and
cultural revolutions, to convert the entire society into the
working class, and, at the same time, to carry out a technologi-
cal revolution, laying solid material and technical foundations
for realizing a high level of productivity. Only then can the
socialist state occupy the two strongholds, ideological and ma-
terial, which it must capture in the course of its advance to
socialism and communism, and guarantee the complete vic-
tory of socialism. If we neglect either of these, the dictatorship
of the proletariat or the technical revolution, we can neither
develop the socialist economy at a rapid rate nor build social-
ism or communism.

The correctness of the revolutionary proposition advanced
by Kim 11 Sung on the correlation between the scale of the
economy and the rate of development of production in a so-
cialist society has been borne out amply by the historical
experience of the Republic in socialist construction. The rate
of development of production was higher, not lower, in the
period of the Three-Year Postwar Rehabilitation Plan, and
particularly during the period of the Seven-Year Plan, a time
of full-scale technological innovation in which the scale of
production was many times larger than previously.

When the Republic tackled the Five-Year Plan, the people’s
standard of living was not satisfactory, although in the main
the ravaged economy had been restored and the living stand-
ard had been stabilized as a result of the successful imple-
mentation of the postwar Three-Year Plan. Further, the Re-
public found itself in a very difficult position. Reactionaries
at home and abroad were directing the thrust of their attack
at the Republic and were engaged in undisguised maneuvers
to frustrate its economic construction. It was in these circum-
stances that the DPRK was faced with the urgent task of lay-
ing the foundation for industrialization, and for this purpose,
large quantities of steel products were needed.

SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS

171

However, at that time there was but one blooming mill in
the Republic, and its rated capacity was only 60,000 tons of
rolled steel, far from enough. Under these difficult conditions,
the Party and the government, under the leadership of Pre-
mier Kim 11 Sung, solved the problem by putting complete
trust in the working people and encouraged them to give full
play to their inexhaustible revolutionary zeal and initiative.
Kim 11 Sung personally visited the Kangson Steel Works and
explained to the workers the difficult situation facing the rev-
olution and construction, and proposed to increase the rated
capacity from 60,000 tons to 90,000 tons:

We have barely managed to rehabilitate the ravaged economy, and
now the factionalists have reared their heads against the Party and
the great-power chauvinists are putting pressure on us, and the U.S.
imperialists and the Syngman Rhee puppet clique are frantically
clamoring for a “March North.” But is that any excuse for us to get
disheartened and to yield to the grave difficulties facing our revolu-
tion and construction? No, that won't do. We trust only you workers,

I he main power of our revolution, and we have only you to rely on.
To overcome these grave difficulties facing our Party, you must he
in high spirits and work hard, produce plenty and construct, so as to
press economic construction more vigorously, isn't that so ? 7

In response to Kim 11 Sung’s call, the workers of the Kang-
son Steel Works resolved to produce 90,000 tons and immedi-
ately set about to improve existing machines and equipment.

( Welcoming a number of difficulties and ordeals, they suc-
ceeded in turning out 120,000 tons of steel products, instead
o! 90,000, by the end of that year, giving full scope to their
i evolutionary zeal and creative initiative. Today, the produc-
tion capacity of the Kangson Steel Works has been raised to a
level of 450,000 tons, or eight times the rated capacity. This
example evoked innovations in all parts of the country, and
old rated capacities were scrapped. In this way, the Five-Year
I'lan, which envisaged a 2.8-fold increase in total production
\ dilne, was fulfilled successfully in two and a half years.

I low about the situation in the seven or eight years after the

172

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

Five-Year Plan? In economic construction, the Republic car-
ried out the tasks of the full-scale technological revolution
and many new industrial branches were created, with ma-
chinery and equipment radically improved and the scale of
production increased many times.

Did the growth rate of production decrease when produc-
tive capacity was increased in this way? Precisely under these
conditions, production maintained a high rate of development
during the Seven-Year Plan. The National Economic Plan for
1967, the first year for implementing the decision of the Party
Conference on building the economy and defense simultane-
ously was a tight plan envisaging a 12.8 per cent increase in
total industrial output value over the previous year. But in
1967, the Republic actually overfulfilled the plan by far and
raised industrial output by as much as 17 per cent in a year.

Further, in 1968, great reserves were created in the course
of the struggle to realize the economic plan. In view of the
frantic war cries by the United States following the Pueblo in-
cident, the Party addressed an appeal to the factories and en-
terprises in all fields of the national economy to fulfill all their
production and construction assignments ahead of schedule
and produce more with the released labor power, materials
and equipment. This call was answered by workers in all fac-
tories and enterprises, and many not only carried out their
assignments but also asked for more work which they did well.

In this way, a socialist society has an unlimited potential for
constantly developing the economy at a rate undreamt of in
capitalist society, and this potential increases as socialist con-
struction proceeds and its economic foundations are strength-
ened. Consequently, if political work is successful in raising
the political consciousness of the masses and in arousing their
enthusiasm, and if techniques are constantly improved, the
economy can be developed at a high rate, however large the
scale of the economy. This is the basic proposition on the eco-
nomic development of socialism. Its correctness has been
borne out fully, theoretically and practically.

SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS

173

This revolutionary proposition advanced by Kim 11 Sung is
the most powerful theoretical and practical weapon for de-
fending resolutely the purity of Marxism-Leninism and expos-
ing thoroughly the counter-revolutionary nature of the theo-
ries of left and right opportunism. Premier Kim 11 Sung says:

The theory that when industry reaches a certain stage of develop-
ment its reserves will diminish and a high growth rate will not be
ensured in industrial production has nothing to do with the Marxist-
Leninist theory of the economy. The “theory” that a large-scale econ-
omy cannot develop rapidly is only a sophistry brought forward by
some to justify the fact that their technical progress is slow and their
economy stagnant because they, talking about “liberalization” and
democratic development,” did not educate their proletariat and, as
a result, the workers are ideologically so sluggish that they fiddle
about and loaf on the job. 8

2. PROBLEMS OF THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION
IN THE FORM OF COMMODITIES AND THE
APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF VALUE

In the second part of his theoretical work, Kim 11 Sung gives
a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the designation of the
means of production as commodities and of the law of value in
socialist society.

Involved here are also questions related to the conditions
lor and characteristics of commodity production, and its aboli-
lion; definition of the form of the means of production pro-
vided by state enterprises; the production and circulation of
means of production as commodities, and the utilization of the
law of value and its significance. Thus, included are all the
important questions in the general area of the use of commod-
lly-money relations, commodity production, and the law of
value, presented in the context of the transitional nature of a
socialist society. Kim II Sung says: “After all, the question of
utilizing commodity-money relations is an important one

174

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

which the proletarian state must settle properly in the period
of transition from capitalism to socialism. Right or ‘left’ errors
in this question can result in serious harm .” 9

It is common knowledge that left and right opportunists,
who have failed to solve this question correctly, cause great
confusion and bring about serious losses to our cause. The
question of commodity-money relations is crucial for clarify-
ing the characteristic features of the transitional economy.

Utilizing commodity-money relations, i.e., the means of
production as commodities and the law of value, is of ex-
tremely important theoretical and practical significance in the
struggle of the working class for socialist and communist con-
struction. This is a very difficult and complex theoretical prob-
lem, which has been discussed actively for a long time among
Marxist-Leninist theoreticians, without any clear conclusion
having been reached.

The general question of commodity production under so-
cialism was stated by the founders of Marxism-Leninism.
Engels, on the supposition that socialist revolutions would
triumph almost simultaneously in highly advanced capitalist
countries, presented the proposition that commodity produc-
tion would be abolished when private ownership of the means
of production was replaced with social ownership. Thus, in a
developed capitalist society which Engels had in mind, class
distinctions between the working class and the peasantry
would be eradicated before the socialist revolution, and con-
sequently there would be no ownership of the means of pro-
duction by the peasantry. Under these conditions, abolition
of capitalist or landlord ownership would mean not only aboli-
tion of private ownership in general but also the establish-
ment of social ownership as the only form of ownership. There
would be no separation of social ownership into two main
categories, ownership by all the people and cooperative
ownership. It is clear that if ownership relations were not
divided, commodity-money relations would disappear.

SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS

175

After the victory of the October Socialist Revolution, Lenin
said, “When we have won on a worldwide scale, we will be
able to build public lavatories with gold on the streets of some
of the largest cities in the world.” He meant that when social-
ism has triumphed on a worldwide scale, the significance and
role of gold as money will disappear.

Stalin, who was a pioneer in socialist construction, gave
considerable thought to the utilization of commodity-money
relations. For instance, on the question of the form of the
means of production in socialist society, Stalin advanced in his
later years the propostion that “the means of production lose
their characteristics as commodities in domestic commercial
transactions and are placed outside the law of value, main-
taining only the accouterments of commodities (cost account-
ing, etc.),”

According to this proposition, the means of production in a
socialist society cease to be commodities uniformly , at least
within national boundaries. If we admit that the means of
production have the accouterments of commodities, why is
this so, and what significance does this have? Thus Stalin’s
proposition has left some questions unanswered.

At present, right opportunists, defining all the means of
production in a socialist society indiscriminately as commodi-
ties, are trying to carry out economic management in a capital-
ist way, while overestimating the significance of commodity
production and the law of value. On the other hand, left op-
portunists, ignoring the transitional nature of a socialist so-
ciety, are unable to rationalize the management of socialist
enterprises and are wasting substantial quantities of means of
production and labor power because they refuse completely
to recognize the role of commodity production and the law of
value under socialism.

In clarifying this question, Kim II Sung first states the
Marxist definition of a commodity: “A commodity is some-
lliing produced not for one’s own consumption but for sale.

176

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

In other words, not all products are commodities, but all things
produced for the purpose of exchange are commodities .” 10

Commodity production presupposes a social division of
labor and a differentiation of ownership. Should either of
these be lacking, there can be no commodity production.

Commodity exchange among communities in the closing
stage of primitive society is explained as the differentiation of
communal ownership among different communities, and com-
modity exchange in a capitalist society as the differentiation
of private-capitalist ownership relations among individual
capitalists as owners of commodities. Consequently, com-
modity production in a socialist society should be explained
on the basis of the differentiation of ownership.

In past controversies, the general proposition of Marxism-
Leninism on the nature of the commodity and its origins was
not only misunderstood but also greatly distorted, causing
serious confusion in the settlement of this question. Some
people, relating the nature of commodities and the origins of
commodity production mainly to the private ownership of the
means of production, asserted that there can be no commodity
production in socialist society, where private ownership has
been abolished. Other people, asserting that commodity ex-
change was carried on even in primitive communities where
communal ownership prevailed exclusively, have distorted
the general proposition of Marxism-Leninism.

If we take private ownership and private labor as the basis,
there would be no commodities in a socialist society, where
there is no private ownership or private labor, and one nat-
urally is led to the extreme leftist conclusion that no means of
production are commodities in a socialist society under any
circumstances.

On the other hand, if we regard as commodities the prod-
ucts of the communal labor of primitive man in primitive com-
munities where communal ownership dominated exclusively,
we will be led to regard all products in a socialist society, even

SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS

177

the means of production among state enterprises, as commodi-
ties in the true sense of the word. Then will follow the right-
opportunist view that commodity production will continue
even in a communist society where ownership by the entire
society prevails.

Kim II Sung formulated this definition of conditions for
commodity production and commodity-money relations in a
socialist society:

I he reason commodity-money relations exist in a socialist society
is that the social division of labor and different forms of ownership
of products exist. As everybody knows, in a socialist society, the divi-
sion of labor not only exists but develops every day. As for owner-
ship, there exist state and cooperative ownership of the means of
production as well as private ownership of consumer goods, although
in the course of a socialist revolution, private ownership is abolished
and different economic forms that existed early in the transition pe-
liod are gradually fused into a single, socialist form of economy. In
addition, socialist states must carry on foreign trade in a situation
where communism has not yet triumphed on a worldwide scale and
frontiers exist . 11

Needless to say, in a socialist society, private ownership is
abolished in the course of the socialist revolution, and vari-
ous forms of capitalist economy and commodity economy
which existed in the early stage of the transitional period are
lused into a single, socialist economic form. However, in a
socialist society, the socialist forms of ownership arc not yet
unified in the single state form but are differentiated. This is
an expression of the transitional nature of socialism as seen
in the relations of ownership.

The characteristic feature of commodity production in a
socialist society is that there are no capitalists and the law of
value applied to commodity production does not operate
blindly, as in a capitalist society, but within a limited scope.

It can be utilized in a planned way by the state as an economic
lever for effective economic management.

178 THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

Under capitalism, commodity production is the means by
which the capitalist makes a profit. The capitalist employs
workers for commodity production and obtains profits by sell-
ing their products. Workers are thoroughly exploited in the
process. Consequently, the law of value operates without
limit and blindly in all areas of social production and com-
modity circulation, and even in the sale and purchase of labor
power.

On the other hand, in socialist society commodity produc-
tion is carried on to satisfy the material and cultural demands
of the people, and its scope is limited. It is confined to the
production and distribution of consumer goods and, partially,
to the production and distribution of the means of production.
Therefore, the operation of the law of value is restricted to
these areas.

Thus, since the conditions for commodity production are
the social division of labor and the differentiation of owner-
ship relations, commodity production also will be abolished
when the transitional period is over and cooperative property
is converted into the property of the entire people so that a
unitary form of ownership is established, aside from foreign
trade. As pointed out by Kim II Sung, then products of social
production no longer will be commodities but will be called
simply means of production and consumer goods or by some
other names. Commodity circulation then will be transferred
to a distribution system and the law of value will cease to
operate.

It is important to remember that even in that stage, the so-
cial division of labor will continue to exist and to develop, for
commodity production is not a prerequisite for the social divi-
sion of labor, though the social division of labor is a condi-
tion for commodity production.* In other words, the social

* Revisionists try to explain the conditions for commodity production in a
socialist society in terms of the “immaturity of the degree of socialization of
ownership by all the people" and the consequent “heterogeneity" of social

SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS

179

division of labor exists and develops irrespective of the exist-
ence of commodity production.

After clarifying the nature of commodities, the conditions
for commodity production generally and under socialism, its
characteristics and the prospect for its abolition, Kim II Sung
posed the question, In a socialist society, when are the means
of production a commodity and when not? And answered:

The deteimination of when the means of production are a com-
modity and when they are not in socialist society should also be
based on the differentiation of ownership. In a socialist society, the
means of production, even when shifted to other places, are not a
commodity if they do not change hands, and a commodity when they
do change hands. 12

According to Kim II Sung, means of production are a com-
modity (ownership of a means of production changes) in the
following cases: (1) when a means of production is transferred
from state ownership to cooperative ownership; (2) when a
means of production is transferred within the cooperative
ownership, or between cooperative farms, between producer
cooperatives, or between a cooperative farm and a producer
cooperative; (3) when a means of production is exported. In
all these cases, a means of production becomes a commodity
because it changes hands and, consequently, the law of value
operates not in form but in substance.

When the confederation of the South and North is effected,
and businessmen in South Korea ask us for machines and

labor. In other words, they try to explain it by distinctions in labor skills —
between simple and complex labor, between manual and mental labor, etc.
II this view were followed, commodity production would continue to exist
even in a complete socialist society, before distinctions between manual and
mental labor are eradicated. Further, when they refer to the “immaturity of
(he degree of socialization of ownership by all the people," the question is,
what is the yardstick? According to this view, commodity production will con-
tinue to exist even when ownership by all the people prevails exclusively, if
socialization is considered still “immature." This is nothing but sophistry.

180

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

equipment, the northern part of the Republic will sell them.
In that case the machines and equipment will be commodi-
ties, and the law of value will operate.

When are the means of production not a commodity? Means
of production or equipment, raw and other materials do not
become commodities when they are transferred between state
enterprises or within the ownership of all the people. In that
case, the socialist state maintains its ownership. Further, the
means of production are not transferred through the transac-
tions of sale and purchase but are distributed according to the
state plan for distribution of machinery, equipment and ma-
terials, in the same way that the state provides the army with
weapons. Thus transfer of ownership does not occur, and the
item cannot be a commodity, nor does the law of value
operate.

If a means of production transferred between state enter-
prises is not a commodity, what is it? And how do we explain
the prices and cost accounting that have to be taken into con-
sideration when it is transferred between enterprises in the
present stage of socialism? Furthermore, what should be used
in such accounting if the law of value is not used? Concerning
these questions, Kim 11 Sung holds:

It would be correct to say that the means of production which are
transferred between state enterprises according to the plans for
equipment and material supply and for cooperative production are
not commodities, but assume the form of commodities and, accoid-
ingly, in this case the law of value does not operate in substance, as
in the case of commodity production, but in form . 13

Thus, as Kim 11 Sung points out, since the law of value does
not operate in the proper sense but only in foim, in the case of
exchange of the means of production among state enterprises,
the form of value is utilized simply as a means of economic
accounting, and does not represent the value itself.

Then, how can it be explained in social and economic terms
that the means of production transferred between state enter-

SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS

181

prises are not commodities but merely assume the form of
commodities? On this, Kim II Sung bases his explanation on
the relative independence of state enterprises whose manage-
ments operate an independent accounting system within the
state sector and the consequent principle of equivalent com-
pensation.

In a socialist society, all state enterprises are owned by the
state, but they are relatively independent in using and manag-
ing means of production, as if they were under different own-
erships. All the business-accounting enterprises in the state
sector separately use the means of production received from
other enterprises according to the unitary plan of the state and
according to the system of independent accounting, and must
net a certain profit for the state after they recover their costs.

Under these conditions, enterprises have to be particular
about what is theirs and what belongs to others, and transac-
tions have to be conducted on a strict accounting basis accord-
ing to the principle of equivalent compensation. This is why
the means of production transferred between state enter-
prises assume the form of commodities and the law of value
operates not in substance but in form.

Why, then, are enterprises within the state sector granted
independence in management, and why are the delivery and
receipt of the means of production strictly accounted for ac-
cording to the principle of equivalent compensation, when
they are not commodities?

Kim II Sung explains this on the basis of the transitional
character which is the specific feature of a socialist society.
The specific features of a socialist society relevant to this
question are:

First, the productive forces have not yet developed to an
extent where each works according to his ability and each
receives according to his needs.

Second, there still remain survivals of the old ideologies in
the thinking and consciousness of members of society, who

182 THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

are not yet sufficiently educated and remolded in the spirit
of collectivism and with ideas of communism. Consequently,
not all people possess sufficient collective spirit to take care
of and protect state properties as their own. There are some
who still harbor old ideas of taking advantage of the state or
other organs and enterprises, placing their own local interests
before everything.

Third, under socialism labor has become honorable and
worthwhile, but not yet life’s prime requirement or man’s
physiological need as in communist society.

All these factors require that under socialism equivalent
values be strictly cost-accounted in transactions between en-
terprises. When the tasks of the transitional period have been
carried out successfully and the productive forces greatly
developed; when our society has a great abundance of goods;
when the working people of all enterprises have been edu-
cated and remolded in the spirit of collectivism and ideas of
communism and completely have overcome old ideas of in-
dividualism and everything else; and when people are as con-
cerned about state property as about their own and conduct
all state affairs as devotedly and consciously as their own —
there will be no need to keep accounts on an equivalent basis.

It is of extreme practical importance to utilize correctly the
commodity form and the commercial form in the production
and distribution of the means of production. Regarding this,
Premier Kim II Sung says:

A proper use of commodities and commerce in the production and
distribution of the means of production is of definite significance in
methodically increasing the profits of enterprises and the accumula-
tions of the state by eliminating the wastage of social labor and
strengthening the save-and-spare regime. It is therefore necessary
to make proper use of them in all branches of the national economy
and all enterprises. 14

Under limiting conditions resulting from the transitional
nature of a socialist society, or when people do not yet work

SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS

183

consciously and devotedly both for the society and their own
welfare without social compulsion, the use of the commodity
and commercial forms is an inevitable social and economic
regime for rational control and management of socialist state
enterprises. If there were no such regime, the managing staff
and working people of the enterprises would not be suffi-
ciently interested in fulfilling plan assignments, controlling
raw and other materials, utilizing labor power rationally, re-
ducing production costs, improving the quality of products,
etc., and enhancing their sense of responsibility.

Only when efforts are made to use the form of value prop-
erly in providing the means of production will it be possible
to strengthen the strict accounting system and the control by
won (the monetary unit of the Republic) over the use of ma-
terials and labor power and to save on material per unit.

In North Korea, the importance of the materials’ supply
agencies for using correctly the commodity and commercial
forms for the means of production is emphasized. And this
assumes the existence of the Daean work system, which is the
basis of socialist economic management.

To increase decisively the leading role of the vanguard
party, to enable broad sections of the working people to par-
ticipate actively in economic management and give full scope
to their creativity, and, for this purpose, to strengthen the po-
litical and ideological education of the working people it is
important to combine the use of the commodity form and the
law of value with the implementation of the principle of so-
cialist distribution.

Kim II Sung pointed out that the most important factor in
utilizing the law of value in a socialist society is that of fixing
the prices of commodities properly: “Prices should be as-
sessed on the basis of correctly calculating the requirements
of the basic economic law of socialism and the law of value .” 15

To fix the prices of commodities on the basis of the law of
value means that prices should be based on the socially neces-

184

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

sary labor contained in the product. This is the basic require-
ment of the law of value; it applies to commodity production
and circulation in socialist society. Therefore, if prices are not
based on the outlay of socially necessary labor, price equilib-
rium cannot be maintained, socialist distribution cannot be
carried out properly, and the development of social production
cannot be implemented correctly.

In pricing, it is also necessary to consider the requirements
of the basic economic law of socialism, in other words, to fix
prices of mass-produced consumer goods at lower levels. In
the final analysis, the purpose of economic activities in a
socialist society is to satisfy the growing material and cultural
needs of the people. It is for this reason that production facil-
ities are equipped with the latest techniques and newest
equipment. The highest law governing the activities of the
Party and the proletarian state is precisely to improve the
living standards of the masses constantly.

Therefore, it is necessary for the Party and the workers'
state to price mass consumption goods as low as possible:
rice, textiles, footwear, mosquito-netting, sewing thread,
matches, stationery and other essential goods so that all people
can be clothed and fed adequately and live comfortably. In
this case, the prices of commodities should be set lower than
their values.

This is not meant to ignore the law of value, but to apply it
correctly in a socialist society. Thus, while it is necessary to
fix the prices of commodities in the direction of making them
coincide with their values on the basis of the law of value, it
is also necessary for prices of commodities to differ from their
values in accordance with the requirements of the basic eco-
nomic law of socialism. This is the correct use of the law of
value in a socialist society.

Kim II Sung clarified the difficult and complex questions
of utilizing commodity-money relations in a socialist society,
and particularly the question of defining the form of the means

SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS

185

of production on the basis of his concept of the differentiation
of ownership, the nature of commodities and the conditions
for commodity production. On this basis, he gave consistent,
full and comprehensive explanations regarding conditions
for and special features of commodity production in a socialist
society, particularly on the definition of the form of means of
production, the prospect for abolition of commodity produc-
tion, and utilization of the law of value. The theoretical con-
cepts clarified by Kim 11 Sung lead to the correct utilization
of commodity-money relations in a socialist society.

3. PROBLEMS OF THE PEASANT MARKET
AND OF ITS ABOLITION

In the third part of his theoretical work, Kim 11 Sung gave
Marxist-Leninist explanations on problems of the peasant
market in a socialist society, including the nature of the
peasant market, objective conditions for its existence, scientif-
ic prospects for its abolition, and the principled stand of the
Marxist-Leninist Party and the proletarian dictatorship on the
law that governs the transition of socialist commerce to a com-
plete system of distribution.

These questions are treated also in connection with the
transitional nature of a socialist economy. Where there are
class distinctions between the proletariat and the peasantry
and where there are two forms of social ownership, that is,
ownership by all the people and cooperative ownership, the
existence of the peasant market is inevitable. Thus, the prole-
tarian state must solve the question of the peasant market as
one of the tasks in the transitional period to the complete vic-
tory of socialism.

It may be said that the peasant market is a component part
of commodity-money relations in the sense that its socio-
economic basis is the differentiation of ownership and that it

186

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

is a special form of socialist commerce. After all, this problem
is unavoidable in the course of doing away with class distinc-
tions between worker and peasant and of solving finally the
agrarian question by completely converting the peasantry into
the working class. In this sense, the problem is part of the
agrarian question in a socialist society and it is important in
the economic theories of socialism.

Nevertheless, the questions of the peasant market and its
abolition hardly have been dealt with in the economic theo-
ries of socialism and still remain entirely unsettled. As a con-
sequence, tendencies of left and right opportunism on such
questions are causing serious confusion and loss in the practi-
cal struggle for socialist and communist construction.

A rightist tendency is toward expanding the peasant market
under socialism and encouraging its spontaneous develop-
ment as a capitalist element. This only results in encouraging
the selfishness of the peasantry and in greatly hampering the
development of socialist agricultural production. On the other
hand, a left opportunist deviation is toward ignoring the ob-
jective necessity for the peasant market in a socialist society
and overestimating the capitalist element in the peasant mar-
ket, in demanding that it be abolished immediately. This
reflects the complete failure to understand the transitional
nature of socialist society.

The character of the peasant market in a socialist society
was analyzed by Kim 11 Sung as follows:

The peasant market represents a form of commerce whereby peo-
ple buy directly from peasants, at definite places, farm produce and
animal products grown on cooperative farms and as a sideline of
individual cooperative farmers. Although a form of trade in a social-
ist society, the peasant market retains many features of capitalism . 16

In a socialist society, a substantial part of the animal prod-
ucts and industrial crops produced by cooperative farms are
purchased directly by the state and are paid for in money.
However, part is distributed among the peasants in kind for

SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS

187

their own consumption or for sale to the purchasing agents of
the state. Also, they can take part to the peasant market. In
addition, cooperative farmers may cultivate their own small
plots of land and keep a few animals. Farmers may use their
produce for their own consumption, sell it on the peasant mar-
ket or barter it for other products.

However, a peasant market under socialism differs radi-
cally from the farmers’ market in a capitalist society. First,
there is no exploitation in the socialist peasant market, which
is a direct relationship between working people, or a direct
producer-consumer relationship. Further, the socialist farm
market is under the influence of state commerce regulations
and cannot but be affected by them. However, the peasant
market still retains characteristics of capitalism. One ex-
ample is that peasant-market prices are determined spontane-
ously according to demand and supply and, therefore, the law
of value operates there somewhat blindly.

The objective conditions permitting the continuation of
peasant markets in a socialist society arise from the transi-
tional nature of such a society. Kim 11 Sung believes it is not all
had for the peasant market to exist under such circumstances.
In a socialist society where the state is not yet able to supply
all the goods necessary for the people’s life, particularly daily
necessities and supplementary provisions in sufficient quan-
tities, it will be beneficial for the people if these goods are
produced by peasants and sold in the peasant farm market.

I hat is the role that the private plots and the peasant market
play in a socialist economy. Therefore the socialist state
should not abolish the peasant market in haste but, on the
contrary, should utilize it positively.

If peasant markets were abolished forcibly, in spite of the
present objective circumstances, it would lead to black mar-
keteering and also great confusion and inconvenience in the
people s living conditions and in economic construction.

The state must take steps to eliminate the conditions which

188

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

give rise to the peasant market, while fulfilling the general
tasks of the transitional period, but meanwhile the peasant
market must be utilized. In doing so, it is necessary to limit
the size of gardens and to strengthen the coordinating func-
tions of the state over the peasant market. In this way, the
growth of capitalist elements in the peasant market will be
prevented and it will be used consciously and purposively.
The next step is to develop socialist commerce and to increase
its leading role. It is especially necessary for the state to coor-
dinate peasant-market prices by purchasing agricultural pro-
duce in a more planned way and by expanding and strengthen-
ing such purchasing operations.

Then, in what stage of the development of socialism will
private plots and the peasant market disappear? And how will
they be abolished? They will disappear when there is no
longer any basis for their support. In other words, private
production and the peasant market will be abolished only
when socialist industrialization has been realized and tech-
nology developed enough to supply sufficient quantities of
all the consumer goods the people need.

Even now, articles that are plentiful are not sold in the
peasant market. Therefore, it is important to reduce the num-
ber of articles bought and sold on the peasant market one by
one and gradually to reduce the sales by developing produc-
tion rapidly to meet the demands of the people. In this way,
the peasant market will become unnecessary and will be abol-
ished.

Moreover, private production and the peasant market will
be abolished when cooperative property is transferred to the
whole people. Since peasant markets are associated mainly
with cooperative farms and private production, they will
vanish when all the people own all the property, as against
cooperative property; when the two forms of ownership are
organically welded together and cooperative property finally
is transformed into the property of the entire people. Then

SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS 189

commodity distribution in general will no longer be needed.
Consumer goods will be distributed according to the diverse
needs of the people. Kim II Sung concludes:

The peasant market as well as underhand dealings will disappear
and trade will go over finally to the supply system only when the
productive forces have developed to such an extent that the state
can sufficiently turn out and supply all kinds of goods required by
the people and cooperative ownership has grown into ownership of
the entire people . 17

Today, the Korean people, led by Kim II Sung, are in the
vanguard of mankind's march toward socialism and commu-
nism. They have undergone revolutionary struggles in un-
precedented situations. There were no ready-made formulas
of Marxism-Leninism to follow. Marxist-Leninist propositions
could be applied only to the concrete, historical conditions of
these struggles. Kim II Sung's revolutionary idea of Juche is a
typical example of the creative application and development
of Marxism-Leninism. It is because of this that his idea has led
the Korean revolution to victory. He wrote:

I have read the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, and the works of
Stalin who directly led socialist economic construction. Further,

I have studied the systems of economic planning in other countries.
But no rational system of planning that suits the actual conditions of
our country was found either in the classical works of Marxism-
Leninism or in books written by others. There was no alternative for
us but to complete our own system of planning for our country so
that the general theories of Marxism-Lenism on planning might suit
the realities of our country . 18

PART TWO

Revolution in South Korea
and Unification of Korea

The struggle of our people to drive the U.S. imperialist aggressors
out of South Korea and unify the fatherland [wrote Kim II Sung] is
developing in close connection with the anti-imperialist, anti-U.S.
struggle which is being unfolded dynamically on a worldwide scale.

South Korea is not only a complete colony of the U.S. imperialists
but also their military base for invading the whole of Korea and Asia,
and our country is one of the fiercest battlefronts in the anti-imperial-
ist struggle where we stand face to face with the chieftain of world
imperialism. We must force the U.S. imperialist aggressors out of
South Korea and accomplish the unification of the fatherland, thereby
fulfilling our national and international duties . 1

Today, U.S. imperialism’s occupation of South Korea and its
artificial division of the country is the fundamental obstacle
to the development of the revolution in South Korea on a
nationwide scale and in a unified way. As a result, the dif-
ferences between North and South Korea are gradually in-
creasing— in politics, the economy, ideology, culture and in
all other respects. The identity of national characteristics,
formed through a long history, gradually is being obliterated.

The split keeps the Korean people from mobilizing and
utilizing the country’s resources and the people’s abilities in
a coordinated way for the development of their fatherland,
and this causes great hardships to all the Korean people, but

191

192 REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

particularly to the South Koreans. The only way to end these
misfortunes and save the South Korean people is to drive the
United States out of South Korea and eliminate their agents,
carry out the South Korean revolution successfully and unify
the fatherland.

The question of the South Korean revolution and the unifi-
cation of the fatherland is a new one, and there is no ready-
made formula for its solution. An original development of
Marxist-Leninist strategy and tactics is required. Kim 11 Sung
has analyzed the situation in and around Korea and the bal-
ance of forces between the revolution and the counter-revolu-
tion, and he has presented the strategy and tactics for the
South Korean revolution and for the unification of the father-
land, so as to reflect the strivings of the South Korean people.

The basis of the strategy and tactics is the Juche principle
of assuming responsibility for the revolution in our own coun-
try and of carrying out the revolution ourselves for the all-
Korean victory against U.S. imperialism.

CHAPTER i

U.S. Imperialism in South Korea
and the Pak Chung Hi Regime

Kim II Sung concretely analyzed the colonial aggressive
Policy of U.S. imperialism against South Korea and the reali-
ties of its society, which still remains colonial and semi-feudal,
lie also exposed the real nature of the South Korean “regime”
as a mere tool of the United States for its aggressive policy.

As a result of the long occupation, the United States controls
all power in South Korea. The U.S. ambassador rules South
Korea as its virtual “governor general”; its politics, military
allairs, economy, culture and all other domains are under
American colonial domination. The people are oppressed.
And the Pak Chung Hi regime is a puppet serving U.S. impe-
rialism — a traitorous, subordinate, anti-people and reactionary
regime.

I lie United States has turned South Korea into an aggres-
sive, military base as a link in the chain of its general military
strategic plan for world domination. It intends to perpetuate
I Ik* division of the Korean nation.

To carry out this policy, the United States has reorganized
socio-economic relations in South Korea along the same lines
as under Japanese imperialist rule, but with certain different
leatures. The feudal landlord system still dominates the
countryside, preserved, strengthened and protected by the
I United States. The feudal exploitation of the peasants by land-
lords is closely linked to colonial plunder by U.S. imperialism,

• i rating a decisive obstacle to the development of South
Korean agriculture.

193

194

REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

Further, U.S. imperialism protects and fosters comprador
capitalists in various ways and at the same time blocks inde-
pendent development of the national economy, precipitating
national capital down the road to bankruptcy and ruin.

These colonial-capitalist and feudal production relations
are a major obstacle to the social development of South Korea.
Because of U.S. imperialism, the people, beginning with the
workers and peasants, have been hurled into intolerable
starvation and poverty, are completely deprived of political
freedom and enjoy no rights.

1. CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S. IMPERIALIST
DOMINATION OF SOUTH KOREA

The U.S. imperialists have enforced the most reactionary, colonial-
military, fascist rule in South Korea for over 20 years. They have con-
verted it into an absolute colony and military base for aggression and
have plunged the South Korean people into a living hell where
poverty and hunger, terrorism and massacre prevail. All sorts of
brutalities, committed by the U.S. imperialists in the southern hall
of our country ever since its Liberation, have left a disgraceful page
in the aggressive history of modern imperialism. 2

After World War II, the U.S. imperialists supplanted the
Japanese as the new colonial rulers of South Korea. The main
purpose of U.S. domination is to turn South Korea into a
military base for aggression not only against the northern hall
of the Republic but also against the socialist camp in Asia. To
this end, it developed a series of specific policies to reorga-
nize the society, economy, ideology and culture of South
Korea. This was done through its “military government,"
which continued for two years and nine months after the
Liberation.

Immediately after the Liberation, the South Korean people,
like the North Koreans, overthrew the machinery of Japanese
imperialism and established people’s committees as theii

U.S. IMPERIALISM IN SOUTH KOREA

195

own organs of power. However, immediately upon landing in
South Korea in September 1945, the U.S. imperialists declared
that they were going to establish a “military government,"
and ordered people’s committees and other organs of sover-
eignty disbanded. They hoisted a sign “U.S. Military Govern-
ment" to replace “Government General of Korea," and took
all power.

Then the U.S. military suppressed the patriotic democratic
forces of South Korea on the one hand, and gathered together
reactionary forces to support the colonial domination, on the
other. Many of the reactionaries were traitorous pro-Japanese
who had been exploiting and plundering the Korean people
in collusion with the Japanese imperialists, and others were
pro-Americans whom the United States had been supporting
lor a long time. The central figure of the latter was Syngman
Rhee.*

When, in May 1948, the United States finally held the
separate elections," they cooked up the Syngman Rhee pup-
pet regime, ignoring the will of the Korean people for the es-
tablishment of an independent and sovereign state. They in-
tended to carry out “indirect domination" through this regime
while at the same time spreading the illusion among the peo-
ple that they had been given “independence" instead of the
Government General" of Japanese imperialism. Needless to
say, the “government of the Republic of Korea," which they
cooked up, was essentially a continuation of U.S. military
government, its policies merely an unmodified continuation of
I Ik* policies of the U.S. military occupation and domination.

The United States has concluded over 60 treaties and agree-
ments with the South Korean puppet regime from 1948 to the
present in order to legalize its domination over South Korea,
npported by domestic laws formulated by the puppet regime.

I "°wn in Korea as Li Sung Man, Syngman Rhee had been kept in Hawaii
‘••I many decades as a reserve puppet of U.S. imperialism.

196 REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

The most important are the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty,
the ROK-U.S. Administrative Agreement and the ROK-U.S.
Economic and Technical Agreement.

On this legal basis the U.S. Embassy was established in the
Republic of Korea, as well as the U.S. Military Command, U.S.
International Development Agency, U.S. Information Center
and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. These agencies
are used to maintain domination over the South Korean pup-
pet regime. And since the U.S. Embassy is actually the su-
preme authority over all phases of life in South Korea, the
legislative and administrative organs labeled “Republic of
Korea,” such as the Government and the National Assembly,
are only formal institutions under the direct control of the
United States, their activities fully controlled Irom planning
to execution.

For instance, according to the ROK-U.S. Economic and
Technical Agreement, the United States is in a position to
“check and reexamine without reservation all projects and
related documents” of the puppet regime and may also de-
cide the nature and scope of each project.” Further, this agree-
ment makes it obligatory for the puppet government to “pro-
vide complete information required by the U.S. Government.
Likewise, the U.S. Economic Development Agency has the
right to “prior examination” of all the materials and reports
from the puppet government concerning the compilation ol
the national budget to the puppet National Assembly debate
on the budget. Not only that, the imperialists have the right to
“post-factum examination,” that is, to revise a bill that has
already been approved by the puppet National Assembly.
Thus even the national budget, which is the financial basis
of the government’s activities, is under the complete eontrol
of the United States and without its consent, the puppet gov-
ernment can make no decision at all.

Further, under the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, the
ROK-U.S. Administrative Agreement and other arrangements.

U.S. IMPERIALISM IN SOUTH KOREA

197

the United States is vested with the power to use the terri-
tory, territorial waters and air space of South Korea as an ex-
tension of U.S. territory. For instance, the United States is
free to deploy its army and its naval forces within the territory
of the Republic of Korea at any time, in any number and in
any place and, furthermore, the United States even enjoys
“extraterritorial rights” in South Korea.

U.S. imperialism subjugates South Korea not only politi-
cally but also militarily. The United States installed military-
bases in the name of “joint defense,” deploying over 60,000
U.S. troops in various parts of the country, and it has some
600,000 South Korean troops as local mercenaries under its
command. According to the Taejon Agreement and also the
ROK-U.S. Administrative Agreement, the U.S. Military Com-
mand controls the puppet army, from the defense budget to
llie internal life of the national army, so that they are not al-
lowed to use even a drop of gasoline, let alone arms and am-
munition, without the consent of the U.S. Military Command.

The fact that over 50,000 South Korean troops have already
been mobilized for the aggressive war in Vietnam will suf-
fice to show the real nature of the puppet “national army.”

Moreover, U.S. imperialism places South Korea under its
eontiol economically. Aid is the main means used for ag-
gression against South Korea and for plundering it. It is classi-
lird roughly into “military aid” and “economic aid.” Between
I'll,) and 1968, about $13 billion in “aid” was poured into
South Korea, of which about $4.2 billion was for “economic
■ml, ’ and the rest for “military aid,” used directly to equip
'I"’ 800,000 puppet troops with aircraft, tanks, firearms and
"llier weapons. “Economic aid” was used to mobilize the
'"’"Hi Korean economy for U.S. military aggression and for
- ulonial plunder through manipulation of the so-called “col-
lilf’ial funds” and other funds — particularly to maintain the
puppet armed forces and to obtain revenue for military spend-
ing I hus military and economic aid are complementary-.

198

REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

The U.S. imperialists make the puppet government include
“aid funds” in the budgetary system in the form of “collateral
funds,” assuring complete controls over the budget and en-
abling the puppet government to obtain revenue for military
spending.

With respect to defense spending, a large part of which is
comprised ot the maintenance costs (salaries, etc.) of the pup-
pet armed forces, the collateral funds included in the revenue
of the budget reach about 40 to 50 per cent of the total revenue
and military expenditures account for about 60 to 70 per cent
of total budget expenditures. The difference is made up by
tax revenues. In other words, U.S. imperialism is dumping
its weapons and other surpluses on the South Korean people,
paid for out of the funds of the puppet regime, while the
deficit is covered by taxes levied on the South Korean people.
Thus “aid” is a means of supplying and raising funds for
maintaining cheap local mercenaries serving U.S. imperial-
ism.

Furthermore, since 1958 the U.S. imperialists, as a result ol
the deepening of the dollar crisis, have been reducing aid.

However, while cutting back, since 1959 they have been re-
sorting to credit to supplement their domination. At the end of
1968, the amount of credits had already reached $588,480,000
in 159 cases, including both government and private. Credit,
though different in form, is essentially the same as aid in
that its aim is to control the South Korean economy and mobi-
lize to a maximum its military potential at the expense of the
interests of the people. Furthermore, since the effectuation
of the ROK-Japan Treaty in 1965, the United States has been
drawing Japanese monopoly capital into South Korea in an
attempt to continue its own domination over South Korea
even if it means turning it into a dual colony of the United
States and Japan.

The United States controls not only the budget of South
Korea but also over 30 per cent of the funds financed, mono])

U.S. IMPERIALISM IN SOUTH KOREA

199

olizes 70 to 80 per cent of raw material supplies and 80 per
cent of South Korean imports, thus establishing a system by
which it can directly control and plunder individual enter-
prises.

The United States also attempts to control South Korea
ideologically and culturally. The imperialists use the U.S.
Information Center in the Republic of Korea as their base of
operation to launch an offensive to benumb the national and
class consciousness of the people, instill anti-communist and
pro-American ideas and to spread the so-called American way
of life to facilitate colonial domination. While suppressing pro-
gressive ideas and organizations, efforts are made to spread
reactionary ideas and set up cultural organizations. Films,
newspapers, magazines, publications and broadcasts are
utilized fully. Further, the educational system is organized
in this direction.

In connection with the U.S. imperialist domination we must
not overlook the reinvasion of South Korea by Japanese mili-
tarism. On this subject, Kim II Sung says: “The Japanese
militarists, dreaming of regaining their old position, have
started worming their way into South Korea again with the
backing of U.S. imperialism, and they appeared on the stage
as a dangerous force of aggression.” 3

Following the conclusion of the ROK-Japan Treaty, Japa-
nese militarists seriously have been attempting to reinvade
South Korea in the areas of politics, military affairs, the econ-
omy, ideology and culture. They have an embassy to which
l hey dispatch military attaches. They are investing “aid
funds” in South Korea at an annual rate of $30 million, a total
of $50 million in the name of “property claim funds,” and the
amount of government and private credits totaled about
$4 10,380,000 at the end of 1968. Japan ranks second only to
die United States in the amount of government credits granted
lo South Korea, and exceeds the United States in the amount
of private credits.

200

REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

However, this does not change the fact that while remaining
the real ruler of South Korea, it was the United States that
brought about the ROK-Japan treaty, helping to revive Japa-
nese militarism, and invited Japan into South Korea. Obvi-
ously, the intent of U.S. imperialism was to save its Par East-
ern strategy and its system of colonial domination in South
Korea from a direct crisis — a crisis which found concrete ex-
pression in the collapse of the Syngman Rhee regime as a re-
sult of the popular uprising of April 1960, and other internal
developments. The purpose was to reinforce the domination
of South Korea by U.S. imperialism. Therefore, the steps to-
ward joint colonialization of South Korea by the United States
and Japan do not signify that the former means to give Japan
an equal footing, but intends to keep it as a junior partner to
bolster its own dominant position in South Korea. The result,
however, is to raise an additional — and ominous threat for
the Korean people. Although a component part of the U.S.
system of command, the participation of Japanese armed
forces in joint operations with the puppet ROK foices, as pio-
vided for in the ROK-Japan treaty, brings the threat sharply
home.

In the realm of political domination the Japanese are also
active. There are yen as well as dollar collateral funds, signil>-
ing Japan's role in South Korean affairs, although the yen
funds serve to make up for a decrease in the dollar collateral
funds (used for military purposes, it should be noted) follow-
ing the dollar crisis and the consequent reduction of U.S.

“aid." . . , i .

Similarly, Japanese credits are granted as a link in the chain

of measures for the militarization of the South Korean econ-
omy as required by U.S. policy, and are placed under the con-
trol of the United States. Consequently, Japanese monopoly
capital is permitted to have a share of the hunting ground in
exchange for its positive service to the U.S. policy of coloniz-
ing South Korea and turning it into a military base. In this way,

U.S. IMPERIALISM IN SOUTH KOREA

201

the reinvasion by Japanese expansionists, thus far at any rate,
is fused with and basically reinforces domination established
by the United States, in politics, military affairs and the econ-
omy. But as the revival of Japanese monopoly capital and
militarism proceeds, Japanese imperialism may be expected
to attempt a more direct role in East Asia.

“After occupying South Korea,” wrote Kim 11 Sung, “the
U.S. imperialists partially reorganized the social and economic
relations of South Korea in order to create a basis more favora-
ble for their colonial domination.” 4

Colonial domination by the United States is based on the
old reactionary social and economic system, reorganized to
facilitate American requirements. Essentially, the socio-
economic relations, even as modified by U.S. imperialism,
retain the colonial and semi-feudal characteristics which
existed under Japanese rule. There are three types of the
economy: capitalist, feudal, and small-scale commodity pro-
duction. Actually, changes in class relations effected in con-
nection with the reorganization have resulted in a further
intensification of socio-economic contradictions.

The basic class composition remains essentially the same
as under Japanese imperialism; capitalists and workers, land-
lords and peasants, as well as petty-bourgeois in urban areas
and reactionary bureaucrats serving the colonization policy of
(ho United States. The capitalist class consists of comprador
capitalists and national capitalists; the peasantry of rich farm-
ers, medium and poor peasants, and hired peasants; and the
urban petty-bourgeoisie includes handicraftsmen and small
merchants.

While retaining the class composition basically intact, the
United States reorganized it to a certain extent to suit the new
historical conditions. Class supporters were recruited as U.S.
agents, while at the same time measures were taken to side-
hack the revolutionary advance of the working masses. This

202 REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

was accompanied by a series of changes that had not been ob-
served under Japanese imperialist rule.

The United States made serious efforts to foster comprador
capitalists in order to dispose of the surplus commodities pro-
duced at home, to help private monopoly capitalists export
capital to South Korea and to procure a part of military sup-
plies locally. A main lever was the “sale of enemy assets” to
comprador capitalists; they were also accorded monopoly
rights in the purchase and sale of “aid” goods as well as
preferential treatment in financing “government” loans. Later,
under conditions of reduced “aid,” introduction of foreign
capital into South Korea served as a shot in the arm to the com-
pradors. In this way, their ranks, insignificant in the days of
Japanese imperialist rule, today have grown into ten major
financial groups, comprised of about 500 entrepreneurs clus-
tered around top comprador capitalists. They now occupy a
leading position in the key industries.

As soon as they occupied South Korea, the U.S. imperialists
issued Military Ordinance No. 2, by which they took posses-
sion of all the public and private assets held by Japanese
imperialism — both movable and fixed— as “enemy assets.
These “enemy assets” were made with the sweat and blood
of the Korean people and should have been returned to
them immediately after the Liberation. These assets, accord-
ing to an official announcement made in those days, were
tremendous, amounting to as much as 80 per cent of the total
assets of South Korea. By taking over all these “enemy assets,”
the United States was able to control the main arteries of the
South Korean economy at one stroke.

Renamed “returned assets” in May 1948 as soon as the pup-
pet regime was cooked up, they came under the control ol
that regime, at least in form. Now they were fully utilized by
the U.S. occupation authorities as a lever to colonize the Soutli
Korean economy. Those necessary for colonizing South Korea
and converting it into a military base were renamed “state-run

U.S. IMPERIALISM IN SOUTH KOREA

203

enterprises” or were “sold” to comprador capitalists; others,
considered unnecessary, were destroyed.

The “returned assets” were “sold” to compradors for next
to nothing, at a price less than one-tenth of market value, and
the payment was to be made in equal installments spaced
over 10 to 15 years. Further, spiraling currency inflation made
the sale of “returned assets” little different from distribution
without compensation. The industrial enterprises sold to com-
pradors were mostly light manufacturing, particularly flour
milling and textile plants. This is closely related to the fact
that farm surpluses given South Korea as aid were mostly
wheat and raw cotton, and it was intended to have the com-
pradors process them. Consequently, the comprador capital-
ists were supported by trade and also by engagement in light
industries, particularly the “three whites” -flour milling,
sugar refining and cotton spinning. As the number of com-
prador capitalists developed under Japanese rule was limited,
some “returned assets” were also sold to landlords who were
thus turned into compradors.

In this way, by the end of 1958, about 92 per cent of 2,203
enterprises, in the form of “returned assets,” had been sold to
private enterpreneurs. Further, U.S. imperialists today are
helping compradors to expand their business operations from
light to heavy and chemical industries with the aid of foreign
capital. This, too, is basically a link in the chain of measures
lor militarizing the economy and for placing it firmly on a war-
time footing.

During the last ten years, U.S. monopoly corporations have
directly invested their capital in enterprises in the textile,
electronic, and other industries in South Korea. In these enter-
prises the Korean people are compelled to work at starvation
wages and under colonial conditions, while the U.S. monop-
olies boast of reaping profits of 1,000 per cent and more. The
goods produced in these factories are almost all for export to
the United States and other countries. They claim the aim is

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to develop South Korea, but, in fact, they are only stealing the
labor power of the people for their own profit. Also, in such
enterprises, important war goods are produced for use in ag-
gression against the Vietnamese and other peoples.

On the countryside, the feudal system of exploitation, favor-
able for colonial domination and plunder, has been basically
preserved. The “land reform” was no more than a fraudulent
measure to appease the demand of the South Korean peasants
for land, which had been stimulated by the land reform car-
ried out in the northern half of the Republic. Even after en-
forcement of the “land reform” in South Korean, feudal rela-
tions of exploitation continued to dominate the countryside,
and the landholdings of peasants became smaller. About
100,000 landlords account for 40 per cent of the total arable
land, on which they exploit 1,400,000 peasant households.
Land rentals in kind reach as much as 50 to 60 per cent of the
harvest.

In this way, the landlords and compradors are identified
with colonial domination by U.S. imperialism and provide a
class support for it.

Having established a system of domination, the U.S. impe-
rialists are foisting an unprecedented, barbarous military dic-
tatorship on the South Korean people. There is a police force
of about 160,000 men, augmented by 400,000 special political
agents. Some 32,000 bureaucrats are directly or indirectly in
collusion with the ruling circles of the United States and with
the landlords and compradors, serving to maintain the colo-
nial, semifeudal society by directing and enforcing traitorous
policies. All these factors are major obstacles to the develop-
ment of the South Korean economy and the democratization
of its social life.

In supporting comprador capitalists and protecting the
feudal landlord system, the method used by the United States
differed from that employed by the Japanese. The latter
openly had supported the tenant system in Korea and main-

U.S. IMPERIALISM IN SOUTH KOREA

205

tained big landlord exploitation. The United States maintains
feudal exploitation but emphasizes medium and small land-
lords. It continues the basic system, although with modifica-
tion, as we shall see, because:

First, it wants to utilize the landlord class and the comprador
capitalists to strengthen colonial rule, particularly as a base
for suppressing the revolutionary forces in the countryside.
In South Korea, a backward agricultural area, the overwhelm-
ing majority of the population is engaged on the land.

Second, even from a backward agriculture the United States
can obtain, on the spot, foodstuffs and other crops needed for
aggression and war. Further, the system hastens the pauper-
ization of the peasantry and increases the number of “under-
employed, who can be enlisted more easily into the puppet
army. Thus, the system forces the peasantry to carry a larger
military burden.

Third, the system maintains feudal production relations,
thus restricting the development of agricultural productive
forces and provides conditions favorable for the disposal of
U.S. farm surpluses.

To this end, the United States and its puppets carried out
the fraudulent “land reform” in October 1950 to reorganize
the feudal relations of landownership. By it, landlords were
allowed to possess legally a restricted but considerable area
of land for their own cultivation. Land was distributed to about
1,550,000 farming households with compensation, but it
amounted to only 490,000 chongbo (or about 32.5 per cent)
of the total area of 1,447,359 chongbo that was cultivated by
tenant peasants under the Japanese.

Forests, wasteland, reclaimed land and river embankments
were excepted from the land reform, and landlords were al-
lowed to retain these areas without limit. In exchange for the
land purchased from them, the United States issued to land-
lords securities with which to purchase “returned assets”;
thus some landlords became comprador capitalists. The end

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REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

result was to retain the landlord system, although in a some-
what hidden form, with medium and small landlords as the
core.

Not only were high prices set on land distributed to cultiva-
tors, but land taxes and an irrigation tax and other taxes were
levied on the newly created landholders. These taxes proved
an unbearable burden on the peasants, and they were compel-
led to sell their land. Thus, more than 40 per cent of the dis-
tributed land was reclaimed by the landlords and rich farm-
ers. As a result, some 1.2 million peasant households, about 50
per cent of the total number of peasant households in South
Korea, work as tenants and have to turn over to the landlords
50 to 60 per cent of their harvests as land rentals in kind. Fur-
ther, peasants are being squeezed at a high annual interest
rate of 70 to 100 per cent by moneylenders. In South Korea,
poor peasants till only 0.2 to 0.5 of a chongbo of land, and are
small-scale commodity producers.

The poor peasants, along with hired rural proletarians, ac-
count for 73.3 per cent of the total farming households of
South Korea, but the land they cultivate is only 45 per cent of
total arable land. The poor peasants, who also work as hired
laborers, are semi-proletarians who suffer from increasing ex-
ploitation and are going bankrupt. Thus the landlords, main-
taining their dominant position in the countryside, are the
basic exploiters as well as the main agents of U.S. imperialism.

Nationally owned economy, outside the direct grip of U.S.
imperialism and its compradors, is in a state of decline. The
national capitalists, of whom there are some 50,000, are robbed
by foreign monopolists and compradors, and suffer from lack
of funds, materials and markets. Their factories and plants are
operating at the average annual rate of about 40 to 50 per cent
of capacity, and every year over 1,000 enterprises close down.
In addition, the South, once called the granary of Korea, is in
a state of chronic starvation, importing annually several mil-
lion suk of rice. Several million people are jobless or partially
employed.

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U.S. IMPERIALISM IN SOUTH KOREA

The national culture, mores and customs of the Korean peo-
ple are being trampled underfoot, and the decadent American
way of life is destroying the fiber of South Korean society.

2. REAL NATURE OF THE PAK CHUNG HI REGIME

In the light of the U.S. role in South Korea — its colonial,
military-fascist control which it is trying to conceal by stress-
ing the “independence” of the puppet regime — it is of special
importance to understand the real nature of that regime.

The Korean people are a single nation and have only one state and
one government [says Kim II Sung]. The only stale of the Korean
nation is the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the govern-
ment of the DPRK alone represents the real national interests and
will of all the people of North and South Korea. The so-called
“Republic of Korea” is a puppet regime which can never represent
the South Korean people nor exercise any sovereignty . 5

The DPRK differs from the puppet regime of South Korea
in that, first, the government of the Republic is patriotic and
anti-imperialist, whereas that of South Korea is traitorous. The
Republic is led by patriotic revolutionary fighters who have
fought against foreign aggressors for the liberation and inde-
pendence of the fatherland. The successive rulers of South
Korea have been, without exception, stooges fostered by the
U.S. and Japanese imperialists who have sold the country and
the nation to their masters. As for the present rulers who form
the South Korean puppet regime today, they are also traitors
who have betrayed the country and the people.

While Korean communists, led by Kim 11 Sung, waged a
bloody 15-year war against Japanese imperialism, the present
South Korean rulers swore allegiance to the enemy. They are
traitors who suppressed and murdered the revolutionaries
and patriots who fought the Japanese. And, after the defeat
of Japanese imperialism, they changed their master and be-
came the faithful lackeys of the United States.

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While the DPRK is a sovereign and independent power,
South Korea is an out-and-out colonial and dependent country.
All domestic and foreign external policies of the Republic
reflect the national interests and will of the Korean people and
encompass the principles of political independence, econom-
ic self-reliance and military self-defense. In contrast, U.S.
domination is firmly established in the politics, military af-
fairs, ideology and culture of South Korea, and the puppet
regime is merely a compliant tool for their policy of war.

The Republic has a genuine people’s government which
represents and defends the interests of working people —
workers and peasants — whereas puppet South Korea is anti-
people and reactionary, representing the interests of land-
lords, comprador capitalists and reactionary bureaucrats. The
power of the DPRK is made up of representatives of the
people, and government bodies at all levels include legitimate
representatives of the people, elected by secret ballot on the
principle of democratic and direct election.

In the puppet regime of South Korea reactionary bureau-
crats, spokesmen for the landlords and comprador capitalists,
occupy leading positions; they are allied closely with the U.S.
imperialists, whose interests they serve. The South Korean
regime does not include even one representative of workers
or peasants but is made up only of reactionaries and exploiters.
For example, the First National Assembly (May 1948) con-
sisted of landlords (42.4 per cent), comprador capitalists
(16.2 per cent), reactionary bureaucrats (21.7 per cent), rep-
resentatives of cultural and religious organizations (7.6 per
cent), and others (12.1 per cent). In the Fourth National As-
sembly (May 1958), the proportion of landlords was reduced
to 12.4 per cent and that of comprador capitalists was increased
to 38.6 per cent, but the basic composition remained un-
changed. The composition of the Seventh National Assembly
(June 1967) of the Pak Chung Hi regime is 4.6 per cent land-
lords, 28.0 per cent comprador capitalists, 32.0 per cent reac-

U.S. IMPERIALISM IN SOUTH KOREA

209

tionary bureaucrats, 5.7 per cent 'political merchants” and
29.7 per cent military and others. The great importance of the
military in the present setup reflects the political direction
of U.S. imperialism — a strengthened military-fascist system.

The United States began preparing for a new war in Korea
before the ink on the armistice agreement of 1953 was dry.
War preparations were stepped up after President Johnson
visited Korea and emphasized the "position of strength”
policy in October 1966, and particularly after the Pueblo
incident. At that time, the Pak Chung Hi regime, to keep
pace with the maneuvers of the United States, increased the
strength of the puppet army, improved its equipment, and
took measures to make it combat-ready and put it on a wartime
footing. The regime called up reserves, suspended the de-
mobilization of army officers and men, lengthened the term
of military service and took various other "emergency”
measures. It increased the strength of the army by one division
and formed a "motorized attack battalion” for each of the 10
reserve divisions, placing them under army headquarters. At
the same time 2,620,000 civilians were recruited into what is
called the "native land reserve forces” to reinforce the puppet
army.

The United States and the Pak Chung Hi regime, while
preparing South Korea for war, are carrying out vicious war
provocations and armed attacks on the North more and more
openly. The number of provocations is increasing. Between
the armistice and April 20, 1968 there were over 54,800 inci-
dents on land, some 990 on the sea, and over 730 in the air. The
number rose sharply after the Pueblo affair, with 8,400 inci-
dents and over 194,000 rounds of ammunition shot into the
northern half of the Republic between capture of the Pueblo
and October 20, 1968.

In addition, the wartime general mobilization setup was
lightened. Fascist laws were passed to implement the military
dictatorship. The Pak Chung Hi gang, in 1967, cooked up an

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“election” for president and for the national assembly, result-
ing in a so-called “legislative organ” dominated by the
military and comprising comprador capitalists and reactionary
bureaucrats. In 1968, the army succeeded in putting military-
fascists in almost all the top official posts and in all important
law enforcement and police posts. The puppet police have
been placed on a sub-wartime footing, and terror and violence
increase as they are being equipped with new weapons.

Since the start of the Pak Chung Hi regime, the budget for
military spending has risen more than four times, and govern-
ment investments in military industries have been increasing.
As a result of the militarization of the economy, which is being
effected in the name of modernization, some industrial sectors
directly related to military uses, such as telecommunication,
road construction, railways, port and harbor facilities, are
growing and the military potential is being increased further.

To obtain funds for the militarization of the economy, the
ROK government actively encourages foreign investment and
as a result the South Korean economy is more and more de-
pendent on foreign capital. Actual foreign investments in
South Korea reached $1,508,120,000 by the end of 1968; if
“approved” cases are included, the total was $1,850,000,000.
A large part is invested in roads, railways, telecommunica-
tions, power, ports and harbor construction and airports to
increase the mobility of the armed forces, as well as in stra-
tegic industries such as oil refining, cement, fertilizer, power
and construction. The dependence of the economy became
more marked particularly after the conclusion of the ROK-
Japan Treaty, as militarization accentuated subordination of
South Korea to both U.S. and Japanese monopoly capital.

Because of the contradictions inherent in it, militarization
deepens the crisis of the economy, which is reflected in the
foreign currency shortage, the collapse of medium and small
enterprises, and the devastation of agriculture.

While according all kinds of preferential treatment to the

U.S. IMPERIALISM IN SOUTH KOREA

211

compradors, the Pak Chung Hi regime prevents national
capital from obtaining funds and taxes it heavily. Under these
circumstances, medium and small enterprises, which com-
prise 98.3 per cent of the total, are finding it very hard to
survive. In 1968 alone, 157 enterprises closed down in South
Chungchong province, over 140 in Kyonggi province, 150 in
Seoul. In North Kyongsang province, 82 per cent of the total
number of medium and small enterprises and in South Kyong-
sang province two-thirds suspended or went out of business.

Despite slogans of “agriculture first,” and “modernization”
coined by Pak Chung Hi and his clique, agriculture is falling
into a most serious kind of bankruptcy. On top of effects of
policies already described, because of the great drought in two
successive years, the 1968 crops were very meager, in some
areas decreasing 80 to 90 per cent. In South Cholla province,
80 per cent of all acreage under cultivation was affected.
Crops in Kangjin, Hwasun and Haenam, in the same province,
were totally destroyed.

In view of all this, it is a wonder the South Korean people
can stay alive. According to a survey by the Economic Plan-
ning Board, the average monthly living cost for a family of
five in the cities of South Korea is 23,530 won; the average
monthly wage of workers in the manufacturing industries was
only 7,730 won in November 1968.*

Almost all workers barely manage to live, earning wages
less than one-fourth or one-third of the cost of living. There is
an 8-hour work day at only 43.3 per cent of all mining and
manufacturing industries of South Korea; up to 12 hours at
23.3 per cent and more than 12 hours at 33.4 per cent, accord-
ing to a survey by the ROK Industrial Health Association, as
reported by the March 9, 1968 issue of the Kyonghyang Shin-
mun. Thus South Korean workers are exhausted, physically

* About $25 at the official buying rate of 305 South Korean icon per dollar,
considerably less at the black market rate.

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and mentally, many toiling as long as 12 or 15 hours a day in
poor working conditions and subjected to speed-up. For in-
stance, in the first five months of 1968 alone, 11,500 labor
accidents were reported, involving 11,700 workers, of which
158 were killed, a two-fold increase over the comparable
period of the previous year.

The conditions of the peasantry are also beyond description.
Even according to conservative figures released by the puppet
regime, more than four million peasants were hit by drought
in South Korea in 1968, of whom 2.6 million were said to be
so hard hit that they were unable to lead even a hand-to-mouth
existence. In the Ryongnam and Ilonam districts, where the
peasants were hit hard by the drought in 1968 — as they were
in the previous year— 98 per cent of all peasant households
had no grain stock. In September and October when they
harvested grain, two million peasant households, accounting
for 80 per cent of the total farming households in South
Korea, were suffering from the shortage of food. It is estimated
that the number of peasants who left their villages in a vain
search for other means of livelihood reached 30 per cent of all
the peasants. It is also reported that over 300,000 rural stu-
dents are dropping out of school to go to work in larger cities.

All this shows [Kim II Sung points out] that the actual rulers, hold-
ing real power in South Korea, are no less than the U.S. imperialists
themselves. The so-called “Republic of Korea” has been in exist-
ence, to all intents and puiposes, as a camouflage to “legalize” the
military occupation and cloak colonial rule and has served as a faith-
ful instrument in the execution of the aggressive policy of U.S.
imperialism . 6

CHAPTER II

Tasks and Methods
of the South Korean Revolution

The South Korean revolution is an important component
part of the Korean revolution, a revolution to liberate the
southern half of Korea and two-thirds of the population still
under foreign domination. Kim II Sung made a scientific
analysis of the concrete socio-economic and class relations in
South Korea and the development of the revolution, and on
this basis, he formulated a strategic and tactical line for the
South Korean revolution.

The South Korean revolution is an anti-imperialist, anti-
feudal democratic revolution. The main target of struggle is
U.S. imperialism, and the main link in the chain of struggle
against it is to frustrate the invasion maneuvers of Japanese
militarism. In addition, the struggle against domestic counter-
revolutionaries allied with U.S. imperialism is important in
undermining the influence of imperialism and leading to
victory of the revolution.

The motivating force of the South Korean revolution is the
working class and its allies — peasants, youths, students,
intellectuals, the urban petty-bourgeoisie and even national
capitalists. The policy for carrying out the South Korean
revolution is based on the principle that all struggles are part
of the battle for the seizure of power and that victory in the
decisive battle can be achieved only by revolutionary vio-
lence. This principle is derived from the historical fact that
no colonial rulers or reactionary governments have ever
voluntarily surrendered power without being overthrown by

213

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REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

revolutionary violence, and also from the realities of U.S.-
ruled South Korea. In addition, to win people's power, it is
necessary to meet counter-revolutionary violence with
revolutionary violence and to smash the domination of U.S.
imperialism to achieve freedom and liberation.

1. REVOLUTIONARY TASKS OF THE
SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE

The occupation of South Korea by U.S. imperialism and its aggres-
sive policy [writes Kim 11 Sung] is the source of all misery and suf-
fering of the compatriots in the South. The South Korean people
should fight more stubbornly to oppose the occupation of South
Korea by U.S. imperialism, smash its colonial rule and overthrow its
stooges — the landlords, comprador capitalists and reactionary
bureaucrats. 1

The colonial social, political and economic systems in
South Korea, established by the United States, hinder the
development of society and national unification. They min
the economy and force the people into the depths of misery,
fomenting sharp social and class contradictions. The basic
contradiction in South Korea at the present stage is between
U.S. imperialism, landlords, comprador capitalists and reac-
tionary bureaucrats, on the one hand, and the workers,
peasants, urban petty-bourgeoisie and national capitalists,
on the other.

The basic task of the South Korean revolution is to liquidate
U.S. domination, to guarantee the democratic development of
South Korean society and to achieve national unification with
the socialist forces of North Korea. The targets of the revolu-
tion are the aggressive forces of the United States, and the
landlords, comprador capitalists and reactionary bureaucrats
who are allied with it.

Thus, the South Korean revolution at the present stage is an

THE SOUTH KOREAN REVOLUTION

215

anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution to carry
out the tasks of an anti-imperialist national liberation revo-
lution and an anti-feudal democratic revolution.

To solve the complex contradictions existing in South
Korean society, there have to be two revolutionary stages — the
anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution and the
socialist revolution. However, these two stages are not clearly
delineated nor are they independent of each other: they are
two stages in the continuing development of the revolution.

When all the factors of the South Korean revolution are thus
defined, the next question posed is: What strategic line should
be taken to effect the revolution? Kim 11 Sung, defining U.S.
imperialism as the main target of struggle, said: “In order for
the Korean people to win freedom and liberation, it is neces-
sary for them to drive out the aggressive forces of U.S. im-
perialism and smash the landlords, comprador capitalists and
reactionary bureaucrats who are their allies." 2

Directing the spearhead of struggle against U.S. imperial-
ism is part of the strategic plan to accelerate the general
collapse of the counter-revolutionary forces and hasten the
victory of the revolution by isolating the main enemy and
concentrating attacks on it. This strategic policy is related
to the fact that the basic contradictions in South Korean society
are complex and there is no single target.

The basic contradictions consist of two component parts:
(1) the contradiction between U.S. imperialism and the South
Korean people and (2) the contradiction between the land-
lords, comprador capitalists and reactionary bureaucrats, on
the one hand, and the people, on the other.

However, the two component parts have different roles to
play; but occupying the most important position and playing a
decisive role is U.S. imperialism. The puppet “regime" is
wholly dependent on the United States; in itself it is very
weak politically, economically and militarily. Consequently
the main strategic attack should be toward driving out this

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REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

dominating force. Only if attacks are made on the U.S. aggres-
sors and on the comprador capitalists at the same time will it
be possible to overthrow the imperialist forces and destroy
the counter-revolutionary forces. It is also necessary to strug-
gle against the feudal forces if they are also to be eliminated.

Following the conclusion of the ROK-Japan Treaty, the
Japanese militarists have made substantial inroads in South
Korea. Under direction of the United States, they are in collu-
sion with reactionary forces of South Korea to exploit and
plunder the people. Thus we cannot relax our struggle against
the Japanese militarists.

Referring to the struggle against revived and armed Japa-
nese imperialism as part of the struggle against U.S. imperial-
ism, Kim II Sung said:

It is important, in the struggle of the South Korean people for
national independence and unification, to shatter the aggressive
schemes of Japanese militarism. . . .

All South Korean patriots must wage a decisive struggle to abro-
gate the “ROK-Japan Treaty” and frustrate any aggressive designs
by the Japanese militarist forces against South Korea. This struggle
is, at the same time, part of the struggle against U.S. colonial dom-
ination . 3

Only after the U.S. forces and their agents are overthrown
and reinvasion by Japanese militarism is prevented can the
South Korean people win freedom and liberation.

Another problem in connection with the South Korean
revolution is to formulate a correct strategic policy to mobilize
all the revolutionary forces in such a manner that they have
maximum effect. Only in this way can the revolutionary forces
achieve overwhelming superiority in the balance of forces
between the revolution and the enemy, and can the counter
revolutionary forces be routed.

The South Korean people must carry out the revolution al
the present stage on their own, with a perspective of an un
interrupted revolution; the people of the northern half ol

I HE SOUTH KOREAN REVOLUTION

217

I lie Republic are not in a position to fight for the South Korean
people, in their place, although they can aid their southern
brothers. This principle should be the basis for struggle,
oner the balance of class forces in South Korea, their circum-

• lances and political attitudes to the revolution, are analyzed
scientifically.

The workers, peasants, urban petty bourgeoisie, national

• apitalists and others— -all may be part of the motive power
■ >l the revolution, even though there are certain differences
.nnong them affecting the relation of forces and in their
political attitudes. In defining the main force of the revolution
uni its auxiliary forces Kim II Sung said:

by the main force of the revolution is meant the basic class that

• .in he mobilized in the revolution, and the Marxist-Leninist party
mils! he deeply rooted in it. Only when the main classes of the
•neiety, workers and peasants, are mobilized under the leadership

• * I Marxist-Leninist party can a revolution triumph . 4

Thus the Marxist-Leninist party in South Korea should be
I lengthened as amass party deeply rooted among the workers
ind peasants. Today, the working class of South Korea is the
most revolutionary class, fighting for the victory of the revolu-
linn in South Korea. It is part of the revolutionary Korean
working class that fought so bravely in the anti-Japanese
national liberation struggle.

Simultaneously, it is of decisive significance to organize the
peasantry as a main contingent of the South Korean revolution.
Hie peasantry comprises 65 per cent of the total population of
South Korea: 95 per cent of the farming population are work-
ing peasants and 77 per cent are poor or hired. They are
doubly or triply exploited and oppressed. There has been a
worker-peasant alliance since the 1930’s and peasants share
with workers the most miserable social and class position.

The core of the South Korean revolution is the Marxist-
Leninist party, armed with the revolutionary ideas of Kim II
Sung. The Party must be developed as the general staff of the

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REVOLUTIONS IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

revolution and must lead the revolution if its growth and
progress are to be expected. It is important, in building such a
party, to form ranks of leading cadres and to expand and
strengthen the ranks of the Party through practical struggles,
to train and qualitatively improve the party with experienced
revolutionary cadres. To improve the quality of Party mem-
bers is an important factor in increasing the fighting capacity
of the Party. The situation in South Korea demands it.

What is important, next, is to rally workers and peasants
around mass organizations as well as around the Party. In
this way, while a strong Marxist-Leninist party is built, a very
effective contingent will be formed for the Korean revolution.
In this respect, Kim I] Sung says:

The important task in organizing revolutionary forces in South
Korea is to rally masses of people in all walks of life around a united
front. South Korean intellectuals, youths, students, urban petty
bourgeoisie, conscientious national bourgeoisie and all other people
in all walks of life who cherish democracy, should be included in a
united front . 5

A united front is necessary to create conditions favorable for
organizing the main contingent of the revolution. It can be the
rallying point for broad masses, isolating the counter-revolu-
tionary forces and weakening enemy attacks on the main
forces of the revolution. Further, it can protect the revolution-
ary forces and expand and strengthen them. Such a united
front also can create forces in support of the main contingent
of the revolution. People in various walks of life cannot be the
main force of the revolution, but when they work together
with workers and peasants they become an important supple-
mentary force that can deal a blow at the counter-revolution-
ary forces.

Consequently, it is necessary to consolidate the main force
of the revolution and, at the same time, to concentrate on
developing a united front to win various strata of the people
to the side of the revolution.

THE SOUTH KOREAN REVOLUTION

279

At the present stage, the concepts that can be a basis for a
coalition of different political forces are liquidation of U.S.
imperialist colonial rule and establishment of people's power,
democratization of South Korean society, and national unifica-
tion. The basic policy of the Marxist-Leninist party is to in-
crease the leading role of the Party and strengthen the worker-
peasant alliance in forming the anti-American national salva-
tion united front. As Kim II Sung writes:

What is important next is to weaken the counter-revolutionary
forces. To weaken the counter-revolutionary forces is synonymous
with strengthening the revolutionary forces. It is necessary to con-
centrate every effort not only on strengthening the revolutionary
forces but also on weakening the counter-revolutionary forces in
politics, the economy, culture, military affairs and in all other areas . 6

The army is the last stronghold of the ruling classes. The
history of revolutions shows that when the army is on the side
of the people, no ruling class can survive. At present, the
officers of the South Korean Army are men of reactionary class
origin, but the overwhelming majority of the soldiers and low-
ranking officers are of working class and peasant origin. When
the soldiers of the “National Army" become class conscious,
the “National Army" of South Korea will be on the side of the
revolution.

2. FORMS OF STRUGGLE IN THE
SOUTH KOREAN REVOLUTION

The South Korean people can wipe out the oppressors and attain
genuine freedom and liberation only by their own determined
struggle. The South Korean people should wage a struggle to drive
the U.S. imperialists out of South Korea and demolish their colonial
rule in close combination with the struggle to seize power, and
should subordinate all forms of struggle to it. . . .

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REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

But whatever their forms, these struggles should all be prepara-
tory to the decisive struggle for winning power, and this decisive
struggle can be victorious only by using force . 7

Kim II Sung’s perspective for the revolution is based not
only on a scientific analysis of the present relations of forces
between the revolution and the counter-revolution and on the
prospect of the development of these relations. It is based
also on a correct analysis of the peculiarities of the South
Korean revolution as an important component of the all-Korea
revolution as well as of the international situation in relation
to the South Korean revolution.

The struggle to drive out the United States and overthrow
its colonial rule is a sharp class battle between the revolution-
ary and counter-revolutionary forces. The strategy and tactics
of this battle cannot be decided arbitrarily but is related to
subjective and objective factors, particularly the resistance of
the reactionary ruling classes. In order to retain their domina-
tion the reactionary classes take ruthless, suppressive meas-
ures against the people fighting for their freedom and libera-
tion. Counter-revolutionary violence is the method the
exploiting classes use to stay in power.

The United States, leader of world imperialism, is deter-
mined to maintain its rule in South Korea and to resort to any
means to achieve domination over the northern half of the
Republic and Asia. Actually, when faced with serious crises
because of the heroic struggles of the South Korean people,
the U.S. imperialists mobilized armed forces and took bloody
and suppressive measures against the people. When the Syng-
man Rhee puppet regime was toppled by the April (1960) up-
rising of the South Korean people, the answer of the U.S.
imperialists was to establish a nefarious military-fascist
regime instead of getting out of South Korea. The people have
to faee counter-revolutionary violence even when they strug-
gle for better living conditions and for the defense of their
fundamental rights.

221

THE SOUTH KOREAN REVOLUTION

Under these conditions, it is foolish to think that the South
Korean people can win power peacefully. This is what the
people themselves think after their bitter experiences in the
past 20-odd years. But this does not negate various other
forms of struggle in the development and strengthening of
revolutionary forces. Nor does it mean that the South Korean
people should engage in leftist, adventurist struggles, because
of an incorrect assessment of the balance of forces between
themselves and the enemy. As the history of revolutionary
struggle shows, adventurism only results in causing serious
damage to the combined revolutionary forces and a retreat for
the revolution. However, if one should fail to develop positive
struggles, waiting for a favorable situation to be created, it
would be difficult to accumulate revolutionary forces or to
surmount a difficult phase in the course of the revolution.

Consequently, in order to develop revolutionary move-
ments it is necessary to combine various forms of struggle,
such as political and economic, legal and illegal, violent and
non-violent, small-scale and large-scale, in keeping with the
subjective and objective situation at different times, while
maintaining strict vigilance against left and right deviations.
And these struggles should be in preparation for a decisive
battle or violent struggle for the conquest of power. This is
all the more urgent in view of the complexity and difficulty
of the South Korean revolution, as stressed by Kim II Sung:

Many difficulties and obstacles are in store for the South Korean
revolution. The complexity', difficulty and protracted nature of the
South Korean revolution are a result of its occupation by the U.S.
Army and its aggressive policy. . . . It is the concentration point and
den of domestic reactionaries. . . . U.S. imperialism forms a counter-
revolutionary force, joining hands with the domestic reactionary
forces assembled there, and is opposed to the revolutionary forces.

Anti-communist ideas are deeply rooted in South Korea. . . . Not a
few people are still deceived by the enemy's anti-communist propa-
ganda. And this is a great obstacle to the development of the South
Korean revolution.

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REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

Under these circumstances, the South Korean revolution has to be
carried out under very difficult conditions and go through many
twists and turns. 8

The complexity and difficulty arise from the fact that the
counter-revolutionary forces relatively are stronger in the
balance of forces between the motive power of the revolution
and the target of the revolution. This is due to the following
three factors.

First, the occupation of South Korea by the U.S. Army and
the U.S. policy of turning South Korea into a colony. The
United States plunders South Korea as a market for surplus
goods, as a supply base of strategic raw materials and a source
of cheap labor power. It regards South Korea as a supply
base for the occupation of all Korea, as a bridgehead for
aggression against socialist countries and all of Asia, and as a
strategic bastion for world domination. The United States will
continue to make desperate efforts to perpetuate the occupa-
tion of South Korea and will never pull out on its own. Thus,
South Korea is one of the sharpest anti-imperialist and anti-
American fronts of struggle in the world.

Second, South Korea is a concentration point of domestic
reaction. U.S. imperialism assembled domestic and foreign
reactionaries in South Korea and fostered and protected them.
As a result, in contrast to what happened in North Korea, the
remnants of Japanese imperialism were not liquidated but
were transformed into pro-American forces and increased.
Furthermore, as North Korea strengthened the revolutionary
struggles and dealt blows at reactionary elements, some land-
lords, comprador capitalists, pro-Japanese elements, traitors,
vicious bureaucrats and fascists, fled to join the reactionary
forces of South Korea. Then, too, not a few reactionaries
returned from overseas. All these forces are being strength-
ened under the protection of U.S. imperialism and Japanese
militarism, as counter-revolutionary forces.

Third, anti-communist and pro-American ideas have a

THE SOUTHERN KOREAN REVOLUTION

223

certain effect on the South Korean people as a result of U.S.
imperialism’s propaganda. Japanese imperialism inculcated
anti-communist ideas in the minds of the people for 36 years.
The county had an overwhelming majority of petty bour-
geois and cultural levels were very low. In addition, after the
Liberation, the United States and its stooges further strength-
ened anti-communist propaganda. During the Fatherland Lib-
eration War (1950-53) the people’s army in South Korea tried
to transform the ideology of the people in the liberated areas,
but the effect was not significant — the time was very short. As
a result, a large proportion of the South Korean people are
deceived by anti-communist propaganda and duped by the
policies of U.S. imperialism and its stooges. This underlines
the importance of enlightening and revolutionizing the people.

However, historical experience shows that the revolution
will triumph when the united people rise and fight. However
difficult the revolutionary struggles of the South Korean
people may be, they are not isolated; they are fighting under
conditions far more favorable than when the Korean com-
munists fought for 15 years against Japanese imperialism,
which boastfully claimed invincibility. The communists had
no state support and no regular army assistance, nor did they
have as strong support as they have today from international
revolutionary forces.

Today, the South Korean people have the powerful revolu-
tionary base and enjoy the positive support of North Korea
which, under the leadership of Kim 11 Sung, considers it its
duty to do all possible to render support to the southern
brothers.

CHAPTER III

Unification of North and South

Premier Kim 11 Sung set forth a firm principle of the Work-
ers Party of Korea and the government of the Republic for the
solution of the question of national unification and he also
clarified the revolutionary strategic and tactical policy for its
realization.

The basic policy is for the peaceful unification of the North
and South of Korea on independent and democratic principles,
without any interference from foreign forces after the United
States has been driven out of South Korea. It embodies the
Juche idea and a tactical line that can solve the question of
national unification best.

Kim II Sung presented a threefold position — to strengthen
the forces of socialism in North Korea, gather revolutionary
forces in South Korea, and to develop the international revo-
lutionary movement and strengthen ties with it in order to
achieve success. This tactical line of strengthening the three
revolutionary forces also defines the interrelations among
these forces and advances the principle of building the in-
ternal forces of North and South Korea, while strengthening
solidarity with the international revolutionary force.

1. BASIC POLICY ON UNIFICATION

Since the first days of its formation, the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea has advanced reasonable and concrete proposals
to unify the country, expressing the unanimous will and desire of the
entire Korean people, and it has exerted every possible effort to

224

UNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH

225

implement these plans. The basic plan is for the North and South to
unite independently without any interference from outside forces,
following the withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Korea. Our
proposals for peaceful unification are fair and realistic, acceptable
to all . 1

h.im II Sung s policy as thus outlined is correct because,
first, it is aimed at solving the question of unification on inde-
pendent and democratic principles. Independence is the most
important of the basic principles for unification. It is an em-
bodiment of the Juche idea that the people of a country should
assume full responsibility for their revolution and should
carry out their revolution themselves. No one else must be
allowed to interfere.

To solve the question of national unification by relying on
external foices would be an illusion and lead to national
suicide. This has been borne out by the experience of our
country as well as by the historical experience of the national
liberation struggles of many colonial and dependent countries.

The Korean people are certainly capable of solving the
question of unification. Under the leadership of Kim II Sung,
the Korean people defeated Japanese imperialism and U.S.
imperialism, which boasted that it was the “mightiest” in the
world. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a social-
ist power independent in politics, self-reliant in its economy
and self-protective in its national defense. Thus a decisive
guarantee for national unification has already been provided.

Further, the Jachc idea w r ould solve the question of unifica-
tion democratically and fairly. In solving problems of a nation,
the yardstick of fairness is the general will of the people and
their national interests. Where there is interference by an
external force, the free will of a nation and its interests would
be violated.

Neither the United Nations nor any external force can inter-
im e in the question of unifying our country. In the past 20
or more years, the UN has been utilized by the United States

226

REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

as a tool for aggression against Korea, and inasmuch as the flag
of the UN was used by U.S. imperialism in its aggressive war
against the Korean people, it has been degraded as a belliger-
ent. Even today, in the name of the UN, the U.S. Army occu-
pies South Korea, violating not only the national sovereignty
of the Korean nation, interfering in the internal affairs of Korea
and preventing unification, but also completely depriving the
South Korean people of their political rights and freedoms.

There are no foreign troops in the northern half of the
Republic. Consequently, withdrawal of U.S. troops from
South Korea is a precondition for unification of the fatherland.
Once this is done, the Workers Party of Korea proposes the
principle of democracy as a basis for national unification. 1 he
question of unifying the fatherland is to be solved in a demo-
cratic way, according to the free will of the people. Refening
to the principle of democracy, Kim 11 Sung says: When all

foreign troops have been withdrawn and wc are not subjected
to any foreign interference, we shall be able to achieve nation-
al unification by holding a general election in North and
South Korea on democratic principles and by establishing a
unified central government.” 2

Today there are different social systems in the two parts of
Korea. National unification thus presupposes the removal of
political and economic barriers separating South from North
Korea and establishment of a single social and economic sys-
tem throughout the country. Roth the question of unification
and of what social and political system should be chosen can
be decided entirely according to the will of the Korean people.
This is the only fair way.

The Party and the government set forth two basic proposals
to assure that the principle of democracy may be strictly ob-
served in a North-South general election for national unifica-
tion: first, the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces from South
Korea; second, the free passage of people between North and
South Korea, democratization of South Korea, and guarantee

UNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH

227

of free social and political activities — freedom of the press,
publication, assembly and association must be guaranteed for
all political parties, mass organizations and individuals in
North and South Korea.

All inhabitants should have an equal right to vote and to
eligibility in all parts of North and South Korea, irrespective
of political affiliation, political persuasion, property and
education, leligion and sex. A unified democratic government
representing the interests of all strata of people can be estab-
lished only through an election to be held by secret ballot on
the principles of universal, equal and direct election in a
completely democratic atmosphere, in which there are no
factois obstructing or suppressing the free expression of the
will of the Korean people. Referring to this question, Kim II
Sung says:

Our Party and the Government of the Republic have made consist-
ent efforts to effect a peaceful solution of the Korean question. We
have no intention of “marching South” nor do we intend to solve the
question of Korean unification by use of arms.

“Communist aggression from the North” is no more than a camou-
llage used by the U.S. imperialists to continue their occupation of
South Korea and to cloak their nefarious design to invade the whole
of Korea and subsequently the rest of Asia . 3

W T hy have the Workers Party of Korea and the government
ol the Republic been making consistent efforts to realize the
unification of the fatherland peacefully? This approach is
derived from their class position. As historical facts show, an
aggressive war is, by its nature, launched by imperialists and
monopoly capitalists, and the working masses, beginning with
I lie working class, never invade another country or start a war,
although they may fall victims to imperialist wars. This is
obvious from the class nature of aggressive wars.

Because the government of the Republic is a genuine peo-
ple’s power, representing and defending the interests of
workers, peasants and other working people, it fosters peace-

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REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

ful unification and is making efforts to effect it. Also, although
the government of the Republic is not afraid of war, it does not
want a fratricidal war. Instead, in accord with the national
interests of the Korean people and the peace-loving peoples
of Asia and the world, the government of the Republic calls
for peaceful unification. Then, too, there is a fair prospect of
unifying the fatherland by peaceful means and there is a
realistic and rational method for achieving this aim.

Since the Liberation, the Party and the government have
made all possible efforts toward this goal according to the
above stated basic policy. But, the U.S. imperialists and t ie
successive puppet rulers of South Korea have refused on evei>
occasion to accept this program and consistently have replied
to our efforts with aggressive, provocative acts.

Immediately after Liberation, the Party at its inaugural
Congress on October 10, 1945 projected the policy of “estab-
lishing a democratic people’s republic that will guarantee the
complete sovereignty and independence of our nation by
broadly rallying patriotic and democratic forces. Under the
leadership of Kim 11 Sung, the Party concentrated its efforts on
peaceful unification of the fatherland, based on the will ol
all the Korean people.

In contrast, the United States started various kinds of
maneuvers designed to oppose the construction of a sovereign
and independent state with the intention of perpetuating the
occupation of South Korea and the split of the Korean nation
The first maneuvers were to obstruct the implementation of
the Three Power Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow.

The Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United
States and Britain met in Moscow in December 1945 to dis-
cuss questions dealing with Germany and Japan. They de-
cided on concrete measures for developing Korea as a com-
pletely democratic, sovereign and independent state, fhe
Soviet-U.S. joint Committee was set up and charged with t e
task of implementing the decision. However, the United

UNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH

229

States moved to trample underfoot this decision by whipping
together the reactionary forces of South Korea.

In this situation, the Party, while frustrating the aggressive
maneuvers of the United States, isolating and weakening the
reactionary forces, put forward the basic policy of rallying all
the democratic forces to realize the decision of the xMoscow
Foreign Ministers Conference, clearly indicating the way to
Korea’s democratic development. To realize this policy, the
Party organized and developed mass support for the decision
of the Foreign Ministers Conference, while stepping up
political activities on a large scale to expose the aggressive
designs of the United States.

This struggle paraleled that in North Korea to create a
democratic base of the revolution. Under the revolutionary
influence of the northern half, the South Korean people active-
ly struggled against the U.S. policy. There were the general
strike of workers in September 1946, the October People’s
Resistance, and the general strike of workers on March 22,
1947. (See Chapter 4, Part II.) These demonstrations tempo-
rarily frustrated the plot of the United States to cook up a
reactionary government consisting mainly of pro-American
and pro-Japanese elements. Thereupon, the United States
finally wrecked the activities of the Sovict-U.S. Joint Com-
mittee in September 1947, developing new maneuvers to
place the Korean question before the UN, which led to a
separate election in South Korea in May 1948 under the
aegis of the UN to set up a South Korean puppet government.

In his 1948 New Year’s message and in his report to the
Second Congress of the Workers Party of Korea in March 1948,
Kim 11 Sung set forth the policy of frustrating a separate South
Korean election under “UN supervision,” establishing a
democratic people’s republic of Korea as a unified power
through the efforts of the Korean people themselves, and
Promoting national unification under its banner. This new
policy was supported wholeheartedly by the South as well as

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REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

North Korean people, as shown by the Joint Conference of
North and South Korean Political Parties and Social Organi-
zations, held in Pyongyang in April 1948, which was attended
not only by middle-of-the-road but also by some right-wing
political parties. The conference unanimously supported the
unification policy proposed by the Workers Party of Korea.
This is also graphically illustrated by the fact that the South
Korean people developed sharp and sustained stiuggles
against a separate election in South Korea.

Workers in various parts of South Korea called a general
strike against the separate election, and the people 1 aided
police stations in all parts of South Korea and burned ballot
boxes. The protests on the Cheju Island developed into an
armed uprising on April 3, 1948. Further, the South Koiean
people expressed opposition to the spurious separate election
by boycotting it. In Kyongsang province alone, as many as
80 to 90 per cent of the eligible voters abstained from voting.
The separate election in South Korea w’as a farce but, in spite
of this, the United States set up the Syngman Rhee puppet
regime.

In this situation, the Party, relying on the rising mass move-
ment, intensified struggles for the establishment of a unified
Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The election of depu-
ties to the Supreme People’s Assembly held on August 25,
1948 was participated in by voters in the South as well as the
North. This was the legitimate election for the whole of Korea.
In the North, 99.97 per cent and, in the South, 77.52 per cent
of the eligible voters took part in the elections in defiance of
barbarous suppression by the traitorous U.S.-Syngman Rhee
clique. As a result, the Supreme People’s Assembly was con-
stituted of the real representatives of the people, and the
government of the Republic was established.

The DPRK is the only government of Korea, representing
the general will of the people of the entire country, established
democratically. Its establishment was a new victory of the

UNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH

231

Korean people and gave a powerful impetus to their struggle
for peaceful unification of the fatherland.

As soon as they concocted the Syngman Rhee puppet
government,” the U.S. imperialists started to prepare openly
for armed aggression against the North, while compelling the
puppet regime to call for a “march to the North” as its “nation-
al policy.”

The Party repeatedly tried to avoid the fratricidal struggle
and to establish a unified governing body. It even proposed
to federate the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK with
the National Assembly of South Korea as a single legislative
body for the whole of Korea. This proposal w’as welcomed
enthusiastically by the people in the South as well as the
North, and mass movements arose in South Korea in support
of this policy.

However, the U.S.-Syngman Rhee puppet clique not only
oppressed and murdered supporters of the proposal but
finally replied to it by launching an aggressive war on June 25,
1950. ft was an aggressive war launched by the United States
and the Syngman Rhee clique to sabotage peaceful unification
of Korea, to perpetuate U.S. occupation of South Korea and,
finally, to transform North Korea into a U.S. colony. After
tlnee years of heroic struggle, the Korean people won a
decisive victory and frustrated the designs of the United
States, creating the possibility of solving the question of
national unification by peaceful means.

After the Korean War, at the Geneva Conference in 1954 to
find a peaceful solution of the Korean question, and repeated-
ly in the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK, the Party
and the government made various proposals to turn the armis-
tice into a lasting peace and to open up a new phase for
national unification. However, the United States and its pup-
pets have refused adamantly to accept proposals for unifica-
tion.

Under the circumstances, the government of the Republic

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REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

proposed to create conditions for national unification tin ough
a series of transitional stages, since the basic program for uni-
fication cannot be realized immediately. In August 1960, it
proposed a plan for a North-South Korean Confederation as a
transitional measure to reestablish severed national ties, a step
which may be feasible even before unification and a Noith-
South general elections are possible. The proposed confedera-
tion would be a supreme national committee consisting of an
equal number of representatives appointed by the Noith and
South Korean authorities, while existing political systems in
the North and South remain unchanged for the time being.
The supreme national committee would adjust economic and
cultural developments and promote mutual cooperation and
exchange between South and North Korea in the common
interests of the nation. The confederation, if realized, would
not mean complete unification, but would deepen mutual
understanding and open a new phase favorable for the
promotion of national unification.

Further, should the South Korean rulers be unable to accept
the plan for confederation, the DPRK proposed that economic,
cultural and personnel exchanges be effected immediately to
alleviate as much as possible the hardships endured by the
Korean people as a result of the split. It was also pioposed that
if even this plan is not acceptable to South Korea, at least the
exchange of mail should be permitted between parents, wives
and children, relatives and friends who are separated.

The Eighth Session, Second Supreme People’s Assembly of
the DPRK, November 1960, discussed peaceful unification of
the fatherland, and made recommendations for economic and
cultural cooperation between North and South and for inde-
pendent development of the national economy. To change the
armistice into a lasting peace, to ease tension between North
and South, is considered of prime importance. On several
occasions the DPRK proposed reduction of the strength of the
armed forces of both North and South to less than 100,000 men

UNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH 233

and an agreement not to use arms against the other. On several
occasions, the DPRK has offered to receive South Korean un-
employed and orphans — to give them jobs and guarantee their
livelihood, to grant scholarships, and extend relief to victims
of natural disaster.

Recently, the Third Session, Third Supreme People’s As-
sembly of the DPRK, on the instance of the government,
proposed a joint conference of political parties and mass
organizations of North and South to encourage national unity
and cooperation through contact and exchange of opinions.
Also, North Korea offered two million suk of rice every year,
100,000 tons of steel products, one billion kwh of electric
power, 10,000 tons of chemical fiber, and large quantities of
cement, timber and machinery to South Korea to rebuild its
destroyed economy and contribute to stabilizing the condi-
tions of the people.

All the proposals reflect the unanimous desire of all the
Korean people for national unification. However, the U.S.
imperialists and the South Korean puppet clique rejected
them outright. They are opposed to any form of contact be-
tween South and North and have refused adamantly to accept
any proposal that will contribute to the unification of the
fatherland. Moreover, the South Korean authorities also sup-
press the rising aspiration among the South Korean peo-
ple for national unification. People are charged with com-
mitting an “act of treason” or an act prejudicial to what is
called “national policy” for promoting economic or cultural
exchanges and mail or personnel exchanges, let alone com-
plete unification of the fatherland; they are arrested and im-
prisoned at random in frantic acts of fascist terrorism.

If the puppet authorities of South Korea do speak about
“unification,” they speak about “unification through a UN-
supervised election.” This is only silly twaddle that ignores
the principle of national self-determination and is aimed at
introducing an external force into the internal affairs of the

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REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

nation. The UN is not qualified to meddle in the Korean
question, nor does it have any right to do so, especially since
the UN is used by the United States as a cover to justify its
aggression against Korea. In this connection, Kim 11 Sung says:

We consider that the United Nations has neither the right to dis-
cuss the Korean question nor the right to meddle in the interna
affairs of our country. The Korean question should not be discussed
by foreigners in New York or Washington, but should be discussed
by Koreans in Pyongyang or Seoul . 4

What the United States and the South Korean puppets mean
by “unification by a UN-supervised election” is merely an
attempt to expand to the North the U.S. imperialist system of
colonial domination established in the South. Recently, a new
obstacle was placed in the path of unification, the traitorous
ROK- Japan Treaty concluded in 1965 between the puppet
regime of South Korea and Japan to draw the Japanese
militarists into South Korea. Japanese imperialists, who have
infiltrated as a result of the treaty, are now a dangerous ob-
stacle to unification.

All facts show that the ROK puppets are walking the anti-
people, traitorous road of dependence on external forces in-
stead of the road of sovereignty and independence and that
they are not at all interested in national unity or national
unification. They are very much afraid of national unification
being solved by the Korean people themselves. They are so
anxious to have U.S. armed forces occupy South Korea and
want to live under this protection because they are afraid ol
the people. Otherwise, why do they oppose a free North-South
election and why do they obstinately refuse to accept ex-
changes of personnel and mail?

In spite of the desire of all the Korean people today, moie
than 20 years after the defeat of Japanese imperialism, oui
fatherland still remains divided because of the U.S. imperial-
ists and the South Korean puppets. Kim 11 Sung says:

UNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH

235

At present, the traitorous clique of South Korea, faithful henchmen
of U.S. imperialism, stubbornly oppose the peaceful unification of
the country and recklessly arrest and imprison people, and severely
punish them, merely because they have spoken in favor of peaceful
unification. The peaceful unification of our country can be attained
only after the present puppet “regime” is overthrown and progres-
sive forces seize power in South Korea . 5

The developments of the past 20-odd years since the Liber-
ation show that the Korean people consistently have sought
sovereignty, independence and peaceful unification, whereas
U.S. imperialism and the South Korean puppets have sought
only enslavement and aggression. The actual situation shows
that unification can never be attained by kneeling to the
United States and begging for it, but only by winning it through
the struggle of the Korean people themselves.

The DPRK’s stand on peaceful unification is based on anti-
imperialist struggle and has nothing in common with a
compromise with the United States or with the theory of
“peaceful transition” of the social system. When the South
Korean people overthrow U.S. imperialism and its puppets
and seize power, unification will be achieved peacefully
through the united strength of the forces of socialism in the
North and the democratic forces in the South.

If the United States, which is intensifying war maneuvers,
should provoke a war against North Korea or unleash a global
war, the conflict on the side of the Korean people would be a
national liberation war, a war for national unification and fora
nationwide victory of the Korean revolution. Kim 11 Sung says:

The Korean people do not want war but are never afraid of it. If the
enemy forces a new war upon us, all the people will rise as one in a
heroic struggle to defend the great socialist gains in the northern half
of the Republic, attain the complete liberation and unification of the
fatherland and safeguard peace in Asia and the world, and they will
deal annihilating blows to the enemy . 6

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REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

The only Korean state is the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea, and only its government can represent the genuine
national interests and will of the people, South and North.
The DPRK represents the future of a unified Korea and em-
bodies the unanimous aspirations of all the Korean people for
complete unification and independence of the fatherland.

2. UNIFICATION AND THE KOREAN REVOLUTION

In order to hasten the day of triumph and glory, the South Korean
people should expedite preparation of the revolutionary forces and
wage the anti-U.S. national salvation struggle more vigorously on a
mass scale. Meanwhile the people in the northern half should fur-
ther consolidate our revolutionary base politically, economically
and militarily, continue to render active support to the South Korean
people in their revolutionary struggle and steadily strengthen mili-
tant solidarity with the international revolutionary forces . 7

This strategic line advanced by Premier Kim II Sung takes
into account that the revolutionary forces for national unifica-
tion and an all-Korean victory are threefold: the forces of the
socialist revolution in the northern half, revolutionary forces
in South Korea, and international revolutionary forces. How-
ever, in the light of their position, role and mission, these
three factors do not have the same weight. Of decisive signifi-
cance among the three are the internal revolutionary forces of
the Korean people, because the Korean people themselves are
the masters of the Korean revolution. According to Kim II
Sung: “Revolutionary forces should be prepared equally in
both South and North Korea, and only when all the Korean
people in both North and South pool their strength and deal a
blow at U.S. imperialism, can the national liberation revolu-
tion successfully be carried out.” 8

The Party established a democratic base of the revolution
in the North after the Liberation, and saw this revolutionary
base as the fundamental guarantee of the Korean revolution

UNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH 237

and unification. This scientific strategic line, reflecting the
objective requirements of the Korean revolution, is being
realized successfully, the powerful democratic base of the
revolution having been created and consolidated in the
northern half. This ensures the superiority of the revolution-
ary forces over the counter-revolutionary forces and guaran-
tees national unification with internal and independent forces.
The invincible revolutionary forces, built up politically, eco-
nomically and militarily in the North, exercise a great revolu-
tionizing and inspirational effect on the South Korean people.
Unification will be successful when the revolutionary forces
in South and North fully are prepared and united.

Consequently, it is important not only to continue to build
the revolutionary base in the North but also to consolidate
the forces in the South which constitute the other component
part of the internal revolutionary power of the Korean peo-
ple. Strengthening revolutionary forces in the South will
strengthen the internal revolutionary forces as a whole and
will isolate decisively the counter-revolutionary forces, has-
tening the decisive moment of unification. Inasmuch as the
South Korean revolutionary forces will engage directly in
the South Korean revolution, strengthening them is important
in creating conditions favorable for national unification. Need-
less to say. North Korea will give powerful support to the
South Korean revolution, but the people in the North cannot
carry out the revolution for the South Korean people. The
South Korean revolution can triumph only when the South
Korean people themselves rise up.

Kim II Sung says: “For an all-Korea victory of our rev-
olution, it is necessary not only to strengthen domestic revolu-
tionary forces but also to increase the international revolution-
ary forces.” 8

The Korean revolution is one front of the world revolution,
a front of sharp anti-imperialist struggles directly confronting
U.S. imperialism. The development of the revolutionary situa-

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REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

tion in Korea is closely related to the weakening ofU.S. impe-
rialism. If the revolutionary forces are strengthened on a
worldwide scale and if the United States is cornered in all
parts of the world, its foothold in South Korea will be weak-
ened and the victory of the Korean revolution will be has-
tened. But the international revolutionary movement can only
extend assistance to our internal forces, however strong it may
be and whatever positive assistance it may extend. Moreover,
the auxiliary role of the international movement depends to a
large extent on how well prepared it is.

In this way, the position concerning the relative importance
of the three revolutionary factors is based firmly on the inde-
pendent role of the government of the Republic and the prin-
ciple of internationalism.

Concerning the tasks of the Korean people, Kim 11 Sung
wrote: “Today, there are two revolutionary tasks before the
Workers Party of Korea and the Korean people. One is to con-
struct socialism in the northern half of our country and the
other is to liberate South Korea from the colonial rule ofU.S.
imperialism and realize the unification of the fatherland.” 10
Korea is one, and our nation is one. Actually, however, the
South and the North have been separated and have funda-
mentally different social systems. Consequently, each is in a
different stage of the revolution. Unlike the North, where the
socialist system has been established, the South is plagued by
contradictions peculiar to itself, being a colonial, semi-feudal
society. Therefore, the South Korean people are faced with
revolutionary tasks different from those in the Noith.

Socialist construction in the DPRK and the revolution in
South Korea are both components of the Korean revolution
and are closely related. But the nature of the South Korean
revolution is defined by the contradictions inherent in South
Korean society. To carry out this revolution successfully, it is
important to strengthen decisively the struggles of the South
Koreans. Consequently, the South Korean revolution cannot
be equated with socialist construction in the North.

UNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH

239

Although the South Korea revolution is closely related to
unification, these two questions should be strictly differen-
tiated from each other. In the first place, there is a difference
in geographical scope. Unification encompasses the entire
area of North and South and its revolutionary task is to com-
plete the Korean revolution on a nationwide scale. The South
Korean revolution is concerned primarily with the southern
half, and is subordinate to the completion of the all-Korea rev-
olution.

Further, the South Korean revolution and the unification of
the fatherland have different contradictions to solve, based on
different factors. Unification is based on the objective reality
of the division of the country and the split of the nation, and
the task is to reunify the severed land and people under the
banner of the Republic. In contrast to this, the South Korean
revolution is based on national and class contradictions in
South Korea, and its task is to solve these contradictions. Be-
cause of these differences, different strategy and tactics must
be used to carry out the South Korean revolution and for the
unification of the fatherland.

For the unification of the fatherland, the revolutionary
forces of the North and of the South and the international rev-
olutionary forces — of which the most important are the revolu-
tionary forces of North Korea — are needed. For the South
Korean revolution, the necessary forces are the South Korean
people, beginning with workers and peasants, whose purpose
it is to solve the social and class contradictions of South Korea,
to seize power and to overthrow the social system. Here vic-
tory cannot be won without violent struggle. However, unifi-
cation of the fatherland is an internal affair, and should be ef-
fected peacefully after the South Korean people drive out the
United States, recover sovereignty, and complete the South
Korean revolution.

This policy of the Workers Party of Korea for realizing the
South Korean revolution and national unification is an em-
bodiment of the Juche idea of Kim II Sung, based on Marxism-

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REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

Leninism. Under his leadership the United States finally will
be driven out of South Korea, and the day will surely come
when the 40 million Korean people will construct a victorious
new Korea and will live happily in a unified fatherland.

CHAPTER IV

The Struggle of the South Korean
People

Since the Liberation of August 15, 1945 the South Korean
people, in defiance of the fascist terrorism of the United States
and its agents, have fought heroically, following the strategic
and tactical line of the South Korean revolution and national
unification indicated by Kim II Sung. The course of this strug-
gle has never been smooth; it has gone through many ups and
downs, upsurges and temporary retreats and then upsurges
again. Today the South Korean people are continuing their
anti-American, national salvation struggles in various ways,
including guerrila warfare.

1. THE COURSE OF THE STRUGGLE

Since Liberation, the South Korean people have gone
through three periods of struggle until today they have
reached a higher plane of struggle, including armed guerrilla
warfare.

(1) First period: From the August 15 Liberation
to Installation of the Puppet Regime

Of this, Kim II Sung says:

Immediately after the August 15 Liberation, labor movements
rapidly developed in South Korea and, under their influence, peo-
ple’s struggles on various levels witnessed an upsurge.

241

242 REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

Encouraged by the results of the revolution in the northern half,
the South Korean people fought unrelentingly against the U.S. impe-
rialist policy to turn South Korea into a colonial dependency, de-
manding sovereignty and independence for their fatherland and
democratic reforms such as were carried out in the northern half . 1

The struggle of the South Korean people immediately after
Liberation was characterized by anti-imperialist and anti-
feudal activities, clearly reflecting the basic tasks of the South
Korean revolution and its rapid development as a mass-based,
positive political struggle for power.

The revolutionary forces launched a strong attack on the
counter-revolutionary forces of U.S. imperialism and its agents
(pro-Japanese and pro-American), and fought against the
colonization of South Korea as a U.S. dependency. They
fought against the dissolution of people's committees and
against the repressive measures taken by the United States
against democratic activities, demanding the guarantee of
democratic freedoms, establishment of unified people s
power, and democratic reforms such as had been carried out
in the North. Raising these demands, they developed mass
struggles involving people in all walks of life.

The working class played a leading role in these revolution-
ary struggles and the worker-peasant alliance was consoli-
dated considerably. This is illustrated graphically by the Octo-
ber People's Resistance, an anti-American action involving all
strata of people, kicked off by the general strike of Pusan rail-
way workers in October 1946, and also by the general strike
of industrial workers.

The general strike and the October People's Resistance
clearly indicated the revolutionary character and fighting
capacity of the South Korean people, who were determined to
win freedom, independence and democracy, dhese struggles
threw U.S. authorities and the military government into utter
confusion and their foundation was shaken greatly, with the
result that the revolutionary situation in South Korea reached
a climax.

THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE

243

The South Koreans who were politically mature and tem-
pered in sharp struggle concentrated on establishing a unified
democratic government, while the United States and its
stooges intensified their attempts to turn South Korea into a
colonial dependency and began openly to carry out their
policy of perpetuating the division of Korea. The South Kore-
an people concentrated on frustrating the maneuvers of U.S.
imperialism to set up a separate puppet regime.

In spite of terror and bloodshed, the February 7, 1948,
national salvation action, in which two million people par-
ticipated, was organized successfully and, following this, the
May 10 struggle against the traitorous separate election was
developed. The February 7 action and May 10 demonstration
were sharp struggles over power and sovereignty — the basic
questions of the revolution. There were 2,863 instances of
struggle between March 3 and May 15, 1948, of which 2,251
(78.6 per cent) were violent. The United States succeeded in
setting up a separate regime (Syngman Rhee) at bayonet
point and by fraud, but the elections were exposed as a fake
by the efforts of the people.

In the upsurge in South Korea during this period the politi-
cal leadership of the Party gave a correct perspective to the
struggle of the South Korean people. The political situation
in South Korea immediately after Liberation was favorable
to the revolution. However, the people were not sure what to
do. They had a strong desire to win national sovereignty and
independence, but they had, to a certain extent, illusions
about the United States. In the early stage they did not under-
stand the aggressive nature of U.S. imperialism.

Under these circumstances, the Party encouraged the South
Korean people to give full play to their spirit of sovereignty
and independence and to their strong desire to have a new
system and lead a new life. It made clear the anti-imperialist,
anti-feudal democratic nature of the South Korean revolution,
while exposing the aggressive nature of U.S. imperialism, and
it led the struggle of the South Korean people in the correct

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REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

direction by raising the goal of a unified, autonomous and in-
dependent state. It was because of this dynamic policy and
wise leadership of the Party that the South Korean people
were able to make full use of the objective revolutionary sit-
uation in those days and develop it to a high political level.

Another factor in the rapid upsurge of revolutionary strug-
gles in South Korea immediately after Liberation was that
while the counter-revolutionary forces were extremely iso-
lated and weakened, the revolutionary forces rapidly were in-
creasing and becoming stronger, resulting in a major change
in the relations of class forces.

The August 15 Liberation put an end to Japanese imperialist
colonial rule and, at the same time, a shattering blow was
dealt to domestic counter-revolutionary forces which were
allied with the Japanese and had followed the road of national
betrayal. They were extremely weakened and lost their po-
tency as a political force. In contrast, after the collapse of
Japanese domination, the enthusiasm of the working people
soared and their forces grew rapidly. The middle classes then
came over to the side of the revolution. This change in the
relations of class forces was an important factor in the rapid
upsurge of the revolutionary struggle.

(2) Second Period: From Establishment of the Puppet Regime
to the April 1960 Popular Uprising

Kim II Sung has this to say:

However, the struggle of the South Korean people entered a pe-
riod of temporary decline after the concoction of a separate puppet
regime in South Korea in May 1948, and the subsequent fascization
policy of U.S. imperialism and the Li Sung Man [Syngman Rhee]
clique. In order to suppress mass movements, U.S. imperialism and
the Li Sung Man clique mobilized the U.S. armed forces, equipped
with newest weapons, to commit barbarous acts of arresting, im-
prisoning and murdering patriotic people at random.

THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE

245

Further, U.S. imperialism perpetrated underhand maneuvers to
split and disintegrate the revolutionary forces from inside by utiliz-
ing factionalist elements and spies who had infiltrated the leader-
ship of the South Korean Workers Party. As a result, party organiza-
tions were completely destroyed and the revolutionary forces were
split in South Korea. 2

Pak Hong Yong and his followers, who were spies serving
the United States, captured the leadership of the vanguard
party in South Korea and deliberately drove Party members
and patriotic people to reckless actions, making them suffer
great losses in order to destroy the Party from within and
stamp out the revolutionary forces.

By the end of 1949, the Party and mass organizations were
completely destroyed and revolutionary movements were
forced into a temporary retreat. The retreat was gradual, in-
dicating that even while the movement was declining, the
South Korean people fought bravely and desperately against
the offensive of enemy reaction. Thus, this period saw dem-
onstrations in South Korea to support and welcome the
establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic, struggles
to hoist the flag of the Republic, a demonstration of South
Korean workers in November 1948 to demand the immediate
withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces, and a revolt of South
Korean soldiers in October in Ryosu. These struggles were on
a higher level than the previous struggles but were unable
to expand and develop into a mass movement involving all
parts of South Korea.

However, the Fatherland Liberation War [the Korean War,
1950-53] was a special period of temporary upsurge of the
movement. During this period the powerful revolutionary
forces of the North were combined with the revolutionary
forces of the South. In those days, as a result of the victorious
advance of the Korean People’s Army, a large part of South
Korea was liberated and Party organizations and people’s
committees were again organized in the liberated areas, vari-

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REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

ous democratic reforms were carried out, and revolutionary
enthusiasm of the masses ran very high.

Groups of South Korean youth joined the volunteers and
fought bravely to annihilate the enemy, and the people in the
rear actively supported the fighting ranks on the front. For a
short period, the South Korean people directly experienced
the policy of the Workers Party of Korea under a people’s
government and, consequently, actively supported the Peo-
ple’s Army even during the difficult time of the temporary,
strategic retreat. Even after that, fierce struggles developed
in South Korea, including the burning of transport materials
in November 1951 by the Pusan dockworkers, the explosion
of the First Arsenal of the Defense Department, and various
guerrilla actions. However, because of the change in the mili-
tary situation and betrayal by Pak Hon Yong and his followers,
the revolutionary forces were not maintained or strengthened
and the Party organizations were destroyed. The struggle of
the South Korean people again stagnated. But the revolution-
ary movement began to recover its former strength gradually
during the period from the armistice to the April Popular Up-
rising of 1960,

(3) Third Period: From the April Popular Uprising
to the Present

Kim II Sung says:

After the [Korean] war, the struggle of the South Korean people
gradually followed a new course of development. The South Korean
people, encouraged by the results of socialist construction in the
North, continued to fight tenaciously against U.S. imperialism and
its stooges, demanding democratic freedoms and rights.

The Popular Uprising, centered on the students and youth of South
Korea in April 1960, finally toppled the Li Sung Man [Syngman
Rhee] puppet government which had long served as agents of U.S.
imperialism. This was the first victory in the struggle of the South

THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE

247

Korean people and dealt a shattering blow to the colonial domination
of U.S. imperialism. 3

During this period the South Korean people struggled
against the increased war provocations of the United States —
against the growing burden of military spending and particu-
larly against the ruthless plunder and fascist repression by the
Syngman Rhee clique. The successful results of socialist con-
struction in the North and the correctness of the policies of
the Party encouraged struggles against the United States and
its puppets. Thus, for seven years after the war, the struggles
of the South Korean people followed a steady upward curve;
in 1959, the number of actions rose five-fold to 891, compared
with 176 in 1954. The South Korean people, in this period,
fought for democratic rights, which they combined with strug-
gles for a solution to the immediate problems of livelihood,
using anti-fascist and democratic slogans. These struggles
finally led to the historic April Popular Uprising, in which
pent-up indignation at extreme suppression and vicious
plunder by the United States and its stooges flared up. Partici-
pating in the mass uprising in April 1960 were more than a
million city people — workers, peasants and intellectuals, with
patriotic students as the core. Syngman Rhee’s fascist dictator-
ship was overthrown in this, the first victory of the South
Korean people in their anti-American national salvation strug-
gle. It was a serious blow to U.S. imperialism’s colonial rule.

The collapse of the puppet regime meant the bankruptcy
of its anti-people policy and especially of its policy to “unify
Korea by marching north.” And it reflected a serious crisis in
the colonial domination system of U.S. imperialism. In this
heroic struggle the people demonstrated their revolutionary
mettle and acquired valuable experience. The April Popular
Uprising showed that further revolutionary advances of the
South Korean people could not be prevented even at bayonet
point.

248 REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

The South Koreans were awakened politically by this strug-
gle and they were convinced that they could storm success-
fully any imperialist stronghold if they were united and
fought tenaciously. Their revolutionary fervor was great after
their first victory. Although the Syngman Rhee clique was
toppled by the April Popular Uprising, colonial domination
by U.S. imperialism continued. The United States imposed
Chang Myon as its new placeman, set up a new puppet regime
and intensified the suppression and plunder of the people,
while promising them a democratic government.

Thus, the people’s demands in the April Popular Uprising
were completely trampled upon, and economic crisis and
political confusion were aggravated further. Consequently,
the South Koreans conducted a more positive struggle, espe-
cially for national unification and national prosperity. Kim II
Sung made this clear in his 1960 report at the celebration of
the 15th anniversary of the August 15 Liberation and at the
Eighth Session, Second Supreme People’s Assembly, where
the program was spelled out, giving a new impetus to the
struggle after the April Popular Uprising.

Under the slogan, “Unity is the only way to live, the South
Koreans advanced their fight for independent unification and
gradually turned the thrust of their struggle against U.S. impe-
rialism, shaking the foundations of colonial domination.
Alarmed by this critical situation, the United States instigated
fascist elements within the South Korean Army to carry out a
military coup in an attempt to establish a military- fascist dic-
tatorship and strangle the people’s revolutionary struggle. In
less than one week after the coup, 23 progressive parties and
238 social organizations were ordered disbanded, while over
2,300 publishing establishments forcibly were closed down;
hundreds of thousands of patriotic people were arrested, many
imprisoned and murdered.

However, suppression by the dictatorship did not strengthen
the position of the United States in South Korea; rather it

THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE

249

deepened the crisis of the system of colonial domination. The
imposition of the dictatorship meant that the United States
and its agents could maintain their colonial domination only
at bayonet point. No suppression can stamp out the struggle
of politically awakened people, and the worse the suppression
and poverty, the greater are the will and strengthen to resist.
This was clearly demonstrated after the coup.

There were a series of protests against the ROK-Japan talks
and the ROK-Japan Treaty, on March 24 and June 3, 1964, and
in August 1965. Hundreds of thousands of people, including
youth and students at 53 universities and at 173 middle and
high schools, participated in the protests, which continued
for more than 70 days from March 24 to June 5, 1964. The
demonstrations frequently assumed the character of riots and
were the first large-scale mass struggles since the fascist sup-
pression imposed after the coup. As a result, the sixth ROK
Japan talks were frustrated and U.S. imperialism and its Pak
Chung Hi clique were dealt another blow.

However, the United States and its puppets tried to resume
the talks with Japan by declaring a virtual state of emergency,
mobilizing the armed forces and resorting to fascist suppres-
sion, including the closure not only of universities but also of
middle and high schools. After the initialling of the ROK-
Japan Treaty at the end of February, more and more struggles
took place until, in August, the people engaged in large-scale,
mass-based demonstrations against the ratification of the
treaty. Anti-treaty protests continued for more than a year in
defiance of fascist suppression. More than 200,000 youth and
students were the center of the movement. The colonialist
policy of the United States and the maneuvers of the Japanese
to enter South Korea were exposed.

The dispatch of South Korean puppet troops to South Viet-
nam aroused even stronger anti-American, anti-government
feelings. There is also wide-spread resentment among the
puppet troops against dying in South Vietnam as a shield for

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REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

the United States. With the defeats of U.S. troops in Vietnam,
the setbacks suffered by the troops of other countries, includ-
ing South Korea, and the sharp increase in the number of war
casualties among them, the number of draft evaders increased
rapidly, alarming the puppet authorities.

Protests against the incursions by Japanese monopoly capi-
tal and the increased robbery by the puppet authorities also
spread, especially since the conclusion of the ROK-Japan
Treaty. Workers in the coal, power and railway industries,
and in the docks, especially employees at U.S. military instal-
lations, participated in struggles. More than 200,000 took part
in protest actions from late 1965 to early 1966; and in 1966
there were 560,000. The people fought not only for higher
wages, better working conditions and other economic de-
mands but also for trade union rights, for the abolition of ex-
traterritorial labor regulations, and against national discrimi-
nation. They fought stubbornly in defiance of suppression by
U.S. military and puppet police and succeeded in winning
several of their demands. Peasants fought against eviction
from their land required for military operations and opposed
low prices for farm products, demanding guaranteed accept-
able prices.

Through these struggles for existence, the South Korean
people gradually came to understand better the real cause of
their starvation and difficulties, and the need to increase their
fighting capacity. At the same time, the demand for sover-
eignty and independence became more and more widespread
during the struggle against sending troops to Vietnam and the
economic struggles of the working people. Demands for the
expulsion of foreign forces, both American and Japanese,
for sovereignty, independence and national unification, were
voiced more and more often.

Despite fascist suppression and control of the press, jour-
nalists and writers criticized and condemned the false argu-
ments of the Pak Chung Hi clique that Korea would be unified

THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE

251

in the latter half of the 1970's by the UN. They urged that
Korea should be unified by the Koreans themselves and that
exchanges between North and South should be activated, so
that Korea could assert national identity in her relations with
the United States.

The anti-American, anti-fascist struggles flared up violently
in a political action against the unfair elections of June 8, 1967.
Participating between June 6 and July 10 were more than
200,000 students at 145 universities, high schools and middle
schools, and a large number of ordinary citizens. They fought
courageously in defiance of school suspension orders and
arrest warrants, police clubs and tear-gas bombs, shouting
“Remember April 19!” “The Unfair Election Is Invalid!”
“Arrest the Ringleaders of the Unfair Election!” “Stamp Out
Corrupt Government!” “Let us Defend Democracy to the
Last!” and “Let Us Defend People's Rights!” As these slogans
show, this was not only a protest against the unfair election but
also a patriotic struggle to restore democracy and freedom.
The struggle spread to many parts of the country in a very
short period of time.

The students used various tactics, including condemnation
meetings, burning effigies of government leaders, demon-
strations and sit-downs, turning their schools into strongholds
of struggle, going on a hunger strike, and stoning the police.

Since the end of 1967, the struggle of the South Korean peo-
ple has developed into a new, active phase on a qualitatively
higher plane, including armed guerrilla warfare.

252

REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

2. THE PRESENT STRUGGLE
AND ITS PROSPECTS

In a recent major report, Kim II Sung said:

The revolutionary struggle of the South Korean people is now ex-
panding and developing into various forms of active anti-U.S., na-
tional salvation struggles, including armed struggle. Their struggles
are becoming organized gradually and are taking deep root among
the workers and peasants, the main forces of the revolution, and are
vigorously growing among broad sections of the masses of all strata.
While further expanding their revolutionary organizations, the revo-
lutionary and patriotic people of South Korea are waging an unyield-
ing struggle against the enemy in towns and villages, underground
and in the mountains, even in prisons and in “courts.” The activities
of the revolutionary armed groups operating in various parts of South
Korea and the revolutionary vanguard of different groups of people,
including workers, students, newsmen, educators, and even con-
scientious national capitalists, have alarmed the U.S. imperialists
and their lackeys and thrown them into utter confusion . 4

The most important problem to be solved in carrying out
the revolution is that of the political leader. The political
leader is the center of unity and cohesion of the masses, and
the leader's revolutionary ideas arc the ideological basis on
which all the people are to be rallied. The South Korean
people have great respect for Premier Kim 11 Sung, who is the
foremost leader of the Korean revolution and is loved by the
40 million Korean people who regard him as the beacon of
the revolution, and are determined to entrust their destiny
to him. 1 he invincible unity of all the people with this great
revolutionary leader is the decisive guarantee for victory.
And this is the most characteristic feature of the present stage
of the South Korean revolution- the conviction that victory
will be won, whatever difficulties and ordeals may ensue, if
they follow the teachings of Kim 11 Sung.

THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE

253

Many individual instances can be cited of the public ex-
pression, despite the fascist repression, of widespread respect
for Kim 11 Sung among the South Korean workers, peasants,
youths and students, and intellectuals. And there is a growing
tendency among them to accept his revolutionary ideas and
to prepare themselves for struggle, according to the strategic
and tactical line of Kim II Sung on the South Korean revolu-
tion and national unification.

Thus, the struggles of the South Korean people are develop-
ing among the broad masses, including workers, peasants,
youth and students, intellectuals, and urban petty-bourgeoi-
sie; the spearhead of these struggles is gradually being di-
rected at U.S. imperialism.

According to incomplete statistics, actions involving all
strata totaled 1,030 between January and October 1968, and
the number of people who participated in these struggles
was 1.3 times larger than in the comparable period of the
previous year.

(1) Workers ' Struggles

Workers have participated in an increasing wave of actions
in defiance of the U.S. -puppet regime. According to incom-
plete statistics, there were 125 workers' actions in the first
half of 1968, participated in by 198,000 workers, a 2.3-fold
increase over 1967, including railway workers, coal miners,
dock workers and seamen, textile workers, and others.

The regime tightened the low- wage policy in early 1968
and tried to revise the Labor Standards Law to the detriment
of the workers, to secure more profits for foreign monopoly
capital and comprador capitalists. It also enacted a fascist
Labor Dispute Mediation Law to take more repressive meas-
ures against the struggles of workers. However, the South
Korea workers have been developing their resistance, linking
their struggle for better living conditions and democratic
freedoms with anti-war actions. A characteristic of the struggle

254 REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

in 1968, was its increased scale, better organization and the
higher political consciousness of the workers.

Early in 1968, more than 30,000 railway workers organized
a committee to work for better conditions in Seoul and in
different districts under its wing, dealing a sharp blow at new
war provocations by conducting the movement under a uni-
fied leadership. About 3,000 clothing workers in Pusan or-
ganized a labor disputes committee with representatives from
more than 30 enterprises and gradually intensified their strug-
gle from a dispute to a strike under a unified leadership. Start-
ing in June 1968, large-scale struggles, each involving more
than 10,000 workers, were continuous. Among these were the
struggle of 13,000 workers of the ROK Public Coal Corpora-
tion who fought for higher wages in June; the struggle of
20,000 postal and telecommunication workers who demanded
higher wages and other benefits in August; and the struggle of
over 40,000 employes at U.S. military bases and installations
in October.

Another important characteristic was that the workers fought
more positively and tenaciously, moving more and more to-
ward formation of an anti-American, national salvation united
front. The 13,000 workers of the ROK Public Coal Corpora-
tion, who had a long dispute demanding a 30 per cent wage
increase, called a 48 hour general strike at all mines in 11 dis-
tricts. When the puppet authorities adamantly refused to ac-
cept any of their demands, they called a strike of indefinite
duration at the end of August. At Pusan, 8,000 dock workers
who conducted a demonstration early in June, launched
another action on October 16.

South Korean workers are moving toward joint struggles in
related industries, or may join an action launched by workers
elsewhere. For instance, early in March 1968, over 30,000
railway workers demanded better living conditions. This was
followed by the struggle of 13,000 workers in monopoly enter-
prises. When the Pak Chung Hi regime attempted to revise

THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE

255

the Labor Relations Law to suppress the struggles of the
workers in monopoly enterprises, the South Korean workers
arose, on March 5, against it. In an expression of solidarity,
railway, telecommunication and government monopoly work-
ers were determined that “one million workers will rise as
one, at any risk, if the Pak Chung Hi clique does not give up
their fascist plots and maneuvers. ” In another instance, 56,000
textile workers in many parts of South Korea adopted a resolu-
tion in mid-June to support actively the struggle of the workers
of Jonnam Paper Manufacturing Co. and spread the struggle
throughout South Korea to help the workers win their de-
mands early in July.

A remarkable thing about the struggles of the South Korean
workers is that they are being developed into struggles against
the United States and the puppet “government.” Workers em-
ployed at U.S. and Japanese installations conducted 15 pro-
tests in the first four months of 1968, the total number of
workers involved reaching 74,000. More than half of the strug-
gles waged by workers in the first quarter of 1968 were
directed against the Pak Chung Hi clique. About 1,000 dock
workers at Inchon completely stopped the transport of mili-
tary supplies during their struggle for higher wages. At about
the same time, some 600 workers employed by the U.S. Army
in the same city joined the struggle and succeeded in winning
their demands. Recently 2,000 workers employed at the U.S.
base in the Osan area carried out a firm anti-American demon-
stration in protest against repressive measures against South
Korean workers. This touched off mass anti-American strug-
gles in Seoul, Inchon, Buchon, Bupyong, Uijongbu, Taegu
and other parts of South Korea.

In this way, South Korean workers, inspired by the develop-
ing revolutionary armed guerrilla actions, are expanding and
strengthening their struggles, led by workers in railway, coal
mining, telecommunication, longshore and textile, which are
key industries of South Korea. Through their difficult strug-

256

RE V01UT,0S IN SOUTH KOREA AND UH.E.CAT.OM

gles, the workers deve.op

battle for higher wages, ■ «* stnlgg i e against the war
p^cy Z and"fascUt Suppression, and for denrocratic freedom.

® s r — -• —

South Korean P easai V ’ the couvse of their struggles, aie

conscious and tempeie main revolutionary force, a

f^ortog class, and are contributing great V

to tL cause of South Korean revolution^ J46 peasant

According to incomplete d ^ ^ first half of 1968,

actions in many parts of ^ & 3 7 . fold gain over the

involving a total of 1-6 * year. The Honarn district

comparable penod o ^ for more than half

particularly haid h > quar ter of 1968.

the peasant actions in ^ ^ ounty . North Cholla province,

Some 2,000 peasants mlmsi et National As-

staged demonstrations in hont ^ ^ forcib l y reqmsr-
sembly demanding P a >'^ wh ile in the Ulsan area,

tinned by the puppet farmland they cultivated

some 300 peasants squatte . South Chungchong

S^rL“ion, for the purpose of building »

military road. North Kyongsang province, ioi me d

Poor peasants in Taegu, N ts > plan to evict them

an organization to Konyang-myon and

from their land to bui Kyongsang province, and

ttSSZZS * ^s which le^fees and rrrr.

gation taxes on the peasants.

THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE

257

The scale of struggle is also increasing. The number of ac-
tions in which more than 100 peasants participated comprised
48.9 per cent of all actions in the first three months of 1967.
This was increased to 68 percent in the same period of 1968.
The number of actions involving more than 500 peasants
totaled 31 in the first half of 1968, a 3.9-fold increase over the
comparable period in 1967. These peasant struggles are mani-
festations of the pent-up indignation over the policy of the
U.S. -puppet regime, which is forcing them to the brink of
complete ruin, and are a logical result of the contradictions in
South Korean society under the occupation of U.S. imperial-
ism.

(3) Youth and Students

South Korean youth and students are actively developing
struggles to democratize the campuses against fascist efforts
of the Pak Chung Hi regime to coordinate the campuses as
their private institutions. In April 1968, the 1,500 students of
Masan Commercial High School adopted a resolution express-
ing opposition to the repressive measures taken by the regime
and staged protest demonstrations. The 600 students of Dong-
jung High School in Chunchon city, Kangwon province, called
a “strike” in opposition to the fascist measures taken by the
school authorities and waged stubborn struggles against the
anti-people educational policy, and against high tuition fees
and various other impositions.

I heir attempts to oppose and boycott mandatory military
training are directed at U.S. imperialism. On September 25,
1958, the Pak Chung Hi clique formulated an Education En-
loreement Ordinance to send students to war as soon as they
gmduate from school. Under the ordinance, military training,
which had so far been given to students at 11 high schools,
was to be given to 400,000 students at 800 high schools
lluoughout South Korea, starting in 1969, for two hours a
week — a total of 40 hours (20 weeks) a year. (University stu-

258

REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

dents were to be given military training as before). The South
Korean students fought vigorously against this militarization
policy. Particularly noteworthy in this respect was the strug-
gle of the Taegu High School students, who fought stubbornly
against the school’s plan to convert three hours of physical
culture to military training, in addition to the two hours speci-
fied for that purpose.

Although the struggles of the youth and students were not
as widespread as at the time of the April Popular Uprising or
of the June 3 and March 24 actions, their potential was greatly
increased. They have learned by experience that they cannot
win a decisive victory unless their struggle is linked up with
that of workers and peasants, and they are making efforts to
strengthen this solidarity.

(4) Urban Struggles

The South Korean people in urban areas are also playing a
role in isolating U.S. imperialism and its agents and in
strengthening the anti-U.S., national salvation united fiont.
Characteristic of the struggles of ordinary city people is then-
mass base and the fact that they are assuming a violent nature.

At the end of March 1968, inhabitants of Chungong-dong,
Sudaemun ward in the city of Seoul, fought against the Pak
Chung Hi clique’s edict to forcibly clear the area of shacks.
They occupied the dong office and assaulted several police-
men, including an officer, of the Sudaemun police station, who
were imprisoned at the dong office. There are countless other
such instances.

It is also characteristic of the urban struggles that the city
people arc becoming more and more indignant at the policies
of the Pak Chung Hi clique. In January 1968, some 2,000,in-
habitants of Ryongtaek-dong and Dodu-dong in Cheju Island
held a meeting, adopted a resolution against the expansion of
the Cheju airstrip, and submitted the resolution to the puppet

THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE

259

government. The people of Ryosu had demonstrations de-
manding compensation and an immediate stop to construction
of the naval port and military roads on which they were forced
to work daily without adequate safety measures.

(5) Guerrilla Struggles

The revolutionaries and patriots of South Korea are develop-
ing diverse forms of struggle, and even combining them with
armed actions.

The form and method of revolutionary struggle are deter-
mined by actual subjective and objective conditions, and par-
ticularly by the resistance of the reactionary, ruling classes.
In conditions where all democratic rights are denied and liv-
ing conditions depressed, the people have no alternative but
to turn to armed struggle to fight counter-revolutionary force.

I hey use as their guide the historical lessons learned in the
anti-Japanese armed struggles led by Kim 11 Sung under
Japanese colonial rule.

The guerrilla struggles, which began in South Korea in the
latter half of 1967, have been expanding rapidly since the
armed attack on the Presidential Residence in the central
l nu "t of Seoul on January 21, 1968. Even according to data re-
leased by the puppet authorities, there were more than 200
attacks by armed guerrilla units in various parts of South Korea
between January and the end of October 1968, wounding,
killing and executing more than 2,000 U.S. aggressors, puppet
military police and their agents.

Guerrilla units showered hand grenades on the building
of the International Telephone and Telegraph office in the
central part of Seoul on the night of April 30, 1968, and took
notions in Wonjon Wonsong county, Hweng county, Kosong
county and other areas of Kangwon province on June 22, 23
and 24. Since November 1968, armed guerrilla units have
been activated in Susan, South Chungehong province; Wuljin

260

REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

and Bonghwa counties, North Kyongsang province; Samchok,
Myungju, Jongson, Pyangchang and other areas of Kangwon
province. On November 3, a guerrilla unit in the eastern part
of South Korea ambushed a small enemy squad on the move,
rained hand-grenades and bullets on the enemy and left
quickly. The guerrilla forces are increasing their equipment
with arms and weapons taken from the U.S. Army and the
puppets, with the help of the people.

Armed struggle is also being directed against U.S. forces in
frequent raids on military trains. On September 3, 1968 South
Korean patriots rained bullets on a military train between
Komo Station and Kyongsan Station in North Kyongsang prov-
ince, and on November 3 they derailed a military train in a
tunnel at Sangwol-ri, Sinrim-myon, Wonsong county, Kang-
won province.

From early in 1968, as in 1967, armed struggles were de-
veloped in various areas of South Korea, particularly in the
provinces of Kyonggi, Chungchong, South Kyongsang, and
Kangwon. Guerrillas fought fierce battles with the enemy in
66 places in about 10 days after the thrust into Seoul on Jan-
uary 21, killing 104 U.S. soldiers and puppet military police
and destroying a number of military vehicles and other war
materials.

Guerrillas have the active support of broad sections of the
people and rapidly are increasing their ranks. Guerrillas,
who moved into Buk-myon, Wuljin county, South Kyongsang
province on November 2, 1968, held the village all night and,
after executing traitors and puppet military police, appealed
to the villagers to “establish genuine people’s power.” They
praised enthusiastically the northern half of the Republic, and
the villagers, greatly impressed by their speeches, received
them warmly. They volunteered to join the guenillas, pledg
ing “to fight to the end, risking their lives, in the struggle to
w’in a new government, a new system and a new life.

THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE

261

South Korean revolutionaries and patriots are actively re-
cruiting forces, as was demonstrated by the guerrillas who
thrust into Wuljin and Bonghwa counties of North Kyongsang
province in early November. While dealing a heavy blow at
the enemy in these counties, they organized a revolutionary
party and formed a National Salvation Youth League and a
Revolutionary Women’s Association, mass organizations to
cement kinship among the people. In Bonghwa county, a
people’s committee was organized on the basis of the unity of
the revolutionary organizations with broad sections of the
people.

These instances indicate that the revolutionary struggles of
the South Korean people are beginning to enter a new phase.

3. THE UNITED REVOLUTIONARY PARTY
OF SOUTH KOREA

With great appreciation of the heroic struggles of South Ko-
rean revolutionaries and patriots, Kim 11 Sung said:

The priceless achievements of struggle gained by the revolution-
aries and patriotic people in South Korea in their dedicated fight for
Ihe freedom and liberation of the people, for the unification and
independence of the fatherland will shine forever in the proud his-
lory of revolution in our country. 5

An important place in the proud struggles of the South
Koreans is held by members of the United Revolutionary
I’arty (URP), including the late Choi Yong Do, chairman of the
South Cholla Provincial Committee of the Party, and Kim
long Tae, chairman of its Seoul City Committee.

The Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the
I )I’RK conferred the title “Hero of the Republic,” the Gold
Mar medal and the National Flag, First Class, on the late Choi

262

REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

Yong Do, in recognition of his heroic and devoted struggle.
He was arrested and imprisoned in July 1968 in connection
with the Imja Island “incident,” and was barbarously mur-
dered in prison on January 25, 1969.

The URP is a militant underground organization, based on
the ideas of Kim 11 Sung regarding the South Korean revolu-
tion and all-Korea unification. The Party has developed rev-
olutionary anti-American, national salvation struggles on a
large scale.

The basic policy on the South Korean revolution at the present
stage [says Kim 11 Sung] is to make preparations for an impending
great revolutionary event by preserving the revolutionary forces
from suppression by the enemy and, at the same time, by constantly
strengthening and enlarging them. Most important for this purpose is
to build a solid revolutionary party and to build the main contingent
of the revolution in South Korea. 6

After a long period of preparation, in which Choi Yong Do
played a leading role, the URP was founded on March 15,
1964. At that time, just before the March 24 struggle against
the ROK-Japan Treaty, class and national contradictions were
extremely acute in South Korea. The Party necessarily started
as an underground organization and remains so to this day in
the midst of blatant fascist terrorism. Represented in this or-
ganization are progressive people in all walks of life, but work-
ers and peasants are the main force. For example, Choi Yong
Do and Kim Jong Tae, both of poor peasant origin, were chair-
men of the South Cholla Provincial Committee and the Seoul
City Committee, respectively, around which rallied workers,
peasants, youths and students, writers, teachers, journalists,
doctors, company employees, national capitalists, politicians
and even puppet army officers.

The Party’s program calls for building up powerful revolu
tionary forces, driving U.S. imperialism out of South Korea,
overthrowing their agents, and completing the national lib
eration democratic revolution through unification of the

THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE

263

fatherland. The program defines the 14 tasks necessary to
achieve success, among which are included: “to prepare to
secure hegemony in armed struggle,” i.e., to secure decisive
superiority over the counter-revolutionary armed power; “to
organize academic study groups and train leading cadres of
the Paity, and to arm all organizations ideologically so that
they may be developed into guerrilla units in the future.”
Kim II Sung says: I he leading core of Party organizations

must consist of competent revolutionaries who are capable
of judging a situation accurately and of skillfully leading the
movement on the basis of the tactical and strategic principles
of Marxism-Leninism in any complicated circumstances.” 7
On this principle, revolutionaries, beginning with Choi Yung
Do, concentrated on picking outstanding cadres from among
the workers, peasants, youth and students, and intellectuals
and on training them as competent revolutionaries. The URP
now has a core of several hundred leading cadres in South
Korea.

While building its own organization, the Party also built
democratic mass organizations around itself, in conformity
with the teaching of Kim II Sung, who said:

Mass organizations must include the broad masses; they must be
democratic organizations that truly defend class interests, and they
must be legal organizations in principle. When the workers and
peasants are gathered together and alerted by their organizations and
united around the Party, the revolution in South Korea will have a
powerful main force. 8

Under the leadership of the URP, a number of mass organ-
izations were formed, including the following nine democratic
gioups in Seoul: the New Culture Study Society, Young Lit-
erary Writers’ Society, Buddhist Youth Society, Donghak So-
ciety, Youth Association, Society for the Study of National-
ism, Christian Youth Economic Welfare Association, Kyongyu
Society, and the Bachelors of Art Pub.

264

REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

The New Culture Study Society was formed around the
graduates of the Literature and Science College of Seoul
University. The society had six subcommittees -on history,
politics, social affairs, economics, culture, and law -and its
aim was to “relate problems in all these areas to the theories
of communism and to acquire communist ideas.”

Im Jung Sam, a literary critic and graduate of Songgungwan
University, was the leading figure in The Young Literary
Writers* Society; among its members were progressive nov-
elists, critics, poets and journalists from various universi-
ties who helped spread its revolutionary influence among the
masses.

The Buddhist Youth Society was made up of graduates of
Songgungwan and Tongguk universities, with Kim Hi San, oi
Songgungwan, as its leader. It organized the Sangsan Culture
Association to train leading cadres and at the same time
worked with ordinary Buddhist believers, organizing and
mobilizing them in revolutionary struggles by training them
politically and ideologically.

The Ponghak Society was a group of graduates and under-
graduates of Seoul University, with Ro In Yong, a graduate ol
the Literature and Science College, as its leader.

It is also important, in forming the main contingent of the
revolution, to build a united front ot people of various social
strata. Kim 11 Sung has this to say:

To win victory for the revolution, it is necessary to mobilize all
forces that are interested in the revolution while building up its main
force. Only by winning over all forces that can be won over and unit-
ing them into a single political lorce will it be possible to fully isolate
the counter-revolution, secure overwhelming superiority over it for
the revolutionary forces, and lead the revolution to victory.

It is one of the most important tasks in strengthening the revolu-
tionary forces and advancing the revolutionary struggle to form a
broad anti-U.S. united front for national salvation that embraces the
patriotic democratic forces of all circles and strata in South Korea
today . 9

THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE

265

In accord with this policy, the URP built the national lib-
eration front and the fatherland liberation front, uniting people
in all walks of life and developing active struggles to form a
broad-based anti-U.S., national liberation united front.

Kim II Sung teaches that it is important to develop the polit-
ical and ideological consciousness of the masses in order to
preserve and increase the revolutionary forces: “The first
and foremost task in isolating the counter-revolution and in-
creasing the revolutionary forces is to awaken the masses
politically and ideologically.” 10

It is especially important today, when the United States and
its puppets are intensifying daily the reactionary ideological
offensive in South Korea to lull the class and national con-
sciousness of the masses, to carry out political, ideological
and educational activities. It is only in this way that the South
Korean people will be convinced of victory in their struggle
for freedom and liberation. It is also essential for the South
Koieans to be educated in the revolutionary traditions of anti-
Japanese armed struggle.

Members of the URP worked to implement the tasks re-
gal ding political and ideological education. First, they con-
centrated on learning Kim 11 Sung’s revolutionary ideas by
studying his writings and his biography. They published
Ilyokymong Jongson (Revolutionary Front) as their party
newspaper and Chong Mack (Blue Range of Mountains) as
the party magazine, and they established study circles.

Hyokmyong Jongson carried revolutionary articles and news
items, and Chong Maek published stories to encourage and
hearten the masses so as to arouse their anti-U.S. imperialist
and anti-“government” feelings and to inspire them to fight
vigorously for a new government, a new system and a new
life. The first issue of the Chong Maek was published in
August 1964, and 44,000 copies had been published by June
1967. The political and ideological activities of the members
ol the United Revolutionary Party reached not only the basic
masses of South Korea but even into the puppet army.

266

REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION

Kim II Sung wrote: “Revolutionary forces cannot be pre-
pared automatically, without any struggle. They can grow in
strength only through arduous struggles. It is through the or-
deals of struggle that leaders and the nucleus of revolution
are reared, the masses of people awakened and revolutionary

forces increase.’’ 11 ,

In conducting mass struggles, the URP searched for meth-
ods appropriate to the constantly changing revolutionary sit-
uation in relation to the goals, and combined these factors ac-
cording to the teachings of Kim 11 Sung. In this way, rt was
possible to maintain the strategic and tactical princip e of
dealing blows at the enemy from all sides. Thus, political and
economic struggles, legal and illegal struggles, violent an
non-violent struggles were all combined and carried out as
part of the preparations for the decisive battle to overthrow
the colonial rule of U.S. imperialism and recover sovereignty
for the people.

For instance, the URP carefully organized and led large-
scale demonstrations against the fake election of June 8, 1967,
and against the inauguration of the “President, dealing^
smarting blow at the enemy. It also led a demonstration
against the visit of the former U.S. Vice-President to South
Korea. These struggles continued for more than 20 days in
30 places in South Korea, and involved over 200,000 persons
in 145 universities, middle and high schools and 32,000 other
citizens. In addition, the Party led other struggles; Choi Yong
Do obtained weapons in Imja Island in South Cliolla province
and organized the training of military leaders in preparation
for the South Korean revolution.

“People who make a revolution should not permit theii
political lives to be sullied even when their physical lives may
be ended,” 12 Kim II Sung said. Bearing this dictum in mind,
Choi Yong Do fought to the end and remained a faithful Ko-
rean communist even though he was subjected to barbarous
torture after he was arrested and imprisoned. He continued

THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE

267

to fight resolutely against the enemy, turning prison and
court into a new arena of struggle, the murderous court into a
tribunal where the aggressors and the traitors to the nation
were put on trial.

Afraid of his revolutionary struggle and his devotion to his
cause, the puppet authorities sentenced Choi Yong Do to
death on December 27, 1968, under the national security law
and the anti-Communist law, and he was murdered in a prison
cell on January 25, 1969. He was 47 years of age.

If U.S. imperialism and its agents kill a revolutionary, thou-
sands of other revolutionaries and patriots will replace him in
the ranks of the revolution. This is the law of development of
revolution. The revolutionaries and patriots of South Korea
will surely overthrow the U.S. aggressors and their stooges
and win ultimate victory in the South Korean revolution. As
Kim II Sung said:

In spite of fascist suppression and all kinds of fraudulent artifices
of the U.S. imperialists and their puppet clique, the South Korean
people will be further awakened and steeled through the struggle
and will grow into an invincible revolutionary force which will even-
tually overthrow U.S. imperialist rule. In due course they will surely
drive out the U.S. imperialist aggressors and overthrow their lackeys,
and thereby emerge victorious from the revolution . 13

PART THREE

The Korean Revolution
and the World Revolution

In his report at the celebration of the 20th anniversary of
the founding of the Republic, Premier Kim 11 Sung made it
clear that the Korean revolution is a part of the world revolu-
tion and that the struggle of the Korean people to drive U.S.
imperialist struggles against the leader of world imperial-
being developed in close relation to the anti-imperialist, espe-
cially anti-American, struggle being waged on a worldwide
scale.

South Korea is not only a total colony of the United States
but is also its military base for aggression against the whole of
Korea and Asia. Our country is a front in the sharp anti-
imperialist struggles against the leader of world imperial-
ism. The Koreans are fulfilling their national and international
duties by fighting to drive U.S. imperialism out of South
Korea and unify the fatherland.

In this report, Kim 11 Sung gives clear Marxist-Leninist
explanations on the question of strategy and tactics for the
anti-imperialist, anti-American struggles. He projects a strat-
egy for the revolutionary peoples of the world, and particu-
larly for the peoples of small revolutionary countries, to de-
stroy U.S. imperialism. It is a positive strategy, directing the
spearhead of struggle at the main enemy, U.S. imperialism,
and concentrating attacks on it from all sides to drive it com-
pletely onto the defensive.

269

CHAPTER I

Kim II Sung on Acceleration
of the World Revolution

1. THE FIGHT AGAINST U.S. IMPERIALISM

Kim 11 Sung wrote: All the events taking place in the inter-
national arena prove more and more clearly that U.S. im-
perialism is the main force of aggression and war, the inter-
national gendarme, the bulwark of modern colonialism and
llie most heinous enemy of the people of the whole world.” 1

What is most important today, therefore, is for all the
world’s anti-imperialist forces to concentrate their attacks
on U.S. imperialism. This is the unquestionable course of the
historical development of the world revolution and of the ob-
icetive process of the anti-imperialist struggle. It is the con-
' fusion necessarily derived from a Marxist-Leninist analysis
ol t he development of the international situation at the present
lage, the class nature of U.S. imperialism, the position and
mle of the United States in the system of imperialist aggres-
sion and its strategy for world domination.

All the anti-imperialist forces of the world should unite to
spearhead their struggle against U.S. imperialism because it
r. the ringleader of aggression as head of world imperialism.
Since the end of World War II, the system of imperialism has
I icon reorganized with the United States at its center, polit-
ir. illy and militarily, as well as economically.

I he United States was the only imperialist power that was
mil directly hit by World War II. On the contrary, in the

271

272

KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION

course of the war, American monopoly capital was able to rake
in fabulous wartime superprofits. In contrast, Germany,
Italy, Japan and other imperialist powers were defeated and
the economic power of the victors, Britain and France, was
decisively weakened. Consequently, the United States
emerged as the most powerful reactionary force in the capital
ist system after the war.

Moreover, U.S. imperialism used the war boom to over
come the effects of the serious economic crisis of the 1930’s,
and for easing the problems arising from the general crisis ol
capitalism. However, the general crisis continued to deepen
in the postwar period, as U.S. imperialism engaged in military
provocations in all parts of the world, strengthened its arma
ments, and heightened international tension. U.S. monopoly
capital temporarily averted a major crisis of overproduction,
largely by maintaining military production on a wartime or
near- wartime footing. U.S. monopolies were thus able to pom
their huge superprofits into the renewal and expansion ol
fixed assets, continuously increasing the productive forces,
and further strengthening their economic power. Supported
by huge industrial power, U.S. imperialism by far surpassed
other nations in military capability, and boasted of its alleged
global military supremacy.

Under these conditions -overwhelmingly superior econoni
ic and military power and the relative weakening of othei
imperialist powers -the United States emerged as the bid
wark of world colonialism, whatever the form. It also set up
under its control various aggressive military blocs to serve its
ambition of world domination, and adopted its so-called “aid
policy for the same purpose.

The network of U.S. military bases extends throughout the
capitalist world, threatening the independence and freedom
of the host countries and world peace. The United States
revived and reactivated West German and Japanese militarism
in order to reorganize the world system of imperialist reae

ON ACCELERATION OF WORLD REVOLUTION

273

lion, of which it is the international gendarme. As the ring-
leader of aggression and war and the main enemy of peace,
democracy, national independence and socialism, the United
States has become the prime target of anti-imperialist forces
llie world over.

The setback suffered by U.S. imperialism in the Fatherland
Liberation War of the Korean people (1950-53) marked the
beginning of the decline in its relative power. Since then,
and especially in recent years, it has lost ground to other impe-
rialist countries and especially to the socialist camp in eco-
nomic and military strength.

However, U.S. imperialism remains by far the strongest
power, especially militarily, in the capitalist world. The very
laet of its declining relative position spurs it to lash out more
viciously in the vain attempt to achieve its world domination
aims. Kim II Sung says:

U.S. imperialism is working desperately to find a way out of its
impending doom by aggravating international tensions, stepping up
I In* arms drive and unleashing a new war of aggression. . . . U.S.
imperialism extends its talons of aggression to all parts and all
countries of the world— Asia and Europe, Africa and Latin America,
and big and small countries. 2

During the present period the strategy of U.S. imperialism
is to concentrate on attacking smaller and weaker countries,

• •specially newly independent countries and divided coun-
tries which are partly socialist. It speculates on hoped-for
plits in the socialist camp to prevent adequate aid to these
countries in their resistance to U.S. imperialism. At the same
lime, U.S. imperialism continues to prepare for a possible sud-
den global nuclear aggression against the USSR, China and all
peoples of the world.

following this strategy, the United States is expanding
military preparations, strengthening its foreign bases and
military alliances to attack socialist and progressive countries.

I ol ^stance, in fiscal 1968 direct U.S. military spending

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KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION

reached $76,200 million which, together with indirect mill
tary expenditures, accounted for more than 50 per cent of the
total national budget of the United States. Defense accounts
for 20 per cent of the total production of U.S. heavy industry.

As part of its war policy, the United States today maintains
more than 2,000 military bases in more than 90 countries <>l
Asia, Oceania, Europe, Latin American and Africa, with 1.5
million members of the U.S. armed forces stationed there
Since the end of World War II, there have been more than 200
large and small wars, all caused directly by U.S. imperialism
It continues to make large-scale preparations for global <»
nuclear war, and has engaged in barbarous aggressive wars.

The maneuvers of U.S. imperialism al the present stage arc
designed, in the first place, to intensify aggression and sub
versive activities especially against the socialist countries. II
is stepping up the barbarous war of genocide in Vietnam, Laos
and Cambodia. Occupying the Cuban territory of Guantanamo,
it continuously perpetrates aggressive and provocative maneu
vers against the Republic of Cuba. Its efforts to provoke a new
war in Korea have reached a grave stage, with new wai
preparations in South Korea and more open military provoca
tions against the DPRK as the anti-American, national salva
tion struggle grows in South Korea.

Pursuing a policy of suppressing national liberation move
ments of Asian, African and Latin American peoples, it is try
ing to strangle national independence everywhere. The
United States instigated the Israeli expansionists to launch
an aggressive war against the Arab peoples and is malicious I \
attempting to stifle their struggle for national independence
and a new life.

In recent years, the United States has been more open in its
subversive activities against newly independent national
states. It has penetrated countries in Asia, Africa and Latin
America, with “aid” as a bait, meddles in their internal affairs
and, having bribed and gathered reactionaries to oppose

ON ACCELERATION OF WORLD REVOLUTION

2 75

progressive forces, engineers reactionary military coups. In
this way it plots to sway these countries to the right and
prevent their firm adhesion to the anti-imperialist camp.

As a result of the revival by the United States of Japanese
imd West German militarism, they have grown into dangerous
aggressive forces in Asia and Europe, menacing the peace
imd security of the world.

I here can be no question that U.S. imperialism is the main
loiee of aggression and war, the main enemy of the peoples.

• he most urgent revolutionary task is to defeat the world
strategy of U.S. imperialism. Then, the anti-imperialist
struggle will develop by leaps and bounds, and the world
revolution will be accelerated decisively.

2. THE SIMULTANEOUS FIGHT AGAINST
ALLIES OF U.S. IMPERIALISM

In order to fight against U.S. imperialism and defend world
peace [Kim II Sung says], it is imperative to fight against the lackeys
"I U.S. imperialism and its allies.

An important factor in U.S. imperialist strategy is to induce all
loiccs of reaction to oppose socialism and the national liberation
movement. In executing their policies of aggression and war, the
I S. imperialists count on the reactionary forces in many countries
ili.it use U.S. imperialism as a guide for aggression. Typical examples

Japanese and West German militarism . 3

While U.S. imperialism is the main target of all the peoples
"I I he world, this does not mean that the struggle against other
imperialist powers, particularly against the lackeys and allies
"I U.S. imperialism, can be underestimated. On the contrary,
decisive blows can be dealt only when the principal target
umI its allies are correctly specified and the struggles against
l hem are linked. The power of socialist countries is increasing,
ond vigorous national liberation movements are developing in
V.iu, Africa and Latin America. As a result, the U.S. strategy

276

KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION

of attacking socialist and progressive countries one at a time
is being dealt hard blows in all parts of the world. Confronted
by an overall collapse of its system of colonial domination,
the United States seeks a solution to this crisis in open aggros
sion and war. In these circumstances, it is important for it In
induce all forces of reaction to oppose socialism and the
national liberation movement, and to carry out its aggressive
world strategy.

Today, Japanese and West German militarism are the mosl
loyal allies of the United States and are active agents of ils
aggressive policy. They have become “shock brigades” <>!
U.S. imperialism and are creating dangerous hotbeds of wai
The struggle against them should be strengthened, as an im
portant part of the struggle against U.S. imperialism.

It is of special importance to intensify the struggle againsl
Japanese militarism. Kim II Sung puts it this way:

Today the U.S. imperialists are directing the spearhead of aggie,
sion particularly to Asia, and Japanese militarism is faithfully sen
ing the U.S. as its “shock brigade” in Asian aggression. . . . The Jap.t
nese militarists, at the bidding of the U.S., are making active prepai u
tions for anew war and Japan is serving the U.S. imperialists as a sup
ply base and military base for aggression against Asian countries. In
these circumstance, the struggle against Japanese militarism can l>\
no means be neglected . 4

Concentrating its military forces in Asia, the United Stales
is integrating Asian anti-communist dependencies into il
plan, reorganizing them and utilizing the power of revived
Japanese militarism to which is assigned a leading role in (In
anti-communist military bloc.

The Japanese, with the backing of the United States, an
trying to realize their old dream of Asian aggression and an
working up war plans against Korea and other socialist conn
tries of Asia. They are also increasing economic and cullui.il
infiltration into Asian, African and Latin American counh i<
under the slogans of “aid,” “joint development” and “cm

ON ACCELERATION OF WORLD REVOLUTION

277

nomic and technical cooperation.” An example of these
maneuvers is Japan’s reentry into South Korea. Under the
T^'so f the United States, the Japanese, in collusion with the
a \ . lung Hi regime, have again penetrated South Korea,
especially since the conclusion of the ROK-Japan Treaty!

hey have interfered in politics, the economy, military affairs
mid culture and all other spheres, with the intention of re-
ducing South Korea again to the status of their own colony.

In military affairs, Japan is reinforcing U.S. domination
ovoi South Korea. The plan is to use South Korea as a military
. e in an anti-communist Pacific military alliance (PATO)
will) Japan at the center, by linking the Northeast Asian
reaty Organization (NEATO) with the Southeast Asian
"■aty Organization (SEATO) in a reorganization of these
alliances into a “vertical military relationship” with the U.S.

• il the apex. This is clearly seen in the establishment of a
•milled system of command and telecommunications- with

U,S> Army at t,le core -unification of military equipment
mid joint military maneuvers of South Korea, the United States’
unci Japan.

Concerning establishment of a unified system of command
mid telecommunications we cite the Japan-U.S. secret agree-
mrnt concerning “mutual exchange of directions and informa-
mn among the Air Force Commands of South Korea, the

il "u Irso tGS an< * J apan ” wllich was exposed in March 1967,

. “ ‘ DGE system which went into operation in March ] 969

dm opening of diffirsed wave communications between South

Korea and J a P an > and the construction of a large long-wave
ii.msmitter in Pusan.

I he standardization of military equipment was started long
.-go. Recently, since the escalation of the war in Vietnam

I il oeurement of military supplies from Japan has increased

• n.irply.

Japanese militarism is also lightening the burden of U.S.
military aid by providing so-called “property claims funds”

278

KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION

and granting credits to South Korea. These funds have been
invested in strengthening the military potential of South
Korea, e.g., the Taejon Engineering Arsenal and the Pusan
Arsenal, and in constructing ports and harbors, military roads,
explosives manufacturing factories and communications
equipment, as well as investing funds to supply military
vehicles and various kinds of weapons to the puppet army of
South Korea. The expressway between Seoul and Pusan, on
which construction is being expedited with aid from Japan,
is designed wide enough to serve as an emergency air strip,
and it is specially reinforced to withstand heavy tanks.

Under directions from the United States, the Japanese
frequently conduct military maneuvers in anticipation of
actual operations in Korea. Japan’s Self-Defense Forces are
trained in mountainous areas with climatic conditions similar
to Korea; they study U.S. Army records of the Korean War
and learn the Korean language. The Japanese are concentrat-
ing land, sea and air units of the Self-Defense Forces in areas
close to Korea and openly conduct large-scale straits-blockade
and anti-submarine training maneuvers, with the naval forces
of the United States and South Korea, in the East Sea and near
the straits of Korea; the Seventh Fleet of the United States is
the central force.

As has been widely exposed, Japanese militarism has al-
ready worked out a number of operational plans in anticipa-
tion of a second Korean War, including Operation Three Ar-
row, Operation Flying Dragon, and Operation Bull Run.*
Puppet Prime Minister Chung 11 Kwon of South Korea stated
that if a war breaks out in Korea, Japan will aid the ROK as a
participant with the UN forces. This statement indicates the
main purpose lor which the Japanese are accelerating their
remilitarization.

Japan s place in the world strategy of the United States is
*See, for example, Wilfred G. Burchett, Again Korea, New York, 1968.

ON ACCELERATION OF WORfD REVOLUTION

279

not confined to Korea. It plays an active role in the war in
Vietnam -as a supply base, as a front line base where weapons
and arms are repaired, as a direct operational base for B-52
strategic bombers and the Seventh Fleet, and as a base for the
transport of military personnel.

U.S. imperialism utilizes Japan as a nodal point connecting
Vietnam to Korea, for military provocations, and for escalation
of the war in Vietnam. Both the RB-47 reconnaissance plane,
which violated the territorial air space of Korea and was shot
down in August 1964, and the spy ship Pueblo, which invaded
the territorial waters of the Republic and was captured in
January 1968, were based on Japan.

The ROK-Japan Treaty is essentially a military alliance and
naturally requires political domination and subjugation in
support of it. The seven-article treaty gives a legal basis for
establishing the Japanese role in the political domination of
South Korea, in conjunction with the United States. In other
words, it is intended to guarantee and justify the political role
of the Japanese as an ally of the United States in Korea.

On the basis of this legal system, a Japanese embassy and
consultate have already been established in South Korea,
staffed by political, diplomatic, military, police and informa-
tion officers experienced in the colonial domination of South
Korea. Other permanent organizations, such as a ministerial
conference of the ROK and Japan, have been established. The
joint colonization of South Korea by the United States and
Japan is supported, as we have seen, by the export of state
capital in the name of “property claims funds” and also of
private monopoly capital; through the “yen collateral fund”
the Japanese have obtained a voice in the control of the
finances of the puppet regime- Economic penetration by Japa-
nese monopoly capital has been stepped up since the conclu-
sion of the ROK-Japan Treaty, reflecting the desire to convert
South Korea into an economic appendage and to control its
market for the export of capital and commodities.

280

KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION

Elsewhere, the Japanese support the aggressive acts of the
Israeli expansionists in the Middle and Near Eastern areas,
and oppose the righteous struggles of the Arabs. A revived
and remilitarized Japan has become a dangerous aggressive
force threatening the peace of Asia and of the world and the
struggle against Japanese militarism cannot be neglected.

“We must be aware of the danger of Japanese militarism in
Asia along with that of West German militarism in Europe,”
wrote Kim II Sung. “As all the socialist countries struggle
against West German militarism, along with U.S. imperialism,
in Europe, so they should fight against Japanese militarism,
along with U.S. militarism, in Asia .” 5

It is erroneous, in terms of the anti-imperialist and anti-
American struggle, to emphasize only the danger of West*
German militarism and ignore the danger of Japanese mili-
tarism, which may lead to a policy of unprincipled compromise
with Japanese militarism instead of fighting against it.

To underestimate the danger of Japanese militarism and
take a negative attitude toward fighting against it, is tanta-
mount to encouraging its aggressive ambitions and strengthen-
ing the position of the United States in Asia. To be sure, there
are certain contradictions in the relations between the United
States and Japan, but since these imperialisms have a common
interest in aggression against Asia, they are closely linked
politically, economically and militarily. To underestimate the
alliance of the Japanese with the United States, to overesti-
mate contradictions between them, is to deviate from the class
principle that must be upheld in strengthening anti-imperial-
ist, anti-American struggles.

At the same time, of course, the contradictions between
Japanese and American imperialism are growing, and if
properly utilized, can aid the struggle for national liberation.

CHAPTER II

Revolutionary Strategy of
Anti-Imperialist, Anti-U.S. Struggle

The peoples of all countries making revolution should tear the

imbs from the U.S. beast and behead it all over the world [Kim II
Sung said] The U.S. imperialists appear to be strong, but when the
peoples of many countries attack them horn all sides and join to

mu l ate them in that way, they will become impotent and bite the
dust in the end . 1

Regarding the basic strategy of the United States and the
present stage of the anti-imperialist, anti-American struggle
Kim II Sung says: ’

For the successful defeat of U.S. imperialism, it is necessary to
understand its world strategy thoroughly.

The basic strategy of U.S. imperialism for world aggression at the
present stage is to destroy by armed force the small and divided
revolutionary socialist countries and newly independent countries
one by one, while refraining from worsening its relations with big
powers and avoiding confrontation with them as far as possible and
to intensify the ideological and political offensive against, and sub-
vert from within, those countries which are weak ideologically and
unwilling to make a revolution, spreading illusions about imperial-
ism among the people clamoring only for unprincipled coexistence
lm P enallsm , a nd a desire to live on good terms with imperial-

On the basis of its world strategy, the United States, while
making large-scale preparations for global or nuclear war has
been committed to the policy of waging “local wars” ’and

281

282

KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION

“special wars” in different areas in the world, including
Vietnam. While bribing unstable elements that are afraid of
revolution, e.g., among labor leaders, and utilizing them as
their agents, the U.S. imperialists actively pursue a cold war
of a new type, promoting sham “liberalization” and “demo-
cratic developments” in certain countries. Under this cover,
they engage in subversive activities, trying to detach newly
independent countries one by one from the anti-imperialist
front. They offer “aid” as a bait and meddle in internal affairs,
seeking to foment counter-revolution by uniting rightist
reactionaries in opposition to the progressive forces. How-
ever, as Kim 11 Sung says, “Like any other imperialism on the
globe, U.S. imperialism, too, is declining steadily and becom-
ing moribund. The intensified aggressive maneuvers of U.Sh
imperialists are not signs of strength but, on the contrary,
prove their vulnerability.” 3

Setbacks in the aggressive war in Vietnam and the bank-
ruptcy of its war policies show that the United States is no
longer a symbol of strength but, on the contrary, a symbol of
weakness; its crisis is deepening in the face of the upsurge of
worldwide anti-imperialist, anti-American revolutionary
struggles. The more the United States holds to its policy of
aggression and war, the stronger will be the counter-attacks
it evokes; the contradictions inherent in its world position will
intensify and precipitate its downfall. It is in its aggressive
Asian policy that the weakness of U.S. imperialism and its
structural crisis are revealed most clearly, especially in
Korea and Vietnam where it most blatantly conducts aggres-
sive war and war provocation.

While the United States has been conducting the unde-
clared war in Vietnam, it has sharpened its antagonisms with
the socialist camp, newly independent countries and other
peace-loving forces of the world. At the same time, it is now
isolated more and more from capitalist countries in Europe,
which are afraid that the escalation of the Vietnam war will

STRATEGY OF ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE

283

have unfavorable political and economic repercussions on
them, and even from its Southeast Asian satellites which are
opposed to the expansion of the war. The isolation of US

S*" If *?**-*: , Pak Chung Hi regime of Sou*
f a ailc ^ u * of colonial dependencies in Asia are the

on y countries that support actively the aggression in Vietnam.

n. , oleov ® r > * e war in Vietnam is deeply dividing the United
States itself. Distrust of government leaders, especially of the
resident ! S spreading rapidly among the American people
over the Vietnam policy. As a result, contradictions between
ruling circles and the people of the United States are growing.
ie escalation of the Vietnam war by reactionary ruling cir-

terv’- he T ] lta T lndUS i rial COmplex ’ and the jingoistic mili-

IcuteTht^L iV i S ° CiaI C ° ntradictions morc and more
Hn r v Sr ° hberatlon movement, in which the opposi-
ion to the \ietnam war and the struggle for civil rights are

S a ;- r C °T g SHaiPer; eCOnomic difficulties and moral
g ation, with a great increase in criminal offenses are
causing deepening social unrest and disaffection.

Practically the entire student body of the country is engaged
in mounting struggle against U.S. aggression in Southeast
Asia and against the militarization of the country. The youth
are in revolt against the military, with large numbers of those
called for service failing to report, or refusing to accept induc-
tion when they do report. Tens of thousands have deserted
and gone into exile.

J he working class is struggling increasingly against the
ie uc ion in its living standards due to soaring wartime prices
an taxes, and against the growing repressive activities of the
government. Millions of workers are going on strik^gainri
the monopolies, and undermining the positions of the pro-
lmpenahst right-wing union leaders.

of die In kne ' SS ; f l h l Umted States is aIso seen in die crisis
of the dollar and of the international monetary system, es-

sen 1a e ements in U.S. imperialism’s aggressive global

284

KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION

strategy. Enormous sums are spent for U.S. overseas military
bases and support of its puppet armies and wars of aggression.
Huge sums of capital are exported to create the basis for bil-
lions of dollars of superprofits in areas where it has military
domination.

Before War II gold was the world currency for inter-
national transactions; regardless of the strength of the United
States, it would have been impossible to obtain enough gold
to sustain world expansion on the scale now required. It was
the Breton Woods agreement, the International Monetary
Fund, that provided the monetary framework for its world-
wide operations after World War II.

Utilizing the IMF, the United States has been able to mobi-
lize the necessary funds for its world strategy by making the
dollar an international currency to take the place of gold.
This international monetary system of the capitalist world,
based on the dollar, was supported by the economic and mili-
tary superiority of the United States, and particularly by the
huge gold reserves which amounted to more than $24 billion.
(In 1948 the United States held about TO per cent of the total
amount of gold in the capitalist world.)

But today, more than 20 years after the end of World War
II, the gold reserves of the United States have been re-
duced to about $12 billion, which is less than one-third of the
$40 billion overseas liabilities of the United States. This in-
dicates the real state of the dollar crisis and threatens a virtual
downfall of the IMF, established on the basis of the dollar.

The seriousness of the crisis is shown further by the U.S.
balance of trade, which had been favorable and made up for
the deficit in the international balance of payments, but
which has now deteriorated to the point that, on a month by
month basis, it is now in the red for about half the year. The
deficit in the U.S. trade balance has now come to assume a
structural character.

A further weakening of the imperialist monetary system

STRATEGY OF ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE

285

was^the forced introduction of the two-tier price system for
gold, major currency devaluations and revaluations, and the
vntual ending of the convertibility of the dollar into gold in
international transactions. Thus, the dollar crisis has sharp-
ened further the conflicts among the capitalist powers- the
sharp demand of France that the price of gold be raised, clashes
letween b ranee and West Germany over revising parity values
at the time of the crisis of the franc in November 1968, Japan’s

Tfu /T a T? rational redistribution of monetary gold,
and the failure of the United States to exercise its influence in
the settlement of the crisis of international currencies.

ie c irect cause of the dollar crisis was the outflow of gold
rom the United States and a consequent sharp decline in the
amount of its gold holdings, kicked off by the growing deficit
in the U.S. international balance of payments. Mainly respon-
sible was the large deficit in capital transactions, due par-
ticularly to overseas military spending and military and
economic aid and export of private monopoly capital. In
othei words, the dollar crisis is caused basically by U.S.
imperialism’s policy of war and plunder which, in turn
accelerates inflation in the U.S. economy and is indirectly

responsible for the decline in its competitive position and its
trade balance.

When did the dollar crisis emerge and what made it break
into the open. This is an important question, relating to the
turning point in world history when the disintegration of
L.J). imperialism was indicated clearly.

The dollar crisis began during the Korean War. This was
the first step of U.S. imperialism on the road to its downfall
not only politically and militarily but also economically. It
was in 1 050, the year of the outbreak of the Korean War, that
t ie international balance of payments of the United States
changed from surplus to deficit and its gold reserves began to

Wo C Id W H TT g °i M r6S T eS had continued to nse, even after
Woild War II; but at the end of 1950, they sank from $24.6

286

KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION

billion to $22.8 billion, a decrease of $1.8 billion that year.
With some fluctuations, this decline continued, falling to a
low of $10.4 billion in May 1968. Thus, the struggle of the
Korean people in the Fatherland Liberation War shook the
imperialists and started them on their downward course.

Although the United States developed its world strategy,
relying on the dollar, the very development of this strategy
led to the disintegration of the dollar and accelerated the bank-
ruptcy of the world strategy itself. Furthermore, if we analyze
relations among the capitalist powers, we find that the dollar
crisis has led to the relatively strengthened position of West
Germany, France, Italy and Japan. It also has revealed the
sharpening antagonisms among the imperialist powers, ip
connection with the crisis of the dollar, the pound, the franc
and the gold crisis that raged throughout Europe. But, as Kim
II Sung warns:

We must neither underestimate nor overestimate the strength of
the United States. U.S. imperialism can still commit many more
crimes.

But U.S. imperialism is on the decline. Today when the U.S. is
acting most outrageously, its weakness is revealed more clearly than
ever before. The Korean people are aware what U.S. imperialism is.
Our people have had experience fighting the U.S. and have defended
their motherland from its aggression. The Korean War revealed that
U.S. imperialism is by no means invulnerable, but can be beaten in
fighting. The triumph of the Cuban revolution proved this truth
again under circumstances different from ours. The Vietnamese
people's resistance war of national salvation, too, clearly confirms
this truth. U.S. imperialism is doomed to complete destruction . 4

For all the peoples of the world to develop a powerful strug-
gle against the world strategy of U.S. imperialism, it is neces-
sary for all anti-imperialist forces to unite for maximum
strength. However, the actual situation falls short of this goal.
There are right opportunist forces attempting to obtain “fa-
vors” by making concessions to U.S. imperialism. And there

STRATEGY OF ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE

287

are extreme leftist adventurists who actually abandon the
struggle, while paying lip service to anti-imperialism.

It is important to overcome these obstacles, and especially
o es a is principled unity in the world communist move-
ment. However, peoples oppressed by U.S. imperialism can-
not wait for all problems to be solved before combatting their
enemy. Moreover, small countries pitted against U.S. impe-
rialism can achieve much by rendering mutual assistance and
combining their forces in joint struggle.

This can create favorable conditions for overcoming dif-
erences in the international communist movement and for
accelemting development of an anti-U.S. imperialist united
front ol the peoples of the world. Even if there are differences
among fiaternal parties, no party is in a position to evade joint

s^hdifeeLer 88 l ° drfeat US ' ‘ mPeiiaIiSm ° f

The world anti-imperialist forces are extremely diverse and
include political parties and organizations in different social
and political systems and individuals with diverse political
and religious beliefs. Nevertheless, regardless of composition
the ant, -imperialist forces share the common objective of
destroying American and world imperialism.

The revolutionary struggles of the peoples of European and
other highly industrialized capitalist countries are closely
connected with those of the newly independent countries of
Asia Africa, and Latin America. The national liberation move-
ments are particularly active in this period. Kim 11 Sung says:

The invariable policy pursued by the Democratic People’s Repub-
bc of Korea in international relations is to cement the unity and co-

onTwdb T T deVdOP fdendly and co °Perative rela-

tions with newly independent states in Asia, Africa and Latin Amer-

■c^ and render acbve support and encouragement to the peoples of

sc aieas in t leir liberation struggles against imperialism and to

the peoples of all countries in their revolutionary struggle. We re-

ffat end * “ internationalist d "ty to do so and to spare no efforts to

288

KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION

The Workers Party of Korea and the government of the
Republic have tried consistently to strengthen the unity and
cohesion of the socialist camp, to support and encouiage, and
increase solidarity with, the revolutionary peoples of the
world. This correct policy contributes greatly to the accelera-
tion of the Korean revolution.

The Party and the DPRK government are making every
effort to strengthen the unity and cohesion of the socialist
camp and consolidate internationalist friendship and unity
with the peoples of the socialist countries. They support es-
pecially the just, heroic struggles of the Vietnamese people
against aggression by the United States, and the heroic strug-
gle of the Cuban people.

At the same time, they develop cooperative relations with
newly independent countries of Asia, Africa and Latin
America and render active support to their struggles against
imperialism and colonialism, for national independence and
prosperity. They support fully the Laotian and Cambodian
peoples in their fight to preserve their independence against
U.S. intervention.

The revolutionary struggles of the people of Asia, Africa and
Latin America are interrelated. When Latin America suffers
under the yoke of imperialism, the peoples of Asia and Africa
cannot possibly live in peace, and if the United States is de-
feated decisively in Asia and Africa, a favorable phase will be
opened for the national liberation movement of the Latin
America peoples.

The Party and the government of the Republic w’ill make
efforts in the future, too, to strengthen and develop militant
solidarity with the revolutionary peoples of the world. The
consistent policy of support for peoples making revolutions
and of cementing solidarity with them is based on a strong
sense of responsibility to the world revolution and on the firm
determination to advance revolutionary str\’"gles until im-
perialism is completely wiped off the earth.

strategy of anti-imperialist struggle

289

oppression and 2 ( c °untnes against exploitation and

u i j- . . , deavor to strengthen solidarity with them

Mdmg h.gh the banner of proletarian internationalism

II S f f 88 C ° f the Korean P e °P'». led by Premie, Kim

1 Song, for peace and democracy, for national independence

surely triumph, and the down-'

CHAPTER III

Kim II Sung on Ultimate
Victory of World Revolution

The International Conference on the Tasks of Journalists
of the Whole World in Their Fight against the Aggression of
U.S. Imperialism was held in Pyongyang, the "capital of the
DPRK, from September 18 to 24, 1969. The conference was
attended by 1 14 delegates from 90 countries, and representa-
tives of 13 international democratic organizations, 221 in all.
This was the first international press conference held under
the banner of opposing the aggression of U.S. imperialism.

The meeting of representatives of the world’s progressive
press to discuss their common struggle against the United
States and its intensified aggression was a great event in the
annals of the anti-imperialist struggle of the journalists.

In his speech at the conference, Kim 11 Sung clarified the
tasks facing all the peoples of the world. He analyzed con-
temporary imperialism, particularly that of the United States,
and the historical position of contemporary imperialism in the
phase of decline.

Kim 11 Sung made clear the position and role of the national
liberation movements of Asia, Africa and Latin America in the
revolutionary movements of the world, and the need to
strengthen the militant unity and solidarity of all the revolu-
tionary peoples, the need mutually to support and assist each
other. Further, he outlined the position and role of the social-
ist countries in strengthening and developing the world rev-
olution and anti-U.S. imperialist struggles, and the need to
strengthen unity and solidarity among themselves.

290

ON ULTIMATE VICTORY

291

1. HISTORICAL POSITION OF
CONTEMPORARY IMPERIALISM

20*'LXvT h ° f "“Jr*’* «*• " ,e la “« half of the
Uth centuiy, is basic in defining the line and policy of the

ild revolution in general, including the strategy in the

the q U eXr t ofT ri f i!m ' 'T 0 **" 5 ’ WA im e eriali sm; and
question °f developing the international communist

of~ d is r point in

f if ™ ". Sun8 “ ade a Uarxist-Leninist assessment of our era
wIm.I'T 8 tW co " tra dictions, tho balance offerees in the’
world, the basic trends, tho decisive factors in the develop

Regarding 1 th/ ISt | 0iy °/ mankl ” d ’ and various other factors.

Prefer Kim , ™ C,ens % <*»«”<» of the present time,
remie, Kim II Sung says: “Today we are living in a glorious'

age of revolutionary change when the colonial system of

age whenThe nT^m b<,y °" d " eCOVe,y ' in a grand historic
age when the national liberation revolution of the oppressed

peoples is gaining great victories.”' PP

In our era irresistible tides of world revolution are rising
ppiessed peoples and nations are struggling for liberation’

fact oTthe Tl a r ld C ;° l0nialiSm Wdl be swe Pt from the sur-
ar ^, f , He ear . th - In the international arena, sharp struggles

revolutin° Pingb ^ Ween SOcialism and capitalism and between
evo utionaiy and counter-revolutionary forces, in which the
revolutionary forces are scoring great victories.

Indeed the ultimate victory of the world revolution is on
the W Clia —cs of the latter

rhe ultimate victory of world revolution and the downfall of
modern imperialism is a realistic prospect for our era, as shown
y le development of the forces of socialism, of the labor

292

KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION

and democratic movements, and particularly by the rapid
development of national liberation struggles. In defining the
characteristics of the present age Kim II Sung attaches im-
portance to the collapse of colonialism and the great upsurge
of national liberation struggles:

In the world arena, along with the revolutionary struggles of the
people in socialist countries, the liberation struggles of the people in
colonial and dependent countries are forging ahead vigorously.
Today, in vast areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America, mighty flood-
tides of national liberation revolutionary movements are surging with
an irresistible force, and great revolutionary storms are sweeping
across the continents, wiping out imperialism and colonialism. Hun-
dreds of millions of people in these areas, oppressed and plundered
by imperialism for centuries, have thrown off the cursed yoke of
colonialism and have risen proudly to emerge in the new arena of
history as heroes; they are achieving brilliant victories in tearing
down the old system of imperialism and colonialism and carving out
a new life. The peoples of the countries still groaning under the
colonial yoke of imperialism heroically are taking up arms against
the aggressive forces of foreign imperialism. Under the powerful
impact of the national liberation movement, the chains of colonial
slavery are falling apart everywhere, and the colonial system of
imperialism, which has spelled so much misery and suffering for
humanity, is crumbling to dust. There no longer exists any “safe
rear' or “quiet backyard” for the imperialists, and imperialism is
breathing its last . 2

The struggles of Asian, African and Latin American peo-
ples against imperialism and colonialism together with the
struggles of the international working class for socialism, are
the two main revolutionary forces of our era. Such tremendous
forces have never before been mobilized against imperialism,
nor has the struggle ever been as strong as it is now.

At the same time, the revolutionary struggles of the pro-
letariat in capitalist countries against oppression and exploita-
tion and for good living conditions and democratic freedoms
are also being developed vigorously. Political and economic

ON ULTIMATE VICTORY

293

the progress of mankind Th^ i n6W force which advances

okiLei i h r: m ? bc "r merabie »d

' > e running amuck in an attempt to check the sum' 11
fon struggles, it is only the death-bed rattle f U, * llW

demned to destruction The f ? ° f those who are con-

act, the more difficult their posTifberom^'u S^fn

going downhill and , confront wlth “

of it will

Ais question. Kin, H Su ” , 1 ,^° Regarding

£ u , V" —

SpeteXm 8 to itS OM P °?° nS - ****** *■ - Zl

aesperate efforts to recover its lost foothold and is tryinc to
fmd a way out in aggression and war to save itself from doom «

actTv^V nit6d Stat f S iS intensif y in S aggressive and subversive
tmties against the socialist countries. It is committed to at-
tacking small and divided countries such as Vietnam Korea
Cuba and the German Democratic Republic, one by one. As

Asii ° *] r Stlategy ’ creates dangerous hotbeds of war in
and Europe by remilitarizing Japan and West Germany.

294

KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION

While paying lipservice to the “independence” and “free-
dom” of peoples, the imperialists are actually set on main-
taining their colonial rule by cunning and nefarious means,
and are trying to bind the peoples of newly independent na-
tions with the fetters of neo-colonialism.

We should pay particular attention to the nature and con-
crete aspects of neo-colonialism, a fonp of dependency em-
ployed especially by the United States to deceive the people
and to maintain and expand its domination, under conditions
where peoples of colonial and dependent countries are
awakened and join in the great upsurge of struggle for national
liberation. In such circumstances, the old forms of colonialism
based on direct political rule can no longer be maintained.

The imperialists bribe the reactionary oligarchy, and top
military or tribal chieftains, bringing together right-wing
groups to maintain the essence of colonial enslavement.
Whenever the puppets they install become even slightly un-
cooperative in fulfilling the colonial policy, they hatch a
reactionary military coup and establish a military fascist dic-
tatorship, sometimes carrying out open military interventions.
These machinations are intended to swerve the newly inde-
pendent countries to the right and make it impossible for them
to emerge from their colonial or semi-colonial status.

The policy of dominating economically the newly develop-
ing countries is one of the most important features of neo-
colonialism. The U.S. imperialists, utilizing “foreign aid” as
an important instrument for overseas expansion, pave the way
for greater investments of monopoly capital. The imperialists
control the economic arteries of not a few countries of the
world by exporting large sums of capital and by obtaining
vested colonial-type interests. Through “economic aid,” they
not only place obstacles in the way of the development of
independent national economies but also meddle in the in-
ternal affairs of developing countries, rendering their political
independence ineffective and nominal. Side by side with

ON ULTIMATE VICTORY

295

blackmail and peaceful infiltration, oppression and appease
men t, political subversion and ideological-cultural infiltration.

viously the road to the ultimate victory of the world
evolution is by no means a smooth peaceful transition It will

££ "Z t°t ^ tlW 6ni " g »f world revolti™"

reaedoii * S1 ™ Struggle against lh « citadel of world

2. THEORY OF THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST
ANTI-U.S. UNITED FRONT

Pyongyang?"^ “ "' e j ° Urn,>liStS “* the '™ rid oonference in

th^ar^ofon* aSPeC J 0i tHe Struggle is t0 establish clearly
the airay of opposing forces. Imperialism, its puppet regimes

and subservient countries constitute the counter-revolution

liberation'' lib S °° ia ' iSt COU "'"c< a ” d «>* national'

on, labor and democratic movements constitute the
forces for world revolution in our era. the

in^VTri'Jn" 0 ^ l '? VOlu,i ° n have a " 'Entity of interests
• uggle against imperialism, and they assist one

296

KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION

another in the struggle. However, the various revolutionary
forces do not have an identical role in the development of the
world revolution. Regarding the role and tasks to be fulfilled
by the socialist camp in organizing forces for world revolu-
tion, Kim 11 Sung states:

In this the peoples of the socialist countries, before anyone else,
should play a leading role. The peoples of the socialist countries
should not only expedite the building of socialism and communism
vigorously in their own countries, exercising vigilance to smash the
subversive activities and sabotage of the imperialists and the rem-
nants of the deposed exploiting classes, but also should regard it as
their internationalist duty to render active support to the national
liberation movement, proceeding from the Marxist-Leninist sense of
revolutionary ethics. The socialist countries, as bases of the world
revolution, should resolutely oppose the war policy and colonial
predatory policy of the imperialists, and energetically assist the op-
pressed nations in all their revolutionary struggles. This will strength-
en the allied forces of the socialist countries and the international
working class, and is the way to hasten the victory in the anti-im-
perialist revolutionary struggle. 6

The socialist camp is the most powerful base and the most
important and decisive of all the anti-imperialist, anti-U.S.
forces promoting world revolution. The forces of the socialist
camp comprise the total political, economic, military and other
potentials of the countries within it, and represent a class
alliance of the states of proletarian dictatorship; it is decisive
in determining the historical development of mankind, in
accelerating the world revolution. The existence and the
strength of the socialist camp, encourage the revolutionary
struggles of the people of the world — inspiring the peoples of
colonial and dependent countries in their liberation struggles,
and creating favorable conditions for and influencing the
struggles of the working class in capitalist countries. Conse-
quently, the socialist camp is the most powerful of all forces
for world revolution.

ON ULTIMATE VICTORY

297

Concerning the struggles of the working class in capitalist
countnes, Kim 11 Sung says: “Together with the peoples of the

s'honW TTZ thS WOrkingclass in the capitalist countries
should also fight more vigorously against imperialism and

ere J > S lve strong support and encouragement to the libera-
tion movement of the oppressed nations.” 7

In the capitalist countries, the working class opposes ex-
ploitation and oppression through the trade unions, and seeks
to achieve its class emancipation. Today, labor movements
n most countries tend toward communism. Militant labor
movements can weaken imperialism and thereby deal a blow
to world aggression and also create conditions favorable to the
national liberation movements. The working class of sover-
eign capitalist states and oppressed nations have common in-
terests in fighting monopoly capital. Therefore the imperia-
ls s mu er eiy effort to estrange the working class of the de-
veloped capitalist countries from the colonial and dependent
peoples in order to increase their plunder and exploitation.
They foster racism and national chauvinism and subvert the
militant ranks of the working class by bribing the labor aris-

coIon°ies Wlth “ P ° rti ° n ^ *** superprofits ‘hey gain in the

Regarding the position and role of the national liberation
movement and its militant tasks, Kim II Sung says:

Colonies are the lifeline of the imperialists, their last stronghold

no 'mT 13 1StS W u n0t giVe UP their colonies of their own accord
nor will they g.ve them independence. The peoples of colonial coun-

, ? U f amte their ^rength and wage a resolute and do-or-die
?nlp g endence7 ^ imperiaIiStS a " d Wi " complete ^edom and

The anti-imperialist national liberation movement to-
gether with the struggle of the international working class for
socialism and communism, constitute the two great revolu-
lonary forces of our era. The national liberation movement in

298

KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION

its revolutionary struggle to cut the lifeline of the imperial-
ists can contribute to the development of an overall world
revolution by rapidly weakening the imperialist forces, ac-
celerating their downfall and safeguarding world peace.

Asia, Africa and Latin America account for 71 per cent of the
earth’s total land area and more than two-thirds of the total
population. These continents have tremendous resources. Im-
perialism has fattened on the sweat and blood of their peoples
and plundered their resources. Even today, imperialism rakes
in profits amounting to billions of dollars annuallly from these
areas. If colonialism, old and new, is wiped out in Asia, Africa
and Latin America, a vital basis of imperialism will be de-
stroyed.

Kim 11 Sung says: “The newly independent countries that
have thrown off the yoke of imperialism are confronted with
the weighty task of safeguarding their national independence,
carrying forward the revolution and assisting the liberation
struggle of the peoples of the countries still in imperialist
fetters.” 9 He points out that peoples who have won inde-
pendence are faced with the task of abrogating all shackling
treaties, agreements and military alliances concluded with the
imperialists, liquidating the political and economic footholds
which they and their domestic reactionary accomplices rely
on for subversion, and rallying forces to effect a revolutionary
society.

On the role of the democratic movement in the mustering of
forces for world revolution, Kim 11 Sung states:

Today, the international democratic movement and the peace
movement hold a very important place in the common anti-imperial-
ist, anti-U.S. front. These movements unite hundreds of millions of
working people and progressives in the world. AJ1 peace-loving peo-
ple of the whole world must fight more stubbornly for a lasting peace
and a bright future for mankind and for checking and frustrating the
imperialist policy of aggression and war. 10

The democratic movement is not directed specifically to-
ward socialism, but it is one of the forces of anti-imperialist

ON ULTIMATE VICTORY

299

struggle It fights to win democratic freedoms and rights to
oppose fascist oppression. Today, all international democratic

!£££ Ta ~ n T res ‘ in ,he

i ipeiiansm, and U.S. imperialism in particular As Kim T 1
Sung says: "When all of the worid’s'evoludo^fo”"
igoiously wage an anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. struggle on
every front they hold, imperialism will he wiped out for good
and the peopJes of all countries will come to achieve genuine

.hi' ,ha, ' t hl ePenden r and S ° Cial »">*"»>•”" « « to preveM
these forces. m ’ Pe ' la IStS are cng ‘ igt ' d ln maneuvers to split

Today, differences within the international communist
novement are obstructing internal unity. An anti-imperialist
anti-U.S. united front formed as quickly as possible can foil
maneuvers to split the ranks of the international communist
movement, overcome “left” and right opportunism and
achieve unity of the international communist movement thus
accelerating the world revolution.

Joint action is necessary not only to accelerate the world

rTef A^toTvt ° t0 d T l0P ieVOlUti0nS in indK ' idual — -

• A victory on one front against the United States will
cl'dr S,r T h ° f U S ' imp “ ialism “ d -«1 create fa vor-

pe S ^ ^ T °' her fr0nf5 ' T ° dag ' a "

™l f V U ' S ; United front on an international scale is

eahsbc because the United States is reaching out its tentacles

o a countries, large and small, which consequently have a
common interest in opposing U.S. intervention On the revo^
lutionary principle and concrete method for realizing an anti-
lmperiahst, anti-U.S. united front, Kim II Sung says:

It is necessary for us to bring together all the forces opposed to ini

stmntTlt X CV6l0P toggles withT., u^iS

strength. It is a basic principle for the strategy and tactics of the Com
mumsts today to bring together as many lies as ptsibleXen'f

istfront to frolate ' if Str ° ng forces > and expand the anti-imperial-
it jointly. 12 ' ' lmpenallsm as mu ch as possible, and to attack

300

KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION

A revolution is carried out by broad sections of the masses.
Consequently, the greater the forces, the more successful the
revolution will be. People with many different ideas are op-
posed to imperialism — those who fight actively against im-
pel ialism, and others who are forced to join the struggles un-
der mass pressure in their own countries and from the peoples
of the world. Whatever their motivations, all forces, even
weak ones, should be united, as long as they are not agents
of imperialism. Kim 11 Sung explains: “In realizing joint
action, the Communists must stick to the principle of achiev-
ing unity through struggle and conducting struggles through
unity.” 13

It is impermissible to make unprincipled compromise with
any forces for the sake of unity to effect joint action or a united
front. In launching a joint struggle, wavering and inactive ele-
ments should be criticized to help them overcome negative
tendencies and to support and develop their anti-imperialist
leanings. It is also necessary to approach those who avoid or
take a negative attitude toward anti-imperialist struggle and
convince them. Today, it is most important to strengthen as-
istance to the Vietnamese people in their struggle against
U S. aggression. Only through practical actions can inactive
forces be awakened and led gradually into more positive in-
volvement.

Kim 11 Sung says: Even small countries can defeat a big

enemy, once they establish Juche, unite the masses of the
people and valiantly rise in battle despite sacrifice.” 14

To establish Juche is a fundamental requirement of a revolu-
tionary struggle. No one can write prescriptions for revolu-
tions in other countries, nor can he carry out a revolution for
other counti ies. The Party and the people of each country are
responsible lor their revolution. Needless to say, however,
revolutionary struggles in each country are a component part
of the world revolution and are closely related to those in
other countries. Consequently, international unity and mili-

ON ULTIMATE VICTORY

301

fcrces arc

gainsTutvictory^deDend.f c o ns olidating revolutionary
“nd revolutionary struggles PKpmUM

m (.ghting against foreign aggressors"^ ' tmggieS> “ wel1 “
Kim II Sung says further:

States. HistorVXarlyThow^thatb* 081 'll Usion about the United
United States and advocating • spieadln 8 illusions about the

only lead to dulling the revo1u3r CiP ^ C ° mpr ° mise with « will
ing ti ie , t o • g C Ievolu t'onary vigilance of the people mak-

and outrageous, ^and * will ^ inS ‘ >len, ' l ’ i * W “ nded

and war. 15 encouiage their maneuvers of aggression

inventing s^h te s^hiT^” a ! 1SI «- a,,e t0 whitewash it by

«o„r™n^S;TwhXa‘ Sm , iS *. SyS,em ° f ' *-<»

out in militarization of the economy tb TCmg * t0 S6ek 3 Way
overseas expansion and wars /■’ e arms race > aggressive
fascism. WarS> and ln the attemp t to establish

longer L U irapl S in'“ '°,r ’’“T i,S na,ure ' « »°uld no

302

KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION

to fight U.S. imperialism it is necessary to take a firm class
stand, to cast off all illusions, and to fight. To fight, it is neces-
sary not to overestimate the strength of U.S. imperialism and
not to be afraid to oppose it. As Kim II Sung says, we should
neither overestimate nor underestimate the United States.
Like other imperialisms, it is already going downhill.

• ^n^ ay ’ United States is carrying on aggression and war
m all parts of the world. This is not an indication of strength
but of the fact that it is in a more difficult position. If one loses
sight of this, it can lead to yielding to U.S. imperialism.

The historical mission of the working class is to eliminate
exploitation on a worldwide scale and to construct socialism
and communism, the highest ideal of mankind. The world
revolution is the struggle of the international working class to
realize its historical mission.

Since subjective and objective conditions for the revolution
do not ripen simultaneously in different countries, the ulti-
mate victory of the world revolution is achieved through so-
cialist triumphs in individual countries and through the gradu-
al expansion and strengthening of the socialist camp. Kim II
Sung formulates the law of development of the world’s revo-
lutionary movement as follows:

As the forces of capital are international, so the liberation struggle
o t le peoples is an international movement. The revolutionary
movements in individual countries are national movements, and
constitute a part of the world revolution at the same time. The revo-
lutionary struggles of peoples in all countries support and comple-
ment each other, and unite in one stream of world revolution Vic-
torious revolutionary forces should assist the revolutions of those
countries which are not yet triumphant, using their experiences and
examples. They should give active support to the liberation struggle
of the world’s peoples, -with their political, economic and military
power. At the same time, people in the countries which have not yet
won the revolution should struggle more actively to defend the
victorious revolutions of other countries against the imperialist
policy of strangulation and hasten victory for their own revolutions.

ON ULTIMATE VICTORY

303

revolu.,„„ and construction in its own J un ^ ToTtohf j

rr 0 " Id* C T P ‘ e,e a “°' d “"''I- *. law oC, lev' op
ment of the world revolutionary movement and also is to he
faithful to proletarian internationalism

I he ultimate victory of the revolution in individual coun
es is impossible apart from the victory of the world revolu

tin: « e ^ M r olutton 1 d «-iopet d h r :™t

countries. evolutionary ^nation in individual

■ I,, 1 " to accelerate the victory of the world revolution

he working class of the countries which have achieved rev”-’
u ion and the working class of the countries that have not yet

"r:t7u«or‘ St “° h ° lher “ nd j0i " « «** cuJn,

Today imperialism is going downhill, toward final coliaDsc
Z' WOr dWide t S , Cale ' °" " ,e “*<■•"*> »f world revolution’ is

Prender Kim’lfsung^ay^f ng “ d

f

Reference Notes

PART ONE

CHAPTER I

ihrR im 11 S ?r g ’ T ! ie Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Is
the Banner of Freedom and Independence for Our People and a

z e ti sr ” sccia,,sm zti

.her. The DIRK), Japanese Edition, Foreign Languages PnhlKl,-
House, Pyongyang, 1968, p. 3 . § Publ.sh.ng

2. The DPRK, p. 6.

3. Ibid , p. 6.

4. Ibid, p. 6.

5. Kim II Sung, Selected Works, (hereafter. Works ) Fnelish

TZt FOre ' S " L ” 8l “ 8 “ P "“ Sh '"<= »«“«■

6. Works, Vol. 11 , pp . 560-70.

7. The DPRK, p. 13.

PmtZTv’ K0 T" editi ° n> VoL Polishing House of Workers’
Party of Korea, Pyongyang, 1968, pp. 40-41.

9. The DPRK, p. 22

mi COlhC,ei Wn ’ tS - E "‘ Ush '’o'- Mos-

fl. The DPRK, p. 25.

12 . Works, Korean edition, vol. II, p. 104 .

13. W’orks, vol. II, p. 516.

14. The DPRK, p. 2 .

15. Works, Korean edition, vol. II, p. 177

Pain- of? 4 ’ K p ean editi ° n ’ V ° L IV ’ Publishi "g House of Workers’
Pait> of Korea, Pyongyang, 1968, p. 354.

CHAPTER II

r \ Kl , m ^ Sun 8. On the Question of the Transitional Period from
pi a ism to Socialism and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat

307

MODERN KOREA

(hereafter, On the Question ), Korean edition, Publishing House of
Workers’ Party of Korea, Pyongyang, 1969, p. 1.

2. Ibid, p. 11.

3. Works , Korean edition, vol. 1, Publishing House of Workers’
Party of Korea, Pyongyang, 1967, p. 501.

4. On the Question, pp. 13-14.

5. Works, Korean edition, vol. II, p. 257.

6. On the Question, pp. 10-11.

7. The DPRK, p. 41.

8. On the Question, p. 41.

9. The DPRK, p. 38.

10. On the Question, p. 14.

11. Ibid, p. 14.

12. The DPRK, p. 47.

13. On the Question , p. 16.

14. The DPRK, p. 47.

15. On the Question, p. 9.

16. The DPRK, p. 36.

17. Ibid, pp. 41-42.

18. Ibid, p. 50.

19. Ibid, p. 43.

20. Ibid, pp. 55-56.

21. Ibid, p. 56.

22. Ibid, p. 62.

CHAPTER III

1. The DPRK, p. 33.

2. Works, vol. II, pp. 47-48.

3. Ibid, pp. 582-83.

4. Ibid, p. 56.

5. Ibid, p. 73.

6. Ibid, p. 376.

7. Kim II Sung, Let Us More Thoroughly Embody the Revolution-
ary Spirit of Independence, Self-Sustenance and Self-Defense in All
Fields of State Activity (hereafter, Let Us) Japanese edition, Foreign
Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, 1967, p. 48.

8. Works, vol. II, p. 376.

9. Ibid, p. 380.

REFERENCE NOTES

309

10. Works, vol. II, p. 381.

11. Works, Korean edition, vol. IV, p. 252.

12. Works, English edition, vol. II, p. 377.

13. Kim II Sung, “Victory of the Socialist Co-operation of Agri-
cukure and the Future Development of Agriculture in Our Coun-
try, Works, English edition, vol. I, p. 456.

14. W'orks, vol. II, p. 395.

15. Ibid, pp. 399-400.

16. W'orks, Korean edition, vol. II, p. 243.

17. W'orks, Korean edition, vol. IV 7 , p. 249

18. Ibid, p. 255.

19. W'orks, English edition, vol. II, p. 547

20. Ibid, pp. 545-46.

21. Ibid, pp. 169-70.

22. Ibid, p. 164.

CHAPTER IV

1. Kim II Sung, On Some Theoretical Problems of Socialist Econ-
omy (hereafter, On Some), Korean edition, Central Standing Com-
1969° ° f 3 General Association Korean Residents in Japan, Tokyo,

2. On Some, p. 2.

3. Ibid, p. 3.

4. Ibid, p. 3.

5. Ibid, pp. 3-4.

6. Ibid, p. 8.

7. Ibid, p. 5.

8. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

9. Ibid , p. 13.

10. Ibid, p. 11.

11. Ibid, p. 12.

12. Ibid, p. 14.

13. Ibid, p. 15.

14. Ibid, p. 18.

15. Ibid, p. 21.

16. Ibid, p. 25.

17. Ibid, p. 31.

18. Works, Vol. IV, p. 255.

310

MODERN KOREA

PART TWO

CHAPTER I

1. The DPRK, pp. 71-72.

2. The DPRK, pp. 72-73.

3. Kim II Sung, The Present Situation and the Tasks of Our Partu
(hereafter The Present Situation), English edition, Foreign Lan-
guages Publishing House, Pyongyang, 1968, p. 104.

4. Works, English edition, vol. II, p. 549

5. The DPRK, p. 73.

6. Ibid., pp. 75-76.

CHAPTER II

1. The DPRK, p. 76.

2. Ibid, p. 42.

3. r lhe Present Situation, p. 104.

4. Works, Korean edition, vol. IV, p. 98.

5. Ibid, pp. 91-92.

6. Ibid, pp. 92-93.

7. The DPRK, pp. 76-77.

8. Works, English edition, vol. II, pp. 552-54.

CHAPTER III

1. The DPRK, p. 81.

2. Kim II Sung, Answers to the Questions Raised by the Delega-
tion of the Democratic Youth League of Finland for the “Kansan
L utiset, Central Organ of the Communist Party of Finland, Fo-
leign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, 1969, pp. 17-18

3. Works, English edition, vol. II, p. 355

4. Ibid, p. 355.

5. The DPRK, p. 82.

6. The DPRK, pp. 65-66.

7. The DPRK, p. 83.

8. Works, Korean edition, vol. IV, p. 81.

9. Ibid, p. 81.

10. Works, English edition, vol. II, p. 510.

CHAPTER IV

1. Works, English edition, vol. II, p. 554.

REFERENCE NOTES

311

2. Ibid, p. 555.

3. Ibid, p. 556.

4. The DPRK, p. 78.

5. Ibid, p. 78.

6. Works, English edition, vol. II, PP . 557-58.
'• 11 te Present Situation, p. 110.

8. Ibid, pp. 110-11.

9. Ibid, p. 111.

10. Ibid, p. 114.

11. Ibid, pp. 107-08.

12. Works, Korean edition, vol. IV, pn 420-21

13. The DPRK, p. 80.

PART THREE

CHAPTER I

1. The Present Situation, p. 5

2. The DPRK, pp. 63-64.

3. Ibid, p. 66.

4. Ibid, p. 66.

5. The Present Situation, p. 8.

CHAPTER II

1. The DPRK, p. 68.

” S " ng ’ G ;“‘ ^ti-ImpertaUs, R eeolutionary Cause of

•tTr

"TtTdprkZ Py ° ngyans - «>• ,3 -»-

4 Kim II Sung, Let Us Intensify the Anti-Imperialist Anti n s
Struggle (hereafter. Let Us Intensify), English edition Foreign ut
guages Publishing House, Pyongyang, 1968, p. 10
5. The DPRK, p. 69.

CHAPTER III

rore *" L “-

312

MODERN KOREA

2. Ibid , pp. 2-3.

3. The Great Anti-Imperialist, pp. 19-20.

4. Progressive Journalists, p. 3.

5. Ibid , p. 7.

6. Ibid, p. 7.

7. Ibid, p. 8.

8. Ibid, p. 9.

9. Ibid, p. 9.

10. Ibid, p. 10.

11. Ibid, p. 10.

12. The Present Situation, p. 36.

13. Ibid, p. 38.

14. The Great Anti-Imperialist, p. 18.

15. Progressive Journalists, p. 13.

16. The Great Anti-Imperialist, pp. 5-6.

17. Progressive Journalists, pp. 18-19.

Index

Agriculture

collectivization of, 48-55
in economic plans, 45, 57, 59
management of, 113-18, 135-49
mechanization of, 59-60,
136-37, 141, 142
policy for, 53, 54, 80, 100,
114-18, 137-49
productivity of, 29, 43, 46,

58, 65, 66, 139
South Korean, 193, 211, 212
technological revolution and,
113-14, 136, 140
See also Collective farms; Farm
management committees;
Rt-unit farms

Association for the Restoration of
the Fatherland, 23, 25, 28

Breton Woods Agreement, 284
Buddhist Youth Society, 263, 264

Cadres

anti-Japanese guerrilla, 25, 26
North Korean revolutionary,
31, 33, 40, 115
South Korean revolutionary,
218

technical, 42, 62, 66, 140
United Revolutionary Party,
263

Capitalism

industrial management of,
121-22

overproduction in, 165
production relations of, 162
technology in, 166-67
Central Agricultural Commission,
138, 143, 148
Chang Myon, 248
Chemicalization, 80, 85, 139, 140
Choi Yong Do, 261-62, 266
Chollima Movement, 20, 154-59
Workers Party and, 58-59
Chongsanri method, 112, 113-18,
119, 138, 147, 153, 154
Chung II Kwon, 278
Class struggle, 72-76, 85-88,
89-98, 99

Classless society, 74-76, 77-79,

80, 81, 83, 86, 97
Collective farms, 24, 47, 50-55,
59, 77, 100-101, 135, 140,
147. See also Agriculture;
Ri-unit farms
Commodities

definition of, 175-76
money relations and, 161,
173-74

production of, 72, 77, 173-85
Comprador capitalists

South Korean, 194, 202-203,
204-205, 214-16
in transitional society, 79
Consumer goods, 44, 45, 46, 59,

66, 178

Cuban Missile Crisis, 62
Cultural revolution, 62, 95-101,
136

313

MODERN KOREA

314

Daean Electric Machine Factory,
119, 127, 129-30, 151
Daean work system, 112, 119-34
139, 146, 154, 183
Democratic centralism, 119, 126
134

Democratic Peoples Republic of
Korea (DPRK) see North
Korea

Distribution, 92-93, 102, 118
Dogmatists, 43, 70, 86, 89
Donghak Society, 263

Economic management, 111-58
agricultural, 112, 113-18,
135-49

Chollima movement in, 154-59
democratic centralism in, 119
industrial, 119-35, 140-42
planning and, 149-53
workers’ control and, 129, 130
151

Economic Planning Board, 211
Economy

planning of, 33, 38, 41, 134,
149-53, 164-66
policy for, 124, 149, 150-53
scale of, 162-73
See also Two-Year Plan;
Three-Year Plan; Five-Year
Plan; Seven-Year Plan
Education, see Political Education
Education Enforcement
Ordinance, 257
Electrification, 59, 136, 140
Engels, Frederick, 174

Factory committees, 126-27
Farm management committees,

116, 137, 138-42, 145, 147,
148

Fatherland Liberation War, see

Korean War

Five-Year Plan, 41, 48, 53, 56-60,
158, 170-72

Geneva Conference (1954), 231
Grain production, 45, 65, 147, 148
“Great East- Asia Co-prosperitv
Sphere,” 6, 7

Group management svstem,
146-49, 154

Heavy industry, 41-42, 44 45
46, 65

Hwanghae Steel Works, 155

Ideological revolution, 98-99, 101
Im Jung Sam, 264
Imperialism, 78, 95, 96, 103, 109
historic position of, 291-95
Japanese, 194, 198, 199-201
213, 216, 244

United States, 34-36, 38, 39n,
40, 105-106, 109, 191,

193-95, 246-47, 271-80
Industry

heavy, 41-42, 44-46, 65
light, 41-46, 65-66, 203
management of, 119-35, 140-42
nationalization of, 24, 28
30, 51, 55, 79

need for, 73, 75, 79, 101-103
production of, 33, 45-46,

58-59, 64-65, 92, 158
South Korean, 34, 203
International Monetary Fund, 284
Irrigation, 46, 59, 80, 85, 136^ 141

Japan, 22, 23, 24
aimed struggle against, 22,

25, 26

imperialism of, 194, 198,

199-201, 213, 216, 244

INDEX

315

Korean colonialism of, 5, 55
militarism of, 276-78, 280, 293
Johnson, Lyndon B., 209
Johnson-Sato agreement, 6
Juche, 7, 10-11, 23, 70, 135,

153, 239, 300-301

Kangson Steel Works, 44, 155,

156, 171
Katsura, Taro, 6
Katsura-Taft agreement, 6
Kim Hi San, 264
Kim II Sung

on agrarian policy, 49, 100,

141, 145

on Chollima movement, 157,

159

on Chongsanri movement,
114-15

on class analysis, 73, 74-75,

76

on Daean work system, 125,

127

on the economy, 43, 80, 118,

122, 123-2< 150, 152,

165, 166, 177, 182, 186,

189

on Japan, 199, 216, 276, 280
on political education, 116-17,
134, 155, 264,265
on political power, 71, 92, 287
on proletarian dictatorship,

83, 85, 90, 98, 100
on revolution, 22, 71, 110,

217. 219, 221, 237, 246-47,

292, 296, 299

on socialism, 92, 101, 105,

129, 145

on South Korea, 27, 191, 194,

207.214.215.218.219,

221, 236, 241-42, 244-45,

252, 262

on technology, 61, 80
on United Nations, 234
on United States, 191, 194,
201,217,219,221,271,
273,281,286,299
on Workers Party, 28, 58,

63, 159

Kim Jong Tae, 261,262
Korea, see North Korea; South
Korea; Unification of
Korea

Korean War, 6, 7, 10, 19, 38-41,
223, 231, 245, 273
Chinese troops in, 39
dollar crisis and, 285-86
Soviet Union and, 39
Kt/onghyang Shinmun, 211
Kvongya Society, 263

Labor Dispute Mediation Law,
253

Labor Law, 31
Labor movements, 297
Labor productivity, 33, 45, 133
Labor Relations Law, 255
Labor Standards Law, 253
Land reform

North Korean, 24, 28, 29-30,
48, 49-50, 51, 79
South Korean, 193, 204-206
Law on Equality of the Sexes,

31

Law on Nationalization of
Important Industries, 30
Law of value, 160, 173-85
Leftist deviation, 63, 77, 99
Left opportunists, 27 n, 86, 89-91
98

Lenin, V. I., 53, 87-89, 169, 175
Li Sung Man, see Rhee
gov'emment

MODERN KOREA

316

Light industry, 41, 42, 43, 45,

46, 65-66, 203

Marx, Karl, 86-87

Mass line, 115, 119, 120, 129,

131, 147, 150, 154
Material incentives, 118, 119, 132
Means of production, 45, 46, 59,
92-95, 118, 160, 179-81
Mutual-aid credit associations,
135-36

National Assembly of South
Korea, 231

National Economic Plan (1967)
172

National liberation movements,
24, 290, 296, 297-98
Nationalization, 24, 28, 30, 51,

55, 79

Neo-colonialism, 294-95
New Culture Study Society,
263-64

Nixon-Sato talks, 7
North Korea

economic management in.
112-59

international policy of, 286-88
South Korean revolution and,
216-17, 223, 237
transitional period of, 69-110
Northeast Asian Treaty

Organization (NEATO),

277

Nuclear War, 273, 281-82

October People’s Resistance, 242

Pacific Asian Treaty

Organization (PATO),277
Pak Chung Hi government, 11,

193, 207-208,249, 250-51

Pak Hong Yong, 245, 246
Pearl Harbor, 6
Peasants

alliance with workers, 24, 28,
32, 54, 79, 217, 219, 242,
293

class distinctions and, 74-75,
76, 77, 78, 80, 86, 88
land reform and, 29-30,

51-52, 55, 146-47
markets of, 185-89
as revolutionary class, 217
Russian, 88

South Korean, 193, 204, 205,
212, 256-57

transitional economy and,

185, 186

Peoples’ Army of North Korea,
38-39, 40, 64, 223, 245-46
People’s committees
North Korean, 28, 32-34,
115-16, 135, 137, 140
South Korean, 34, 245-46
Petty bourgeoisie, 73, 74, 76,

77, 85, 96
Political education

Chollima movement and, 154,
156

collectivization and, 145
Daean work system and, 119,
132, 133

group management system and,

importance of, 116-17, 140
Ponghak Society, 264
Popular Uprising (April 1960),
200, 246-48

Pi oduction development rate,
162-73

Production relations
capitalist, 162

Chongsanri method as, 113-18

INDEX

317

Daean work system, 119-35
Proletarian dictatorship, 20,
32-33,37, 38, 69-70, 77
Provincial rural economy
committee, 142-43, 144
Provisional Constitution of
Korea, 35

Provisional People’s Committee
of North Korea, 28, 29,

30, 31-32

Pueblo incident, 67, 172, 209
279

Revisionism, 43, 57, 70, 86, 89
Revolutionary Party for
Reunification, 7
Revolutionary Women’s
Association, 261

Rhee government, 195, 200, 230,
231, 233, 246-48
Ri - unit farms, 114, 115, 135,
137-44

Right deviationists, 63-64, 76,

86

Right opportunists, 27 n, 89,

98, 99

Ro In Yong, 264
ROK-Japan Treaty ( 1965) , 6,
198, 199, 200,210,216,
234,249,250,262,279
ROK-U.S. Administrative
Agreement, 196-97
ROK-U.S. Economic and

Technical Agreement, 196
ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense
Treaty, 196-97
Russo-Japanese War, 6

Sangsan Culture Association, 264
Seven-Year Plan, 10, 60-67,

158, 170, 172
Sexual equality, 28-29

Shin Han Public Corporation, 34
South Korea

agriculture of, 193, 211, 212
army of, 197, 219, 248
culture of, 191, 199, 207
economy of, 194, 196, 197-99
202-203

general strikes in, 229, 230,
242, 254

industry in, 34, 203
Japanese imperialism and,

194, 198, 199-201,2.13,

216, 244

labor groups in, 254-55
land reform in, 193, 204-206
militarization of, 194,

197-98, 203, 204, 209,
248-50, 278

reactionary forces in, 195,
201-202, 208, 228-29
students, 257-58
taxation in, 198, 206, 211
unrest in, 256-61
U.S. imperialism in, 26, 27,

191, 193-212,213,231
economic, 197-99
202-203

military, 197, 198
political, 195-97
workers in, 253-56
South Korean revolution
M arxist-Leninist party in,
217-19

motivating classes in, 213,

217, 220, 236-38, 253-55
North Korea and, 216-17, 223,
237

reactionary classes and 216,

219, 220, 222
Southeast Asian Treaty

Organization (SEATO), 277
Soviet-U.S. Joint Committee,

318

MODERN KOREA

35, 228-29
Stalin, Josef, 175
State Planning Committee,
150-51, 152, 153
Supreme People’s Assembly, 36,
230-31

Taejon Agreement, 197
Taxation

North Korea, 67
South Korea, 198, 206, 211
Three Powers Foreign Ministers
Conference (1945), 228-29
Three- Year Plan, 41, 44-48, 60,
170

Toyo Takushoku Co., Ltd., 34»
Technical revolution
Chongsanri method and, 113
defense and, 63-66
need for, 80, 97-99, 100-101 ,
164, 166-72

Seven-Year Plan and, 60-66
See also Agriculture;

Industry

Tractors, 60,'' 136, 139, 141-42
Transitional society, 69-110,

161

class structure and, 72-83,

85, 88, 89, 91

classless society and, 74-83,

88

description of, 71-82
peasant market and, 185, 186
proletarian dictatorship and,
69-70, 77, 82-86, 89
Socialism in, 91-110
Two-Year Plan, 38

Unification of Korea, 26-27,

35-37, 192, 224-40, 248
United Nations, 225-26, 229,
233-34, 250-51

United States
Asian policy of, 194, 200,

222, 281-83
dollar crisis of, 284-85
imperialism of, 34-36, 38,

39n, 40, 105-106, 109,

191, 193-95, 246-47,

271-80

internal conflicts of, 283
Korean War and, 34, 38, 39 n,
40, 273

war economy of, 272, 273-74
283-84

t World War II and, 271-72
U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), 196
U.S. Economic Development
Agency, 196

U.S. Information Center, 196, 199
L.S. International Development
Agency, 196

L S.-Japan-ROK military alliance,
6, 7

U.S. Military Command, 195, 196
197, 222, 236

United Revolutionary Party,
261-67
cadres of, 263

mass organizations of, 263-65
program of, 262-63
USSR, 24, 88

Vietnam war, 6, 7, 197, 249-50,
278-79, 282-83
Violence (revolutionary), 22,

25, 213-14

Women, equality of, 28-29, 31
Worker-Peasant Alliance
North Korean, 24, 28, 32, 54, 79
South Korean, 217, 219, 242,

293

INDEX

319

Workers Party of North Korea
Chollima movement and, 58-59
collectivization and, 50-51,

53, 126

economic planning and, 33, 41,
48, 60, 62-63, 65
on Korean unification, 224,

226, 239-40
Korean War and, 38
leadership of, 36, 119, 127,

155, 159

mass line of, 135, 227
Workers Party of South Korea,

245

Working class

class distinctions and,

74-75, 76, 78, 80, 86, 88
leadership of, 24, 25, 32, 92, 95

political power and, 20-21,
61-62, 77, 92

production development and,

102

unity of, 99, 107-108
World revolution, 84, 90,

237-38

imperialism and, 272-80,
291-92
Marx on, 87
outlook for, 290-303
socialism and, 103-10
united front for, 224, 298-99
World War II, 6, 27, 35, 39n,
194, 271-72

^ oung Literary Writer’s
Society, 263, 264